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INTRODUCTION:
A REVOLUTION?

On January 4, 1995, as Rep. Richard Gephardt, Democrat of Missouri, handed the
gavel of the House of Representatives to the newly elected Speaker of the House, Rep. Newt
Gingrich, Republican of Georgia, it was clear that a momentous change had occurred in
American politics. For the first time in four decades, Republicans comprised a majority of
the House of Representatives after winning a sweeping victory in the 1994 elections in which
fifty-four seats changed party hands from the Democrats to the Republicans. In fact, not a
single member of the GOP had ever seen a Republican majority, save Congressman Bill
Emerson of Missouri who had been a sixteen year old page during the 83rd Congress in 1954.
Just two years prior, this sea change would have been inconceivable. After twelve
years of Republican presidents, Democratic Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas had captured
the White House. Democrats had held onto control of both houses of Congress yet again.
The Republican Party was fractured; by the thousands, registered Republicans bolted the
party in 1992 to support third party candidates like Ross Perot or just decided to stay at home
on Election Day, disillusioned by a party that they felt no longer represented their interests
and ideas.
Nevertheless, following the 1994 elections, Republicans would control both chambers
of Congress for the next twelve years, instituting policies that departed considerably from the
norms set during four decades of Democratic rule. Undeniably, many of the issues that the
Clinton Administration had introduced—welfare reform, for example—were still on the table,
but after the 104th Congress took office, the emphasis shifted in a decidedly Republican
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direction. Even Democrats recognized this fundamental shift. In his 1996 State of the Union
Address, President Clinton famously declared, ―The era of big government is over,‖ paying
homage to a central theme in the Republican ideology—reducing the size and scope of the
federal government.
The Republicans came to Congress in 1995 intending to consummate a revolution. In
the words of their Contract with America, they meant ―to restore the bonds of trust between
the people and their elected representatives‖ and to end ―government that is too big, too
intrusive, and too easy with the public‘s money.‖ Their success was mixed, and their claim
of a full revolution is overstated, but nevertheless in a sense the Republicans truly shifted the
national debate and revolutionized the way campaigns are run and majorities govern. The
Republican Revolution may just be catchy alliteration, but, as we will see, the Republican
Party was genuinely able to make decisive change in Washington, both good and bad.
The Republicans did not become a majority overnight. Indeed, the story of how the
GOP came to capture their first majority in the House of Representatives in four decades is
certainly not limited to the two years between 1992 and 1994. Rather, the success of the
Republicans would have never been possible without the dramatic transformation that
occurred within the House Republican Party in the 1980s and early 1990s. The party
matured during this era, changing its attitude from passive to active, and adopted a style of
partisan politics aimed at forcibly making themselves a majority. The internal transformation
of the House Republicans was essential to put themselves in a position to win the majority in
1994.
As such, this thesis aims to examine the developments behind the so-called
Republican Revolution of 1994 with specific emphasis on the long-term maturation of the
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Republican Party in the House of Representatives from a passive minority to an ambitious
majority. I have chosen this focus because the House was where almost all of the important
action took place; it was the driving force in campaign strategy and legislative goal setting.
The crowning achievement of the House Republican leadership in these two areas was the
Contract with America. The Contract was a ten point pledge, signed by 367 Republican
Congressional candidates, detailing the actions that the Republicans would take in the first
100 days of the 104th Congress if they won a majority in the 1994 elections. The Contract
included both government reform ideas (e.g. requiring all laws that apply to the rest of the
country apply to Congress and opening committee meetings to the public) as well as major
policy changes (e.g. tort reform, welfare reform, and a balanced budget constitutional
amendment).
There are several historical questions I seek to answer. First, can the events of 1994
and 1995 truly be described as a revolution? It is obvious that 1994 was a significant
political victory, but can the Republican win genuinely be said to have had lasting influence?
Furthermore, I seek to examine several larger questions about the nature of Congress itself.
How did the maturation of the House Republican Party affect majority-minority relations,
partisanship within Congress and congressional campaigns, the nature of congressional
leadership, the balance of power between the White House and the Congress, and are these
lasting changes?
Before beginning our history, however, I will take a moment to briefly sketch several
overarching themes.
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The House as a Majoritarian Institution
The House of Representatives is fundamentally a majoritarian institution. That is to
say that a determined and cohesive majority party can impose its will on the institution as a
whole. The majority party in Congress holds all the power. It organizes the Congress, elects
the speaker, writes the House rules, and determines the organization of the committee system.
Members of the majority are always the subcommittee and the full committee chairmen and
the majority hires three times more committee staff members than the minority. Most
importantly, the majority controls debate in the House. It decides the rules of debate, which
bills come out of committee, which bills receive a vote, which bill may be amended and what
type of amendments may be offered, and places time limits on the debate.
For its part, the minority party has extremely limited power, and can only act in its
own right if it is supported by disaffected majority members. If confronted with a unified
majority, the minority‘s influence completely depends on the whims of the majority.
The tradition in the modern House of strong majority rule dates back to the adoption
of Reed‘s Rules in 1890. Throughout his entire career in the House, whether he was at the
time serving in the majority or minority, Rep. Thomas Brackett Reed (R-ME) advocated for
stronger majority rule, and upon becoming speaker in 1889, pushed through a complete
overhaul of the House rules that significantly curtailed minority power. One of the most
powerful representatives to have ever served as speaker, Reed was once supposedly asked by
a constituent to send him a copy of the House rules, to which the speaker replied by sending
an autographed photo of himself.

A man characterized by his acerbic wit, Reed was

notoriously contemptuous of the minority. Once asked by a Democratic member, ―What is
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the function of the minority?‖ ―The function of the minority, sir,‖ Reed replied, ―is to make
a quorum and to draw its pay.‖
The majoritarian tendencies of the House endure to this day, and in a legislative body
that severely curtails minority power, natural tension exists between the majority and the
minority. As we will see, the House Republicans in the 1980s were able to harness this
tension in an effort to galvanize its members into more activist positions and behaviors.
Furthermore, the strengthening of majority rule by Reed and in the years since enabled the
Republicans, once they gained a majority in the 104th Congress, to act quickly and efficiently
in implementing their Contract with America.

Partisanship in the House
Intricately bound with the majoritarianism of the House of Representatives is the
existence of partisanship.

The relationship is understandably complex.

Although

partisanship does not necessarily follow from majority rule, majority rule provides the
motivation and ability to exert partisan control. For example, if a majority wants to ram
through a bill that the minority does not like, it may do so by taking advantage of the
instruments of majority rule, especially by setting restrictive debate rules that offer no
opportunity to alter a bill (a so-called closed rule). Even in writing legislation, if a majority
decides to exclude the minority from the bill writing process, it can do so since it only takes a
simple majority to report a bill to the House floor.
On the other hand, partisanship becomes an attractive option for the minority, since
often it serves as the only way for minority members to gain attention or influence. Although
minority parties cannot prevail in the long-term over the will of the majority, partisan tactics
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can provide a significant thorn in the side of the majority, and can be very effective in
galvanizing support among minority members to resist the will of the majority for as long as
possible or to make the majority‘s victory a Pyrrhic one.
The 1980s marked a significant increase in partisanship in the House on the part of
the Democratic majority and the Republican minority. As we will see, the Democratic
majority, feeling threatened by Ronald Reagan and defecting Democrats within their own
caucus, increased the use of partisan tactics such as closed rules and other methods to
strengthen their power. On the other hand, a group of backbench Republicans, led by Rep.
Newt Gingrich (R-GA), used raw partisan tactics to polarize the House and transform the
Republican minority into a more confrontational party, an attitude these members believed
would be better suited for winning a majority.
Of course, this increased partisanship in the House brings up the normative question:
is partisanship in and of itself a bad thing or is it a legitimate means to an end? If the latter,
to what end, and does the achievement of this end inhibit other, more beneficial ones?

The Party Leadership and the Committee System
The House is organized into about two dozen committees, where the typical work of
writing and shaping legislation is done.

Each committee is divided into several

subcommittees and a member of the majority party chairs each full and subcommittee.
Chairmanships are normally assigned by seniority.

Once legislation is reported out of

committee, it goes to the Rules Committee to decide what rules of debate the full House will
use in considering the legislation. The ratio of members of the majority and minority party
within the committees will generally match the ratio in the full House, with one exception;
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the Rules Committee, since it is imperative for the majority party to impose the rule it wants,
usually holds a 2 to 1 ratio of seats for the majority.
The committee system is complemented by the party leadership. Each party has a
leader and a whip, as well as other elected or appointed offices. The leader of the majority
party is the Speaker of the House. The role of these leaders is to ensure that the party‘s
agenda is carried out on the House floor. They have several tools at their disposal, including
the ability to control floor debate, the whip system to count votes, and decide which of their
members sit on which committees.
Over the history of the House, power has oscillated between the committee chairmen
and the leadership. Beginning in the 1970s, power started to shift away from committee
chairmen and toward the leadership as a way of centralizing power and ensuring that party
goals were achieved. When the Republicans took control of the House in 1995, they had
been out of power for so long that there were no real power bases that the leadership had to
be wary of in assigning committee chairmanships. Therefore, Newt Gingrich was able to use
extraordinary power in handpicking committee chairmen and bypassing the usually rigid
seniority system. Indeed, one of the great changes of the 104th Congress was the increased
power of the leadership over the committee system through the creation of taskforces and
advisory panels appointed by the leadership to circumvent the committee system.

Congressional Elections
The conventional wisdom pre-1994 on congressional elections closely followed
former House Speaker Tip O‘Neill‘s (D-MA) maxim, ―All politics is local.‖ Candidates for
Congress generally ran very locally-focused campaigns, emphasizing what they had done for
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the district. National issue rarely played a significant role in these races, except for in clearly
extraordinary circumstances (the Democratic sweep in the 1930 elections, in the doldrums of
the Great Depression, comes to mind first).
The Republicans were able to turn this conventional wisdom on its head by
nationalizing the 1994 elections, choosing to run against the unpopularity of President
Clinton (who, incidentally, was not on the ballot) and to collectively endorse a national
platform, the Contract with America, which solely consisted of national issues. The friction
between local and national issues, and by extension, between voters‘ abstract disdain for
Washington and their appetite for programs that directly benefit them, would prove to be a
tricky dichotomy for both Republicans and Democrats to manage.

Revolution
In the modern sense, defining what is meant by revolution is extremely complex. Our
notions today are not what they once were and our criteria no longer solely encompass armed
upheavals. In the modern definition of revolution, wholesale and widespread social and
political change in which the new order does not resemble the old is not the only type of
revolution that qualifies. If it were, short-lived revolutions that cause no immediate change
would not make the grade. And who would argue that the Revolution of March 1848 did not
put Germany on the road to unification, although historians are in agreement that by the
following decade the Revolution had made little impact?
One of the most common definitions, that revolutions are events that have lasting
impact, also is not by itself sufficient. Indeed, the original notion of a revolution, coming
from the Latin revolutio for ―a turn around,‖ seems to suggest that revolutions can begin and
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end at the same place, much like the cosmological usage of the term to indicate the Earth
making a full rotation around its axis or a planet one full ―revolution‖ around the sun.
In his Politics, Aristotle demarcated two types of revolutions:

those in which

complete change occurs from one constitution to another and those in which an existing
condition is modified. He wrote, ―Hence the changes which take place may be of two kinds
according to whether they involve a complete change from one constitution to another, or
only a modification on an existing one. Examples of the former are from democracy to
oligarchy…or the reverse.

In the other case those who seek change wish the existing

constitution to continue but want it to function through themselves.‖1 When discussing the
Republican Revolution, it is obvious that it does not fit under the first requirement, but what
about the second?
It is with these ideas about revolutions in mind that I evaluate the Republican
Revolution. How sudden or momentous was it? How dramatic was its change? What were
its lasting consequences? And if it was a revolution, where did this revolution take place? In
the institution of Congress? In policymaking? In legislation? In campaigns and elections?
As we will see, when the Republicans took control of Congress in 1995, they indeed
were able to bring about revolutionary change, albeit one that was short-lived in some places
but lasting in others. Though widespread change did not last, and the revolutionary zeal
waned as the Republican majority became more entrenched in power, the Republicans
shifted the direction of the country in a decidedly center-right direction. The Republicans
came to Washington intending to put into practice the vision that Ronald Reagan articulated
but never accomplished.
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A Note on Sources
A significant portion of this thesis is based on interviews conducted in the summer
and fall of 2008 with key figures in the history of this era, including current and former
congressmen, staff members, pollsters, and consultants. Where I have taken direct quotations
from the interviews, I have noted the specific interview in the text; however, other
information gleaned from my interviews appears without citation.
Throughout the process of researching this thesis, I have been wary of the potential
pitfalls of interview material. The relationship between history and memory is a fickle one,
and can be confounded further by the natural biases that many of my interview subjects have
toward the era, especially since many of them played key roles and continue to judge the
events from their particular points of view.
To combat this, I have taken every precaution to verify information given to me with
other sources. Every person I interviewed was asked a set of base questions, and the
differences in their answers provided some insight into where further verification would be
necessary. Especially helpful in this endeavor have been contemporary newspaper articles
from the era as well as numerous journalistic and political science texts. Although no
genuinely historical text deals specifically and solely with the events I relate and analyze here,
especially at the same level of detail, several more sweeping narratives have been helpful in
placing the development and maturation of the House Republican Party from 1980-1995 in
historical context.
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Chapter Breakdown
This thesis is broken into four roughly chronological chapters, each dealing with a
different aspect of the development and maturation of the House Republican Party. Chapter
1 focuses on the party in the 1980s and its transformation from a passive to an active
minority party. This chapter also traces the rise of Newt Gingrich from a backbench member
to his entrance into the leadership and describes and examines the vehicles and strategies he
used to gain power.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the House Republicans during the Bush and early Clinton
presidencies. Here, I examine the first missteps of Clinton and the continued entrance of
activist members into the Republican House leadership. This combination sets the stage for
Chapter 3, which covers the development of the Contract with America, the failure of the
Clinton healthcare plan, and the 1994 campaign.
Chapter 4 focuses on the transition to and the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, as
Republicans moved to take control of the House and implement their Contract with America.
Chapter 4 concludes with a brief discussion of the stalling of the Republicans‘ momentum
with the two government shutdowns in late 1995 and early 1996. Finally, my epilogue ties
the various themes introduced here and throughout the four chapters together and evaluates
the lasting legacy of the Republicans in this era.
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CHAPTER 1:
TRANSFORMING AN ATTITUDE

On September 15, 1980, Republican presidential nominee Ronald Reagan and over
150 House and Senate candidates gathered on the steps of the Capitol in Washington to
outline a five point agenda that they promised to pursue if the voters gave them control of the
White House and Congress, both of which were under Democratic control. Their hope was
to provide the American electorate with a clear choice that November, and to show that the
Republican Party would be united in delivering on their promise. Speaking grandly of
―shared goals, shared responsibilities, and shared visions for the country,‖ 2 Reagan drew a
contrast between his own party and the Democrats, whose bickering during the
administration of Jimmy Carter had become legendary: ―Each of us here pledges that if
elected we will begin working the day after election as a solid, unified team, and we pledge
that within a year from today we will achieve five major goals for America.‖3
The congressional leaders in charge of planning the event hailed it as historic. The
―Capitol Steps Event,‖ as it soon became known, was the brainchild of Rep. Newt Gingrich
(R-GA), a freshman congressman who was the head of the long-term planning branch of the
National Congressional Campaign Committee (NRCC), a title that carried no staff, no
influence, and no power. Although the event was decried by Senate Majority Leader Robert
C. Byrd (D-WV) as ―another cotton candy media event,‖ 4 Gingrich was confident that
Reagan‘s coattails could bring Republicans a majority in Congress, something they had not
enjoyed since 1954.
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Although the Reagan campaign hardly took the Capitol Steps Event seriously and the
promises made there would be quickly forgotten, the ceremony had substantial significance
for junior GOP congressman like Gingrich.5 They believed that this was the first step toward
achieving the one thing that had eluded the GOP for almost three decades: a majority in the
House of Representatives.
Indeed, by 1980, the Republican Party had already dwelt in the minority for twentysix years, ten years longer than any other previous minority party. In fact, between 1931 and
1980, Democrats had controlled the House for all but the four years of the 80th and 83rd
Congresses. Both times, the Republican majority had been fleeting. The vast Republican
gains made in 1946 at the nadir of President Harry Truman‘s popularity were wiped out just
two years later when the Democrats picked up seventy-five seats to return them to a
substantial majority. Then, the Republican majority brought to power by President Dwight
Eisenhower‘s coattails and Truman‘s dismal approval ratings in 1952 was also quickly swept
away two years later partly as a result of the public backlash toward the Army-McCarthy
Hearings.
A former history professor, Newt Gingrich had first run for Congress in 1974, taking
on Rep. John J. Flint (D-GA), a twenty-year incumbent and ardent segregationist. Although
Gingrich lost his two races against Flint, in 1974 and 1976, his status as a promising
challenger taking on an unsavory incumbent attracted notice from the Washington
establishment, including Washington Post political reporter David Broder. 6 When Flint
retired in 1978, Gingrich seemed to be a shoo-in for the seat and won it handily. Ever
purposeful, Gingrich barely celebrated after his victory, instead flying directly to Washington
and declaring ―his intent to destroy Democratic control in the Capitol.‖7
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A month before he was to take office, this ambition led him directly to the office of
Rep. Guy Vander Jagt of Michigan, the chairman of the National Republican Congressional
Committee (NRCC), the political arm of the House Republican Party. For three hours,
Gingrich inundated Vander Jagt with ideas, hoping to convince him that the NRCC should
set up a long term planning committee to plot the path to a Republican majority: ―In those
three hours, he absolutely boggled my mind,‖ Vander Jagt later recalled. ―Totally boggled
my mind. I said, ‗I‘ll tell you what, I‘ll make you the chairman of the NRCC task force to
plan for a Republican majority.‘ I‘m not sure anybody could be so brash…I skipped him
over 155 sitting Republicans to do it.‖8
***************
Nevertheless, the young, optimistic Gingrich faced a long, uphill battle to transform
the House Republican Party into the majority. By 1980, the Republican Party had dwelt in
the minority for so long that many of its members had simply accepted the fact that they
would forever be relegated to second-class status.
It had not always been this way, of course. In the pre-World War II era, it was
commonplace for the minority to just bide its time until it regained power. 9 In the 1950s,
1960s, and early 1970s, Republicans, though the minority, would often ally with conservative
Southern Democrats (called ―Boll Weevils‖) to wield significant influence in crafting
legislation. Writing about the period of the late 1960s, political scientist Charles O. Jones
remarked, it sometimes ―appeared that the Republicans were the majority and the Democrats
the minority.‖10 Then-Rep. Dick Cheney (R-WY) agreed: Because ―there were enough Boll
Weevil Democrats, we controlled the agenda on economic issues.‖11
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In this era, committee chairmen and ranking minority members often worked hand-inhand, with the ranking member often able to significantly influence legislation. In the words
of one former GOP member, ―To a junior Republican, there was something to look forward
to, even if he wasn‘t going to be in the majority. [Being ranking member] wasn‘t the same as
being chairman, but it was the next best thing.‖12 The relationship between Wilbur Mills of
Arkansas, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee from 1957 to 1975, and John
Byrnes of Wisconsin, the committee‘s ranking member, exemplified this custom. Although
he was one of the most powerful men in Washington, Mills ―practiced the kind of bipartisan,
consensus politics‖ that made a Republican member ―feel like he was an important member
of the committee from the start,‖ according to Barber Conable, a Republican member from
New York who served on the committee with Mills.

To Conable, Byrnes was the

committee‘s first sergeant and Mills was its commander, which, ―in the Ways and Means
Committee…constituted very effective leadership.‖13
For Republicans, the downside to this state of affairs was that it bred complacency.
Many Republicans were simply content with working their way through the seniority system
and gaining their own share of personal power, which led former Rep. Fred Grandy (R-IA) to
joke, ―The trouble with Republicans is they don‘t have anything and they won‘t share.‖14
Republicans like Byrnes were reluctant to take risks on behalf of the party for fear that they
would jeopardize the personal status they had already come to attain. Rep. Richard Armey
(R-TX) succinctly summed up the relationship between the minority members and their
Democratic chairmen: ―I used to call it the dissertation syndrome. You live a crucial, critical
part of your life where the most important person in the world for you to please is your
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dissertation adviser or supervisor.

If he‘s not happy, you‘re dead.

That‘s what the

Democratic chairmen were to a lot of our more senior guys.‖15
This ―go-along-to-get-along‖ attitude was unacceptable to Gingrich and other young
conservatives who blamed it for keeping Republicans out of the majority for decades. In his
new position at the NRCC, Gingrich set out to change this attitude and the Capitol Steps
Event was his first attempt. He seemed to be successful, as Republicans picked up thirtyfour seats in the House and twelve in the Senate, gaining control of the upper body for the
first time since the Eisenhower administration. Gingrich had a special reason to celebrate the
GOP‘s gains: six of the winning candidates stood with Reagan on that sunny September
morning, a fact that Gingrich did not believe was inconsequential: ―Say to yourself, What
are the odds of these six guys, who all won their upsets, winning them without the kind of
media attention that they got back home after having gone to the Capitol steps and standing
next to Reagan…You can arguably make the case that that wouldn‘t have happened.‖16
Although Gingrich‘s account of the reasons behind their victories can be disputed, the
idea of displaying a united Republican Party, a platform endorsed by candidates running in
races all over the country, and a pledge to make good on their promises would be something
that would stick with him for years to come, waiting to resurface at the appropriate moment.
***************
In the late 1970s, several changes occurred that would severely inhibit Republicans‘
ability to influence legislation. First, as a result of post-Watergate reforms, committee
sessions were opened to the public. Whereas, in the words of one Republican staffer, ―in
closed meetings, Republican members used to be able to cut a deal and drive the chairman,‖
public meetings meant that chairmen were under intense pressure to toe the party line. Even
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more frustrating to Republicans was the fact that ―Democrats on some committees started to
make decisions at caucuses that were closed to the minority,‖ and, unsurprisingly, closed to
the public.17
The make-up of the House Democratic Caucus was also changing.

The 1974

elections brought seventy-five freshmen Democrats to the House, and these ―Watergate
babies,‖ as then-Majority Leader Tip O‘Neill (D-MA) called them, quickly became a
significant legislative bloc. The Watergate babies were a new kind of politician, one that had
―never rung doorbells, or driven people to the polls, or stayed late stuffing envelopes at
campaign headquarters,‖ according to O‘Neill.18 Elected on a wave of discontent following
Watergate and Vietnam, these freshmen wanted to get things done and get them done now.
As O‘Neill remembered, ―New members once were seen and not heard, but now it seemed
that even the lowliest freshman could be a power in the House. Almost before we knew it,
there were 154 committees and subcommittees, each with his own chairman.‖19 This led Rep.
Morris Udall (D-AZ) to quip if you didn‘t know a member‘s name, you were on pretty safe
ground if you addressed him simply as ―Mr. Chairman.‖ Committee staff also ballooned 41
percent between 1972 and 1978.20
Along with the number of committees increasing, changes occurred in the committees
themselves.

First, the Democrats restored proxy voting in committees in 1975, which

eliminated the Republicans ability to take advantage of Democratic absences. Second, as a
result of a revolt against the powerful committee chairmen, much of the power in writing
legislation shifted from the full committees to the subcommittees, which doubly hurt
Republicans since subcommittee chairmen were generally more liberal than full committee
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chairmen and party ratios on subcommittees tilted even more heavily toward the majority
than full committees.21
By the end of the 1970s, it was clear that the Republican Party had survived the
Watergate scandal and now it was the Democrats who were in trouble with the voters. The
problems of the Carter Administration—stagflation, a lagging economy, the country‘s
―malaise‖—now had put the Democrats on the run. In the 1978 midterm elections, the
public‘s lack of confidence in the unified Democratic government cost the party twelve seats
in the House and three in the Senate—not an unusually large total, but for a party that had
clearly swept the last few national elections, it was an omen of trouble.
In 1980, the Democratic Party‘s problems were compounded even further, as Ronald
Reagan won a resounding victory over the incumbent Jimmy Carter and the GOP picked up
control of the Senate. The House Democratic majority, 242-192, was the smallest in twentyeight years. With the defection of conservative Southern Democrats, the Republicans could
claim a working majority, especially with a popular new president. ―The plain fact is that the
House is Democratic, but only nominally,‖ Udall said. ―Technically, I‘ll be in control of one
of the key House committees, but I won‘t have the votes there or on the floor.‖22
With the party having lost the White House and the Senate, the Democratic majority
in the House seemed to be the last bulwark against total capitulation to Ronald Reagan‘s
vision of government as the problem not the solution.

With this in mind, centralized

leadership, especially in as tough a partisan as House Speaker Tip O‘Neill, came to the
Democrats‘ rescue. GOP Leader John Rhodes of Arizona had once called O‘Neill ―the most
partisan man I have ever known and recounted an O‘Neill warning: ―Republicans are just
going to have to get it through their heads that they are not going to write legislation!‖23
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Under O‘Neill‘s direction, restrictive rules became the norm, limiting the time and
substance of debate. The GOP‘s power to offer amendments, move to recommit legislation,
and raise points of order was restrained. Proxy voting was used to bottle up Republican bills
in committee and even if they moved on in the process, the Rules Committee—controlled by
the speaker—would report the bill with an unfavorable rule. In 1986, Rep. Henry Waxman
(D-CA) voiced a common belief on Capitol Hill: ―If we have a unified Democratic position,
Republicans are irrelevant.‖ 24

Rep. Joe Moakley (D-MA) accurately expressed the

Democratic attitude: ―Hey, we‘ve got the votes. Let‘s vote. Screw you.‖25
Rep. Robert Walker (R-PA) explained the Republican plight: ―Democratic rule in the
House had grown increasingly arbitrary. When I first came to Congress [in 1976], there was
pretty much full and free debate in the Congress. Normally there was the opportunity for the
minority to offer any and all amendments that were germane to bills, for example. As the
1980s moved forward and particularly as the Reagan Administration became more successful
with its programs, Democrats tended to shut down a lot of those opportunities. By the
middle of the decade, they were relying heavily on closed rules for debate.‖ 26 By fully
exploiting majority powers, the Democrats stifled Republican opposition.
As another former member put it: ―[At one time] you were looked upon by your
colleagues on the other side of the aisle as first, a member of the House, second, as the
member from [your state], and third, as a Republican. And that order has been reversed.
Now the defining characteristic that labels everybody initially is party. If a member is a
Republican, they don‘t care much about him.‖27
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The growing frustration that Republicans experienced beginning in the early 1980s
began to shape the ways they viewed their relationship to the majority, and consequently
made them more accepting of activism and confrontation as the decade progressed.
***************
Although Newt Gingrich now considers himself a disciple of Ronald Reagan, it was
to Richard Nixon that the junior congressman turned in the fall of 1982 for advice on how to
reenergize the House Republican Party. Ironically, Gingrich had gotten his start in national
politics by working on the Nelson Rockefeller campaign in 1968, but he recognized that the
former president was one of the party‘s elder statesmen and a shrewd analyst of the political
scene.
Despite the immense success that the Republican Party enjoyed in 1981—which led
Speaker of the House Tip O‘Neill to comment, ―All in all, the Reagan team in 1981 was
probably the best run political operating unit I‘ve ever seen.‖28—by 1982 the political climate
had dramatically changed. As a result of ―a tight monetary policy pursued by the Federal
Reserve Board and astronomically high interest rates,‖ the country slipped into a recession
and by December 1981, 9 million Americans were unemployed.29 This gave the Democrats
an opening to reclaim the offensive.
Just before Gingrich went to meet Nixon in New York, the GOP had suffered a
dismal showing in the 1982 midterms, losing twenty-six seats in the House to almost wipe
out the gains they had made on the coattails of President Reagan in 1980. Even more
depressing for Gingrich, who wanted more than anything else to achieve majority status, was
that the Reagan Revolution was beginning to lose its steam. ―It was clear after the August
break [in 1981] that the great wave of Reagan reforms was over and that they did not have a
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second great wave [with which] they could build the same momentum,‖ Gingrich later
recalled. Without the leadership of the White House, he feared, the House GOP would revert
back to thinking like a permanent minority.
At their meeting, Nixon agreed with Gingrich‘s assessment. The former president
was concerned about the attitude of the Republican leadership regarding change, and, like
Gingrich, he believed that ―they had accepted the idea of being in a permanent minority
status.‖30 ―Change would not come easy,‖ Nixon counseled, but nor could one single person
transform an institution the size of the House. 31 Nixon had been first elected in the
Republican landslide of 1946 and had twice within a decade seen the GOP lose its majority
after only two years of control. 32 If they were ever to regain a majority, ―the House
Republican Party had to become more interesting, more energetic and more idea-oriented,‖
Gingrich recalled Nixon telling him.33 He encouraged the junior congressman to go back to
Washington and put together a team of committed activists who could develop an agenda of
issues around which the party could rally.
Gingrich took Nixon‘s advice to heart, and upon returning to Washington he began to
recruit other activist members to join his quest to transform the Republican Party into the
majority. He first approached Rep. Vin Weber, a Minnesota Republican who had been
elected with Reagan in 1980 and who did not intend to spend his House career in the
minority.

―He came up to me one day,‖ Weber said. ―We were not very close.

He

essentially asked me, ‗What are you doing next year—and for the next ten? I sort of laughed
and said, ‗Nothing special.‘‖34
By early 1983, Gingrich attracted a core group of members, including Robert Walker
of Pennsylvania, Dan Lungren of California, Judd Gregg of New Hampshire, Dan Coats of
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Indiana, Duncan Hunter of California, and Connie Mack of Florida. As Walker recalled,
Gingrich ―recruited activists one by one.

He got about twelve of us meeting in his

Longworth office working in a coordinated fashion.‖ 35 The group took the name the
―Conservative Opportunity Society‖ (COS), which was ―carefully selected as the antithesis
of what they were seeking to topple, the hated ‗liberal welfare state.‘‖36
Although Nixon had recommended monthly meetings, Gingrich rejected that, instead
deciding that meetings once a week were necessary to build up a rhythm of activism. ―They
met every Wednesday morning and plotted strategy aimed at the goal of taking control of the
House.‖37 In addition to meetings in the morning to plot the day‘s strategy, the group would
often hold mini-retreats on Saturdays to stay on top of, and ahead of, the issues of the day.
As Walker remembered, ―We‘d come back to Washington on Saturdays and sit down for a
whole morning to talk to people like Alvin Toffler, John Naisbitt, and others who were at the
forefront of defining the information economy that was emerging. And so we developed an
agenda that stayed focused on the idea that we were looking forward into the future. We
didn‘t simply want to debate the issues of the moment.‖38
Specifically, the group looked for wedge issues and magnet issues. As Gingrich
explained, Republicans ―must emphasize a wedge of issues that drive our opponents away
from the American people, while having a secondary theme of magnet issues that attract the
American people to us.‖39 In a December 28, 1983 memo to Weber, Judd Gregg outlined the
issues that the COS should emphasize during the next year, including a line-item veto, school
prayer, a balanced budget, crime, drugs, welfare reform, and others. 40 Ever the believer in
the power of ideas, Gingrich was certain that after decades of New Deal liberalism, the issues
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were moving their way and the voters would follow: ―It‘s like Kondratieff‘s long wave
theory of economics,‖ he said. ―It‘s a long wave theory of politics.‖41
In the beginning, the COS had three goals: ―discredit the Democrats, develop a
positive agenda for the Republican Party, and eventually dominate the party itself.‖ 42 They
joked that only two things stood in their way: the Democrats and the Republicans. The
issues were fine, but the problem was that the COS had tremendous trouble attracting public
notice. Stuck in the staid seniority system of the House, promoting their ideas through the
committee system was not an option. Moreover, the members of the COS were too junior to
get coverage on the national networks. They needed a method to ―gain instant attention and
circumvent the hierarchies that remained in the chambers, including the authority of party
leaders.‖43 They found one in C-SPAN.
***************
Television had come to the House of Representatives for the first time in 1979, the
product of years of negotiations between cable companies and House leaders.

Former

Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas had unwaveringly opposed opening the House to cameras
and microphones because he thought it would ―detract from the dignity of the chamber.‖44
However, once Tip O‘Neill had assumed the speakership, he agreed to let cameras into the
House on the condition that the ―camera only show close-ups of the person speaking and not
reveal what was going on in the chamber itself.‖45
Charging that the Democrats were ―ruthlessly partisan in changing the rules of the
House, stacking committees, apportioning staff and questioning the Administration,‖
Gingrich concluded that the use of television would empower individuals like himself. 46
Television soon became a potent weapon in the COS strategy. Bob Walker recognized this
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opportunity first: ―C-SPAN does work best for the minority party,‖ he reflected. ―The
majority controls the process—and it looks like it‘s closing things down.‖47 Several years
earlier, Republican leader Bob Michel (R-IL), noting Walker‘s mastery of the House rules
and his ability to think quickly on his feet, named him the ―Minority Objector on the Consent
Calendar,‖ the party‘s traditional watchdog post. In this role, Walker would spent hours on
the House floor, objecting to unanimous consent requests, offering amendments, and
generally slowing the legislative process to a halt to protest what the COS saw as Democratic
injustices. He often would make more speeches on the floor in one day than some members
would make in a year.48 Walker appeared so often on television that every time he would
return to his office after giving a speech attacking the Democrats, he would find that the
―phones in my office would light up.‖49
Walker was surprised at the effects his tactics were generating outside of Washington.
At party conventions, the Republican faithful would often recognize him from his
appearances on C-SPAN. ―I was amazed at the outside impact of my tactics on the floor,‖ he
recalled. ―The C-SPAN coverage of Congress was reaching the country.‖50
Former Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY), the former Buffalo Bills quarterback, allstar and AFL MVP, liked to tell the story of how he was strolling on a beach in Puerto Rico
when a woman came up to him and said, ―Aren‘t you Congressman Jack Kemp?‖ Ah,
recognition; Kemp puffed with pride and admitted that he was. ―Oh, Mr. Kemp,‖ the woman
gushed, ―do you know Bob Walker?‖51
By 1984, C-SPAN was delivering coverage of the House of Representatives to over
16 million households and had developed a devoted following of about a quarter-million
viewers.52 As Gingrich put it, ―I figured out if I could start making speeches on C-SPAN,
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then I would reach a dramatically bigger audience than people who flew five hundred miles
to speak to a Kiwanis club.‖53
Walker and his COS colleagues took advantage of House rules to propagate their
views to the television audience. Each morning, the members of the group would flock to the
House chamber to give one-minute speeches attacking the Democrats. ―We would hold COS
meetings at a time in the morning that just preceded [the meeting of] the House and we
would literally walk out of the COS meetings and walk as a group over to the House floor
and sit down and do our one-minutes on the theme we had decided for that day,‖ Walker
remembered.54 The number of one minute speeches increased from 110 in March 1977 to
344 by March 1981.55
In the evening, they would congregate along the back rail of the chamber to decide on
topics for the evening‘s ―special order‖ speeches, speeches lasting up to one hour given after
the close of House business, usually to an empty chamber, and as such, designed for home
consumption. At the beginning of the 1984 session, Bob Walker tried to reserve four hours
of special order time each day for COS members. The request, duly denied, took forty-five
minutes and was an omen of things to come. ―It‘s going to be like Chinese water torture,‖
Gingrich said at the time.56
Day after day, Gingrich, Walker, Weber, and other COS members hammered away at
the Democrats in the special order speeches, criticizing everything from pork barrel spending
to their despotic control of the House. In the midst of these attacks, the COS speaker would
often pause for a moment, seemingly to give their opponents a chance to respond. Of course,
no one could; the House chamber was almost always empty. But it did not look as such to
the television audience; since the cameras only showed the speaker, ―viewers therefore
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presumed that he or she was addressing a full house when actually the chamber was
empty.‖57
The Democrats deplored the tactics of the COS. Rep. David Bonior (D-WI) warned
in 1983 that these speeches ―will poison the national dialogue and cripple democratic
debate.‖58 Others were more vulgar. ―They‘re not going to achieve anything by all this,‖
said Rep. Bill Alexander (D-AR), the fourth-ranking Democrat. ―They‘re a bunch of ticks on
a dog. The most they deserve is a swat of the tail.‖59 Some Democrats took personal shots at
members of the COS. ―Bob Walker? The man‘s an embarrassment,‖ said Rep. Mickey
Leland (D-TX). ―He‘s got to be the most disliked guy in Congress.‖60
Initially, the members of the COS were perceived as mavericks by their own
leadership. In fact, they had come to be known as ―Gingrich‘s Guerillas.‖61 The COS tactics
worried senior Republicans in the House, who had been raised in the tradition of comity and
camaraderie that transcended party differences. 62 Thus, the relationship between the two
groups was a contentious one. Republican Leader Bob Michel‘s staff thought that the COS
was impossible to work with. Moreover, they felt that Gingrich‘s proposals ―aimed to wrest
power from the Republican leadership.‖63 ―The mainstream Republican establishment in the
House viewed Gingrich as this ‗acid-throwing, bomb-throwing nut,‘‖ recalled Rep. James
Rogan (R-CA).64 Michel, who had served in Congress since 1957, was a congenial leader,
the embodiment of the old-school tradition of the House. ―I have given them some fatherly
advice,‖ Michel was quoted as saying at the time of his rebellious youngsters.

―Be

gentlemanly and once you‘ve made your point, get on with the business of governing.‖65
On the other hand, members of the COS reacted against the timid attitude of the GOP
leadership; they believed that the ―go-along-to-get-along‖ attitude was responsible for the
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Republicans‘ inability to win a majority for decades. ―If we behave the way we have always
behaved, we will remain in the minority,‖ Gingrich wrote at the time. ―We need large-scale,
radical change.‖66 Republicans would only be successful in becoming a majority, he said, if
they understood that ―we are waging a peaceful civil war to take power from our
opponents.‖67 To them, the arguments about ―governing‖ rang false; what they believed their
leadership was doing was solely acquiescing to Democratic demands. Years later, Vin
Weber described their attitude: ―We felt our leadership did not have a winning strategy and
needed to be prodded and cajoled to put one together to accomplish conservative
objectives.‖68
Some more senior Republican members, however, could be counted on for support.
Reps. Trent Lott of Mississippi, Jack Kemp of New York, and Dick Cheney of Wyoming
offered the ―Young Turks,‖ as the COS members were sometimes called, aid and comfort.
Although none of them formally joined the COS, Lott, Kemp, and Cheney would from time
to time ―pop into COS meetings, take temperatures, offer words of encouragement, and then
leave them on their own.‖69
***************
Although the Conservative Opportunity Society had been steadily gaining a following
among devoted C-SPAN viewers thanks to their own tactics, it was the Democrats that
finally put the COS on the map among the general public. On May 8, 1984, the COS was
using their C-SPAN speeches to attack the Democrats for a weak record on fighting
communism. Gingrich had taken the floor to criticize several Democrats by name of being
―blind to communism‖ and accusing them of appeasement, saying they had a ―pessimistic,
defeatist, and skeptical view toward the American role in the world.‖70 At different points in
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his speech, he stopped and challenged the accused Democrats to respond to the charges, but
―since the cameras only showed the person speaking, viewers were unaware that the
Republicans were talking to an empty chamber.‖71 Gingrich then read a report written by his
aide Frank Gregorsky that had researched and compiled dovish statements made by several
prominent Democrats over the years, including Eddie Boland (D-MA), a close friend of Tip
O‘Neill.

Gingrich again challenged the accused Democrats to respond.

It looked on

television that the Democrats had no response when in fact they weren‘t even present.
Initially, Speaker of the House Tip O‘Neill (D-MA) thought that the members of the
COS could be ignored. After all, they were just a bunch of backbench Republicans that their
own leadership scarcely paid attention to. But as their attacks began to gain traction, this
attitude changed. ―Tip felt he could ignore Gingrich like a mosquito,‖ Rep. Geraldine
Ferraro (D-NY) recalled, ―but after a period of time people began to tell him that he better be
careful because the mosquito was carrying malaria.‖72
When O‘Neill heard of Gingrich‘s comments, he was enraged, especially by
Gingrich‘s suggestion that Boland and the other cited Democrats did not have the courage to
rise and defend themselves. As O‘Neill described the events years later, ―The next day,
when Robert Walker of Pennsylvania tried something similar, I called Charlie Rose, the
member in charge of television in the House, and told him I thought the cameras should pan
the entire chamber. Charlie informed the camera crew, and when they showed the empty hall,
Walker looked like a fool.‖73
Trent Lott, the Republican whip, who had been watching Walker speak in the
Republican cloakroom, rushed to the House chamber to inform Walker of what had just
occurred. Although O‘Neill‘s orders were well within his authority, Walker immediately
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began attacking his actions: ―It is my understanding that as I deliver this special order here
this evening, the cameras are panning this chamber, demonstrating that there is no one here,‖
he said in shocked tones. ―It is one more example of how this body is run: the kind of
arrogance of power that the members are given that kind of change with absolutely no
warning.‖74
The Republicans were furious, and not just the members of the COS. GOP Leader
Bob Michel accused O‘Neill of an ―act of dictatorial retribution.‖75 Jack Kemp charged that
O‘Neill had ―altered procedure and tried to use the televising of the House to embarrass the
Republicans.‖76 When the debate was resumed the next Monday, O‘Neill himself took to the
floor of the House to defend his actions. ―Nothing in the rules says that I have to notify
you,‖ he declared. ―Courtesy probably said that I should have. That is a courtesy your
member [Gingrich] never gave to the twenty members he accused on the floor of the
House.‖77
The next day, Gingrich was back on the floor to respond to O‘Neill‘s actions. As he
spoke, O‘Neill became angrier and angrier and, in a rare move for a speaker, went to the well
to join the debate. Shaking his finger at Gingrich, he said, nearly shouting, ―My personal
opinion is this: You deliberately stood in that well before an empty House and challenged
these people, and you challenged their Americanism! It‘s un-American! It‘s the lowest thing
I‘ve ever heard in my thirty-two years here.‖78 Immediately, Trent Lott jumped to his feet
and demanded the speaker‘s words be ―taken down‖ (stricken from the record) for violating a
House rule against personal attacks on the House floor. Although the man sitting in the chair
was Rep. Joe Moakley (D-MA), one of O‘Neill‘s close friends, the conclusion to Lott‘s
request was inescapable: ―The Chair feels that that type of characterization should not be
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used in debate.‖79 This was the first time the Speaker of the House had been so reproached
since 1797.80 Upon gathering his papers and making his exit a few moments later, Newt
Gingrich received a standing ovation from the other Republicans in the chamber; he had
carried the day.
The confrontation on the floor had huge implications for Gingrich and the
Conservative Opportunity Society. First of all, ―Camscam,‖ as the Republicans took to
calling it, instantly made Gingrich a national figure, transforming him from a backbencher
into a serious partisan contender. The exchange between him and the speaker was shown on
all three network news shows that evening and was on the front page of The Washington Post
the next day. ―I am now a famous person,‖ Gingrich triumphantly declared.81 Later, O‘Neill
would agree while talking to Bob Walker:
grumbled.

―Walker, you and Gingrich owe me,‖ he

―When I came out on the floor and attacked you, you were nothing but

backbench-rabble rousers. I made you.‖82
Second, and most importantly, it brought the House Republican Party together.
Whereas the COS was once viewed as an outside fringe, more and more members—
conservatives and moderates among them—began to look at Gingrich and Co. as more than
rabble-rousers. Indeed, when combined with the rule changes the Democrats had been
implementing since the start of the decade, the COS‘s claims that the Democrats were little
more than a corrupt majority began to ring true. Hamilton Fish of New York, the ranking
Republican on the Judiciary Committee known for his patrician reserve and moderate views,
agreed: ―Those of us who were not inclined to confrontation have now discovered that
pressure, and tough pressure, is the way to get results.‖ 83 Republican whip Trent Lott
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concurred: ―When you‘re in the minority and the rules and the committees are stacked
against you, you can roll over and whimper like a dog or you can bite somebody,‖ he said.84
―It was a huge breakthrough. It was just huge for us,‖ Bob Walker later recalled.
―What made the moment was Trent Lott. When the Whip came to Newt‘s defense, not only
did we move from the back bench to the national spotlight, we were defended by our
leadership and legitimized.‖85 Indeed, when I visited Walker in his downtown Washington
office in fall 2008, he proudly pointed to a photograph of the cameras panning the empty
House chamber as he spoke. ―That was one of the most seminal moments in the history of
the modern House,‖ he told me. ―It was the moment when we began to take back the
House.‖86
Almost immediately, partisan rancor became the norm. Tip O‘Neill took to calling
Gingrich, Walker, and Weber ―The Three Stooges,‖ and California Democrat Tony Coelho,
the chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, the political arm of the
House Democrats, hired a private research firm to dig up dirt on Gingrich‘s past and feed it
to the leftist journal Mother Jones.87
The rancor was certainly not reserved for the Democratic side of the aisle. In a
closed-door party conference, Vin Weber called O‘Neill a ―petty, second-class Boston
politician [and] one of the cheapest, meanest politicians to occupy that office [speaker] in this
century.‖ 88 An edited tape was produced called ―Tip‘s Greatest Hits,‖ which compiled
scenes of O‘Neill ―overruling, ignoring, insulting or denouncing assorted Republican
members from his lofty perch at the front of the House chamber.‖89 For a party long divided
by moderates and conservatives, accomodationists and confrontationists, and party activists
and district activists, the figure of Tip O‘Neill became a rallying point, something that all
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Republicans could identify with. As Washington Post political reporter T.R. Reid noted,
―Whatever else O‘Neill may achieve in the 98th Congress, he has pulled off one feat: he has
molded the House Republicans, a farrago of conflicting philosophies and clashing ambitions,
into a single unit held tightly together by mutual disdain for the speaker.‖90
***************
The transformation of the House Republican Party into a cohesive unit and the
legitimization of Newt Gingrich and the COS continued that fall. On election night 1984,
incumbent Democratic congressman Frank McCloskey of Indiana seemed to have won the
election by a seventy-two vote margin over his GOP opponent, Richard McIntyre. A few
days later, officials discovered an accounting error and, after a recount, awarded McIntyre
the seat with a thirty-four vote edge, a result that was then certified by Indiana‘s Republican
Secretary of State.91
According to Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, each house of Congress is the
―judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members.‖ On the opening day
of the 99th Congress, Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-TX) introduced a resolution to declare
the Indiana seat vacant and create a special taskforce of two Democrats and one Republican,
chaired by Rep. Leon Panetta (D-CA), to investigate.
The committee dragged its feet for months, so during a pro forma session on March 4,
Minority Leader Bob Michel surprised the Democrats by introducing a resolution to seat
McIntyre. Since no Democrats had expected business to be conducted on the floor that day,
most were absent, and Republicans flooded onto the floor. Rep. Bill Alexander (D-AR), the
Democratic whip, then moved to table the resolution while he stalled the vote in order to
allow Democrats enough time to get back to the Capitol. Speaker O‘Neill criticized the GOP
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leadership for bringing up the motion, to which Michel responded that he could not ―wait for
the majority in this House to find a way to seat someone other than one duly elected.‖92
The time for debate seemingly dragged on forever. In the words of Rep. Otis Pike
(D-NY), who was then a journalist covering the House, ―One of the glories of being in the
majority is that you not only control the schedule, you control the clock…There were forty
minutes of time left for debate. Eighteen minutes later, there were still thirty minutes left for
debate.‖93 The motion passed by one vote.
Several days later, on March 11, Rep. Bill Thomas of California, the lone Republican
on the task force, walked out of its proceedings, saying the Democratic members had ―set up
the rules so their guy can win. I‘ve tried to participate in the process, but by a two-to-one
vote, I‘m superfluous.‖ 94 On April 18, by a two-to-one margin, the taskforce declared
Democrat McCloskey the winner by four votes. The result was ratified by the House
Administration Committee 12-0, with all the Republicans walking out of the committee room
in protest.
Newt Gingrich had been paying close attention to the saga and saw another
opportunity to make his point about the ―corrupt‖ Democratic leadership. Meeting behind
closed doors with the Republican leadership and entire Conference, he first suggested
engaging in civil disobedience in the House. Although most Republicans did not want to go
that far, they agreed to his plan B—a symbolic walkout of the entire Conference from the
House floor.

―It does not hurt to shoot a few warning shots across the bow,‖ Iowa

Republican Tom Tauke said at the time. ―On the other hand, the majority of Republicans
know that shutting down the House is not a viable option.‖ 95 On May 1, the full House
approved a resolution to seat McCloskey on a party line vote, with all Republicans and ten
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Democrats voting no. When the result was announced, Gingrich led a walkout of the entire
GOP Conference down the steps of the Capitol in symbolic protest, the first such walkout
since 1890.
For many Republicans, the McIntyre-McCloskey saga had been ―a radicalizing
experience that made them more receptive to Gingrich‘s message.‖96 Moderate Republican
Olympia Snowe of Maine said the election ―symbolizes frustrations that have been building
up for years.‖97 ―It goes much beyond one seat in Indiana,‖ asserted Trent Lott. ―It goes to
the fundamental problem about the way the House is run, to the Democrats‘ arrogance of
power.‖98 To Bill Frenzel of Minnesota, this was symptomatic of the Democrats‘ long stint
in the majority: ―Democrats have run the House for so long, they have lost the capacity to be
embarrassed by any partisan act.‖99
For one thing, Gingrich‘s strident cries of a corrupt House majority were seemingly
proven true by the episode. Republicans were especially enraged that the Democrats would
not hesitate to employ any and all tactics to accomplish what they saw as sleazy partisan ends.
In this atmosphere, Republicans simply could not compete by playing by the old rules. GOP
Policy Committee Chairman Dick Cheney fumed, ―What choice does a self-respecting
Republican have . . . except confrontation? If you play by the rules, the Democrats change
the rules so they win. There‘s absolutely nothing to be gained by cooperating with the
Democrats at this point.‖100 ―The action validated Newt‘s thesis,‖ Vin Weber later recalled.
―The Democrats are corrupt, they are making us look like fools, and we are idiots to
cooperate with them.‖101
The episode also portrayed Gingrich for the first time as more than just a bombthrower, but as a leader of the Republican Conference. ―The Indiana incident legitimized
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Newt‘s claim to leadership,‖ Republican strategist Rich Galen said. ―It gave him moral
standing that he otherwise never would have had. It may have taken him another decade to
become leader.‖102 Gingrich was truly able to tap a deep nerve that ran through the House
GOP with his decisive, albeit symbolic, action to demonstrate that what the Democrats were
doing was simply unacceptable.
Interestingly, Newt‘s leadership was contrasted by Michel‘s.

Although Michel

helped lead the walk-out of the House Republicans, he almost immediately returned to the
House floor to shake McCloskey‘s hand, receiving a standing ovation from the Democrats on
the floor. While Gingrich viewed this as appeasement, Michel looked at it as governing. To
the Leader, confrontation was good politics but not good policy; after all, members had been
elected to the House to pass legislation, and to do that, they had to work with the Democrats.
Some saw the two competing styles as complementary. ―It‘s like two sides of a coin,‖ said
Rep. Lynn M. Martin (R-Ill.). ―One complements the other. The Bob Michel style allows
time for congeniality and comity to exist. Without that, you can‘t govern. The Gingrich style
believes confrontation can also produce results. He believes in action, in pushing, in moving
forward. Without that, you could always be in the minority.‖103
***************
On the opening day of the 100th Congress, Jim Wright of Texas was elected speaker,
replacing the retired Tip O‘Neill. Wright had served in Congress since 1954 and had been
House Majority Leader, the number two leadership post for the Democrats, since 1976, after
he won election to the position by one vote. Although initially Wright had striven to work
from the center of the political spectrum, his tenuous hold on the Majority Leader position
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caused him to turn sharply left and sharply partisan. As one Democrat explained it, ―He
couldn‘t be elected speaker. It‘s that simple.‖104
Republicans did not have high expectations for the new speaker, but rather feared that
his election would usher in an era of increased partisanship, even from the previous highs set
during the tenure of O‘Neill. Their fears came true on October 29, 1987, a date Republicans
would later call ―Black Thursday.‖ In the midst of a debate about a budget reconciliation bill,
Wright had directed the Rules Committee to impose a self-executing rule on the bill, which
attached ten separate Democratic amendments to the bill without separate votes. Included in
these ten was a 6 billion dollar welfare reform package. Republicans, and many Democrats,
opposed this action, believing the amendments should be voted on separately. Subsequently,
a coalition of Republicans and the dissatisfied Democrats defeated the rule.
Wright, however, was not to be outdone. According to House rules, a bill must
receive two-thirds support to be returned to the floor on the same day, a threshold Wright
could not meet given the solid Republican opposition to the bill. To get around this rule,
Wright ordered the adjournment of the House and then immediately reconvened it for a new
―legislative day,‖ a maneuver that only required a one-half majority. It was obvious that this
act was a raw power play, but one that Republicans were unable to stop. Conservative
William Dannemeyer (R-CA) took to the floor and said, ―Genesis tells us that the Lord
created the world in seven days. We are now witnessing the creation of an eighth day. I just
ask the gentleman, does he have a name for this new creation?‖ Majority Leader Tom Foley
replied, ―Yes, it is called the Guaranteed Deficit Reduction Act.‖105
Fifteen minutes later, when time expired on voting for the reconciliation bill, the vote
stood at 205-206. Republicans were ecstatic and shouted at Wright to declare the bill
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defeated. The speaker continued to stall, sitting quietly in his chair and refusing to close the
vote.

Suddenly, a voice rang out ―Hold the vote!‖ and a Wright aide brought Texas

Democrat Jim Chapman back to the well to switch his vote.106 With the total standing at
206-205, Wright rapped the gavel and pronounced the bill passed.
Republicans were furious. ―Bush League! Boooo! Bush League!‖ they yelled.
Trent Lott slammed his fist on a lectern, shattering it. Dick Cheney paced the floor, saying
―This is just totally unacceptable. This is absolute bullshit. It‘s absolute bullshit.‖ Dan
Lundgren, a member of the COS, stormed the speaker‘s dais and was blocked by John Bryant
(D-TX); the two of them were on the verge of blows.

Although some of the other

Democratic leaders had expressed concerns over Wright‘s tactics, as then-Majority Leader
Tom Foley (D-WA) reported, ―It was pretty much the speaker‘s decision…The bill was
going to pass, ‗it was going to goddamn pass.‘ He was in that sort of mood.‖107
In the aftermath of the reconciliation bill, partisan tensions in Washington exploded.
The enormous animosity felt between Wright and the GOP poisoned the work of Congress.
―I‘m so mad at Jim Wright and Tom Foley I don‘t want to talk to them, never mind negotiate
with them in good faith. They ought to be ashamed of themselves.‖ Lott said.108 Cheney
claimed, ―The degree of partisanship, the strength of feeling, is more than it has been…We
had our problems with Tip O‘Neill, too, but with Wright it is somehow more bitter.‖109
Speaking with a National Journal reporter, Cheney was even more explicit: Wright
was ―a heavy-handed son of a bitch…and he will do anything he can to win at any price,
including ignoring the rules, bending rules, writing rules, denying the House the opportunity
to work its will. It brings disrespect to the House itself. There‘s no sense of comity left.
Why should you, if you are a Republican, and given the way Republicans are treated, think
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of a Democrat as a colleague? They aren‘t colleagues.‖ 110 Even Willis Gradison of Ohio,
the lone Republican to offer the Democrats his help on the budget several months prior, said
a week after the reconciliation vote, ―It takes a lot to politicize me. Wright‘s done it. I‘m
partisan as hell now.‖111
The highly charged atmosphere once again led Republicans to the strategies and
tactics of Newt Gingrich and the Conservative Opportunity Society. Without intending to do
so, of course, Wright ―really became a catalyst for bringing the whole Republican Party over
to our [COS‘s] side,‖ reported Bob Walker.

―It galvanized the GOP around activist

tactics.‖112 Gingrich took up the Republican cause against Wright with a vengeance. Wright,
he asserted, was ―the most corrupt speaker in the 20th century,‖ a man ―so consumed by his
own power that he‘s like Mussolini.‖113
Employing a tactic he had used against other Democrats in the past, Gingrich
instructed his staff to begin looking into possible ethics violations against Wright. His goal
was to make Wright a metaphor for a corrupt Democratic Party.114 He sent a staff member to
Texas to investigate Wright‘s past and then used Wright‘s relationship with savings and loan
executives to raise questions about his personal integrity.

In September 1987, The

Washington Post gave Gingrich more ammunition by published a front-page story disclosing
that Wright had a sweetheart deal on a privately published book. According to the Post,
Wright received 55 percent royalties, which was five times more than an author‘s standard
payment. 115 After compiling a thick folder of clippings raising questions about Wright‘s
business dealings, Gingrich publicly announced on December 15 that he intended to formally
file an ethics complaint against Wright.
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Gingrich‘s friends initially thought he was making a huge mistake. After having
shown himself to be a leader of the House GOP during the fight over the Indiana
congressional seat, they believed that Gingrich would jeopardize his new status by pursuing
the ethics complaint against Wright. For one thing, they did not think it was possible to
dislodge a sitting speaker. In fact, Gingrich was opening himself up for a Democratic
counterattack into his own personal past, a past that was not exactly as clean as a whistle.
Gingrich dismissed these concerns, telling Vin Weber, ―I‘m not a perfect person. I‘ve got a
lot in my background that isn‘t pleasant. But there‘s nothing like the genuine corruption of
Jim Wright.‖116 ―Newt finally said, I‘m going to do it. I‘m going to see these charges get
filed and if no one is behind me then so be it,‖ Bob Walker remembered.117
The outrage that followed Wright‘s maneuver during the reconciliation bill provided
Gingrich the opportunity to make his case to the entire Republican Conference. However,
the leadership was still skeptical, and in March 1988, Bob Michel asked two Republicans
with prosecutorial experience, Bob Livingston of Louisiana and James Sensenbrenner of
Wisconsin, to examine Gingrich‘s evidence to see if it was enough to go to a grand jury.
They concluded that it was not. Undaunted, Gingrich went back to the press. Gingrich
tirelessly made speeches, held press conferences, and spoke with reporters about Wright. His
strategy was simple. ―We worked on the assumption that if enough newspapers said there
should be an investigation, Common Cause118 would have to say it. Then members would
have to say it. It would happen.‖119 On May 18, Common Cause called for an investigation
and on May 26, Gingrich filed a formal complaint, which was accompanied by a letter of
support signed by seventy-one House Republicans. 120 On July 26, the House Ethics
Committee launched their investigation.
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By the spring of 1989, the House seemed to be mired in scandal. On April 17, the
Ethics Committee issued a report charging Wright with sixty-nine separate violations of
House rules.121 On March 26, Democratic Whip Tony Coelho of California resigned rather
than face an investigation into questionable financial dealings in junk bonds. Wright faced
intense pressure in the press, as dozens of editorials were written calling for his resignation.
Most importantly, his support among members of his own party was melting away.
Democrats ―were so concerned about public opinion,‖ said Rep. John Murtha (D-PA), ―the
fact that it looked like Jim had done something wrong‖ was enough to make them distance
themselves from him.122 Finally, on May 31, after an hour-long, emotional speech on the
House floor, Wright resigned as speaker and a month later resigned his seat in Congress.
Democrats lamented the growing partisan atmosphere in Washington, and blamed
Gingrich for bringing it about. ―There‘s an evil wind blowing in the halls of Congress today
that‘s reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition. We‘ve replaced comity and compassion with
hatred and malice,‖ said Rep. Jack Brooks (D-TX) after Wright‘s resignation. 123 Some
Democrats insisted this was opportunism. Rep. Vic Fazio recalled, ―I had seen him use the
ethics issue from the day he arrived, not because he cared about ethics but because of his
ongoing effort to expose the Democratic Congress as corrupt and out of touch.‖124
But in Republican eyes, Wright was so partisan and ruthless that his fall, by whatever
means, was beneficial. Indeed, at the next meeting of the Republican Conference after
Wright‘s resignation, Gingrich was given a standing ovation.
***************
Partisan or not, by this time Republicans had recognized a certain toughness in
Gingrich, a steeliness of will that elevated him above the others in the COS. His dogged and
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often singular pursuit of Wright, though the speaker had not yet resigned, had shown his
colleagues that he was more than just a bomb-thrower, but someone who had the ideas, the
audacity, and the drive to finally carry them out of their long stay in the minority.
On March 10, 1989, President Bush nominated Dick Cheney, who had become
Republican whip when Trent Lott had been elected to the Senate in 1988, to be Secretary of
Defense. The surprise appointment had come on the heels of the Senate‘s rejection of Bush‘s
first nominee, former Senator John Tower of Texas. As soon as he heard the news, Gingrich
decided to run for whip. ―I couldn‘t allow another member of the Michel wing…to get into
the chain of succession,‖ Gingrich explained. ―Michel is a very fine man. A man I can
respect a great deal. But he had adopted a model of politics in which it was virtually
inevitable we‘d be a minority.‖125
Initially, the whip‘s race seemed wide open; The Washington Post reported that nine
members were considering entering the race. However, when Gingrich announced he was
running, the contest became, in the words of Oklahoma Republican Mickey Edwards,
―Gingrich vs. anti-Gingrich.‖126 The Michel wing of the party coalesced around Edward
Madigan of Illinois, the chief deputy whip and stylistically a carbon copy of Bob Michel. In
fact, Michel made it clear that he would support Madigan, but at the behest of Bob Walker
and a group of two dozen conservatives, Michel agreed that he would not play an active role
in corralling votes for Madigan.
Cheney‘s nomination was announced on a Friday, and Gingrich and his COS allies
immediately got on the phone to round up support for Gingrich‘s candidacy for whip. ―We
had calls going all over the nation. I personally made fifty or sixty calls that weekend. Newt
called nearly everybody in the conference,‖ Bob Walker remembered. Two of the first calls
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Gingrich made that weekend were to Steve Gunderson of Wisconsin and Nancy Johnson of
Connecticut. Gunderson and Johnson were influential members of the 92 Group, a caucus of
the moderate Republicans in the House.
The 92 Group had been formed around the same time as the Conservative
Opportunity Society, but the two groups were not rivals. In fact, Gingrich, recognizing that
creating factions within an already weak House GOP would be detrimental to his goal of
creating a majority, had established friendly relations between the COS and 92 Group in the
mid-1980s. Often, members of each group would meet together on Wednesday mornings to
talk policy and strategy. Although they did not agree on everything, the leadership of both
organizations realized they shared a lot of common ground. Gingrich understood how to deal
with their differences ―without eroding what united us,‖ Johnson later recalled.127
Over years of working with him, Gunderson and Johnson came to admire and respect
Newt Gingrich, both for his intellectual curiosity as well as his unwavering drive. When
Gingrich called them to ask for their support for the whip race, they immediately agreed, and
went to work courting other GOP moderates. Gunderson instructed his staff to call every
other Republican moderate. ―I said don‘t commit to anyone else until we have a chance to
tell you why we think this is important to the future of the party.‖ Although some were
shocked that they would be supporting Gingrich, Johnson told them that he had ―the vision to
build a majority party and the strength and charisma to do it.‖128
When the votes were tallied, Gingrich had won a stunning victory by a razor-thin
margin of 87-85. His success was testament to the incredible frustrations that had been
building up within the Republican Party for years. The election broke down generational
lines, with most of the younger members, including many moderates, willing to gamble on
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Gingrich while rejecting the party‘s traditional attitude of accommodating the majority. As
William Safire wrote in a New York Times editorial before the votes were cast, ―This is not a
moderate vs. conservative split.

The struggle is about the basic approach to how the

Republicans do business in the House: dickering for crumbs from the table of Speaker
Wright or sharing fairly in power with Speaker-to-be Foley.‖129 Representative Lynn Martin
of Illinois said: ―I think people felt we accommodated ourselves for a number of years and
we‘ve ended up with fewer seats. Let‘s try something else.‖130 Even Bob Michel realized
that the GOP Conference wanted change. Michel said Gingrich ―won by a clean, clear fight
in the conference. And so what that says to me is they want us to be more activated and
more visible and more aggressive and we can‘t be content with business as usual.‖131
***************
The story of the House Republican Party in the 1980s is one of dramatic
transformation. When the decade began, House Republicans were content in their minority
role, accepting of the fact that they were a permanent minority. All but a very small few had
never served under a Republican speaker, and none believed that they would ever see such a
thing again. Time had bred complacency, and no Republican with any piece of power, no
matter how small, was willing to risk it for their party.
By the end of the decade, an active and confrontational House GOP had been forged,
and the highly partisan Newt Gingrich had been elected GOP whip. The whip election itself
offered powerful evidence of the degree to which the House Republicans had been
transformed. ―I came here [in 1978] and the party would never elect Newt Gingrich to be
whip, and for ten years I changed the party,‖ Gingrich said. ―I didn‘t run for leadership, I
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just changed the party. In 1989 I went from being backbencher to the second-ranking
Republican.‖132
Gingrich, of course, overstates his case. First of all, the partisan tactics employed by
the Democrats in restricting debate, stacking committees, reporting closed rules provided the
context in which Republicans could first begin to listen to the arguments of Gingrich.
Second, the membership of the House was changing. Older Republicans, generally more
accomodationist in their thinking, retired throughout the decade, and they were replaced by a
new crop of younger Republicans who were more willing to take risks given their low
position on the seniority lists and their miniscule amount of power. By 1989, the factions
that favored Gingrich had grown while those that opposed him shrunk.
Nevertheless, one cannot discount the actions of Gingrich and the members of the
Conservative Opportunity Society in reshaping the mindset and attitudes of their House
Republican colleagues. No one man can change an institution the size of the House, Richard
Nixon told Gingrich in the fall of 1982, but a group of committed activists, faithful to ideas
and willing to take risks, can accomplish a revolution. The COS displayed remarkable
fidelity to their cause and were able to master a powerful new medium—television—in order
to advance it. They called for a change of attitude before anyone else did, and when
partisanship became the norm in the House chamber, they were uniquely suited to lead.
Like people, institutions are shaped by the major events in their lives. The special
order debates on the floor, Camscam and the subsequent battle on the floor between Gingrich
and O‘Neill, the McCloskey-McIntyre election, ―Black Thursday,‖ and the ethics probe of
Jim Wright each seared the memories of Democrats and Republicans, coloring their vision of
subsequent events. These fights became the oral history of the House, a sort of creation myth
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that each party taught to their newcomers. These stories changed patterns of thought and
action.
Gingrich benefitted greatly from the emerging GOP story that portrayed the
Democrats as arrogant politicians that would yield to nothing but fierce partisan pressure.
Now with a leadership position as House whip, and as the heir apparent to GOP Leader Bob
Michel, who was widely expected to retire within a few years, Gingrich was uniquely
positioned to lead the Republican Party into the tumultuous political waters of the 1990s.
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CHAPTER 2:
DEVELOPING AN IDENTITY

The idyllic farms and rolling hills of Kentucky‘s second congressional district were a
peculiar place to find a revolution. The district, spreading south and west of Louisville along
the Ohio River, was emblematic of small-town America, a place where family roots ran deep
and a connection with the past was much more pronounced than one would find in the cities.
Both Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis had been born within the boundaries of the
Second District, and during the Civil War its counties had been split on secession. However,
at the end of the war, the district, like much of the Old South, voted solidly Democratic.
By 1994, William Huston Natcher had represented the second district in the United
States House of Representatives for forty-one years. A member of the very old school, he
served as the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, one of the most powerful positions
in Congress, and was so hard-working and conscientious that he had never missed a single
roll call vote during his entire career, a streak of 18,401 consecutive votes. So faithful to his
streak, Natcher had once hired a cab to drive him from Louisville to Washington when
weather grounded his plane. Near death in March 1994, Natcher was even rolled onto the
House floor on a gurney hooked up to an IV and oxygen to keep his streak alive.
Natcher was a living legend, an institution within the institution of the House. He
was in his office by 7:00 a.m. every morning, opened his own mail, and, in an age when the
number of congressional staffers was skyrocketing, only employed ―five ladies,‖ as he
described them, who answered the telephones, greeted visitors and took dictation. 133
Although as Appropriations Chair he was one of the most powerful men in the country and
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could have easily raised a war-chest of campaign cash, he refused to take campaign
donations, preferring instead to place a few advertisements in the local papers and drive his
own car around the district, going from farm to farm, house to house, door to door. In 1990,
he spent $6,768 of his own money to win 66 percent of the vote against his Republican
challenger who spent $144,315.134
When Natcher died of heart failure in March 1994, Democrats did not worry about
losing the seat. Although in recent presidential elections, the district had voted for the
Republican candidate, including a dominating 20 percentage point margin in 1988 for
George Bush, the Second District had been represented in the House by Democrats
continuously since 1865, and 68 percent of the district‘s voters were registered Democrats.
Following Natcher‘s death, a special election to fill his seat was called for May 24.
Initially, the Kentucky contest looked like a terrible mismatch. The Democratic
candidate, Joe Prather, was well known after having served as state party chairman and as
Democratic leader in the State Senate for a decade. His Republican opponent was Ron Lewis,
a Baptist minister and owner of a small Christian bookstore with no political experience.
Prather was so confident that he would win the seat that the week before the special election,
he traveled to Washington to go apartment hunting.
The Republicans, however, had different ideas. On March 10, a special election was
held in Oklahoma to fill the seat of retiring Democrat Glenn English, and Republican Frank
Lucas had won a surprisingly easy race against his Democratic opponent, Dan Webber, who
worked for popular Oklahoma Senator David Boren. The relatively easy GOP victory in a
traditionally Democratic district had important implications.

As Newt Gingrich later
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explained, ―The unexpected, easy victory in Oklahoma…inspired us to put all of our efforts
into the [Kentucky] campaign.‖135
Buoyed by the prospect of another stunning victory, the National Republican
Congressional Committee (NRCC) committed maximum resources over the last two weeks
of the Kentucky race. In early May, the committee commissioned a poll that showed Prather
with a fifteen point lead, which was far from insurmountable considering that Lewis had
almost no name recognition. Even better news was President Clinton‘s abysmal standing in
the district.

As a result of his failure to keep his campaign promises, his languishing

healthcare bill, and his inability to work effectively with congressional Democrats, only 30
percent thought he deserved reelection in 1996 and 56 percent—including almost half of the
Democrats surveyed—thought that voting Republican would be a good way of sending the
president a message. The strategy was clear to NRCC Chairman Rep. Bill Paxon of New
York: ―We‘re going after Clinton,‖ he told his staff.
The attack, however, could not be an overt, frontal assault, but rather a stealth
campaign that would catch the complacent Democrats napping. The NRCC prevailed on
Lewis and his campaign to hold their attacks and their money for the last week of the
campaign. In the meantime, the national party organization was hard at work producing an
advertisement that would evaporate Prather‘s lead in the polls and epitomize the Republican
strategy for the fall campaign: the Morph Ad.
Computer technology had grown sophisticated enough in the mid-1990s that
programmers were able to transform faces on the screen. This was the basis of the Morph Ad.
―If you like Bill Clinton, you‘ll love Joe Prather,‖ the unseen announcer‘s voice boomed as
Prather‘s face morphed into Bill Clinton‘s and then back again on the screen, ―Send a
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message to Bill Clinton. Send Ron Lewis to Congress.‖ On Friday, May 13, the Lewis
campaign bought saturation-level coverage of the Morph Ad, which prompted an immediate
shift in the polls. Prather, who was on his apartment-hunting trip to Washington when the ad
came out, rushed back to the district but never regained his footing. In the last week of the
campaign, a Republican barrage of mail, television, and endorsement visits inundated the
district. Lewis toured the district from the air with Bob Dole; it was the first time Lewis‘s
wife had been on an airplane.
On Election Day, May 24, Lewis won a resounding victory, 55 percent to 45 percent.
The significance of his victory was not lost on the national party establishment. In the
NRCC offices in Washington, an impromptu party had broken out, with members
backslapping and celebrating. ―You could almost feel the dam burst,‖ Paxon recalled. 136 A
tidal wave of excitement was clearly afoot, and the Republicans knew they could take
advantage of the anti-Clinton feelings to gain seats in the House of Representatives that fall.
Clinton—more specifically, opposition to Clinton—was the glue that would connect this new
coalition of voters. Speaking of the Morph Ad the day after the special election, Newt
Gingrich told reporters, ―I wouldn‘t be surprised to see that ad in two hundred districts this
fall.‖137
***************
The GOP victory in Kentucky in 1994 instantly and dramatically changed the
complexion of the 1994 race, but such a victory was unimaginable just two years prior. In
the aftermath of the 1992 elections, the Republican Party was in the doldrums. The party had
lost the White House after twelve consecutive years of Republican governance, and the
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Democrats continued to hold substantial majorities in both houses of Congress. Worse, the
party was disillusioned and disappointed.
Central to this lack of identity among Republicans was the performance of George
H.W. Bush as president. By nearly all measures, the Bush years had been a failure for the
Republican Party. ―When Ronald Reagan left for California on January 20, 1989, George
Bush was left with more assets than any president in history,‖ Rep. Dick Armey (R-TX)
wrote. ―Seeing liberalism in its death throes, voters turned to George Bush and said, ‗Finish
it off!‘ Instead, they got a reversal of the Reagan Revolution.‖138
Armey‘s derisive comments refer to the 1990 budget battle, arguably the defining
political contest of Bush‘s presidency and the moment when House Republicans declared
their independence from White House leadership. In the midst of the 1988 campaign, Bush
famously pronounced, ―Read my lips—no new taxes!‖ However by the spring of 1990, the
forecasted deficit for fiscal year 1991 was $20 billion more than the $64 billion level that the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act allowed. Bush, partly looking toward his own reelection,
opened up budget negotiations in May by declaring that ―everything was on the table,‖
including the possibility of increased taxes, in the effort to close the budget gap.
After two months of false-starts, Bush invited congressional leaders from both parties
to the White House for breakfast on June 26 as a way to jump-start the budget process. In a
statement to the press later that day, Bush reaffirmed his earlier willingness to consider what
he termed ―tax revenue increases.‖ No one was fooled by the semantics. The Washington
Post ran the headline, ―Bush Abandons Campaign Pledge, Calls for New Taxes.‖139
As soon as they heard the news, House Republicans were furious. White House
Chief of Staff John Sununu called Gingrich to reassure him that the president was still
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committed to not raising taxes, only to increasing revenue. Privately, Gingrich was livid and
slammed the phone down on Sununu. By mid-afternoon, Rep. Bob Walker (R-PA) had
rounded up ninety signatures on a letter from House Republicans to Bush: ―We were
stunned by your announcement that you would be willing to accept tax revenue increases as a
part of a budget summit package. A tax increase is unacceptable.‖140 Walker‘s letter was
quickly followed by a similar one signed by two dozen Republican senators.
Although Gingrich, as the Republican whip, was nominally part of the negotiations,
he was torn between his loyalty to the Republican Conference that elected him and his desire
to want to help a president of his own party. Initially, he seemed willing to compromise,
hinting that he and other House Republicans would be able to support increased taxes as long
as they weren‘t in the income tax and they were combined with a reduction in the capital
gains tax. However, Gingrich‘s resistance to any new taxes stiffened as he learned more
about the president‘s proposal. ―There got to be a point during the budget summit that I was
beginning to listen carefully to liberal Democratic arguments and tried to figure out how I
could agree with them,‖ Gingrich said. ―When I got home I realized, in fact, that that was
not why I got hired,‖ he said. ―I suddenly realized how real the ‗Stockholm Syndrome‘ is—
when you are captured by a terrorist and start identifying with the kidnappers.‖141
Throughout the summer, the warning signals from the House Republicans grew
louder and more frequent. In July, Rep. Dick Armey proposed a resolution in the Republican
Conference that said GOP members would oppose any deal that included a tax increase. The
Conference adopted it by a two-to-one margin on July 18. ―We admire the president, and we
support the president, but we don‘t work for the president,‖ said Representative Mickey
Edwards, an Oklahoma Republican.142 In the wake of this resolution, Armey was excluded
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from budget negotiations, despite the fact he was the ranking member of the Joint Economic
Committee. On August 22, Gingrich gave a speech to the Heritage Foundation in which he
lambasted the proposed tax increases. Over Labor Day weekend, Gingrich told White House
congressional liaison Nick Calio that he owed his loyalty to the House Republican
Conference and his own principles, not to the White House.
Bush and his principle economic advisors, Office of Management and Budget
Director Richard Darman and Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, ignored these warnings,
instead believing that Gingrich and the rest of the House Republicans would have to support
the package in the end. ―The pressure on Newt at that point was enormous,‖ Walker said.
―What they were using on him was, you‘re now a member of the leadership, you signed up to
be a member of the leadership, your president needs you right now.‖143
Gingrich was sending mixed signals. He continued to attend the summit negotiations,
but spoke little, instead preferring to read novels and write notes to colleagues. 144 In
September, he sent a memo to Sununu and Darman that hinted that he could support the final
package:

―With a good agreement and full partnership in the decision process, the

Republican leadership and membership will work hard,‖ he wrote.145
With 10 days to go before the negotiators‘ self-imposed deadline of October 1, most
of the negotiators, including Gingrich, were dismissed and the fate of the budget package was
put in the hands of the so-called Big Eight:

Sununu, Darman, and Brady from the

administration and Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS), House Minority Leader Bob
Michel (R-IL), House Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA), House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt
(D-MO), and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME). As the negotiators met
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behind closed doors at Andrews Air Force Base, nervous House Republicans sported ―Junk
the Summit‖ buttons.
Finally, on September 29, a deal was reached and a Rose Garden ceremony was
planned for the next day. Sununu called Gingrich to brief him on the outline of the deal,
which included $133 billion in new taxes over five years, but did not contain the capital gains
tax cuts that Gingrich and other House Republicans had wanted. Gingrich said that House
Republicans would not support it, and repeated the same message to the president just before
the Rose Garden announcement the next day: ―I can‘t support this,‖ he said. ―I don‘t think it
will pass…I think you may destroy your presidency and I think it‘d be an enormous
mistake.‖146
Immediately, Gingrich left the White House and traveled back to the Capitol to
organize the opposition to the budget bill. He found an angry GOP Conference. ―It looks
like a road map to recession,‖ said Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). ―I think it‘s a cave-in to
the liberal Democrats. This is totally irresponsible, and the system has broken down.‖147
―To me, this is the fiscal equivalent of Yalta,‖ remarked Rep. Chuck Douglas (R-NH).148
Initially, their opposition strategy was undecided, but as Rep. Dan Burton (R-CA) made clear,
―This is guerrilla war, and you may rest assured that whatever it takes to scuttle this terrible
budget package, we will do it.‖149
Gingrich quickly came out publicly against the package, and he was joined by four
other members of the GOP House Leadership: Reps. Vin Weber (R-MN), Bill McCollum
(R-FL), Duncan Hunter (R-CA) and Robert Walker (R-PA). Both Dole and Michel urged
Republicans to support the president, and the White House sent Sununu, Brady, Darman, and
Vice President Dan Quayle to lobby for the package. On October 2, the president spoke to
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the American people from the Oval Office, telling them that ―this deficit agreement is tough
and so are the times…This is the first time in my presidency that I‘ve made an appeal like
this to you, the American people. With your help, we can at last put this budget crisis behind
us and face the challenges that lie ahead.‖150
On October 4, debate ensued in the House and on the next morning, the package was
defeated by a vote of 179-254, with 105 House Republicans, led by Gingrich, voting against
the measure and only 71 supporting it. Combined with a majority of the Democrats who
were upset at the bill‘s spending cuts, the budget package went down.

It was an

embarrassing defeat for the White House, especially considering President Bush‘s strident
appeal for support in his televised address. Although the budget negotiators went back to
work and agreed on a new package by the end of the month, the second bill was even worse
than the first one in the eyes of House conservatives, and it passed with the help of
Democrats, not Republicans.
The budget episode demonstrated how volatile the House GOP had become, and how
willing they were to buck their party‘s leaders in favor of their ideologies. Ironically, the
House Republicans‘ insistence to not bend on ideological principles caused the White House
to look for votes on the Democratic side of the aisle, guaranteeing that the new bill would be
even more unacceptable to the House GOP. Rather than compromise, their all-or-nothing
approach was detrimental to their efforts to align policy with principle, although it ended up
being beneficial politically, one of the fundamental paradoxes of politics.
For many Republicans, the Bush years were characterized by the words of Rep. Tom
DeLay, who said, ―I spent the entire four years fighting Republicans, not Democrats.‖ 151 The
budget battle was the moment when the House Republicans declared their status as an
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autonomous political force, and they began to think of themselves and their fate, as
independent of the White House.
This change of perspective was extremely significant as the 1990s moved forward.
Since the Republicans had last been the majority in the House in 1954, of the thirty-eight
years between then and 1992 when Bill Clinton was elected president, the House GOP had
served for twenty-six of them under Republican presidents, including the last twelve under
Reagan and Bush. By the 1990s, they had grown accustomed to taking their lead from the
White House, which in many cases meant they had no opportunity to pursue their own ideas
and proposals. However, after the break with Bush, the House GOP no longer felt tied to the
White House, and thus was able to become an independent political force even while a
Republican still controlled the White House.

By not merely existing to further the

president‘s agenda, the House Republicans were free to formulate their own, and thus were
able to acclimate themselves to acting independent of outside guidance. The two years that
the House Republicans were able to do this under a Republican president were instrumental
in allowing them to become a formidable opposition to President Clinton when he took office
in 1993. In contrast, the Democrats went from being an opposition party to being the
governing party (in the sense that they controlled the White House), and did not acclimate to
their new situation as seamlessly as the Republicans.
Gingrich himself, as a member of the leadership, came under heavy criticism for his
opposition to the president. ―You pay a penalty for leadership,‖ snapped Bob Dole, the
Senate Republican leader. ―If you don‘t want to pay the penalty, maybe you ought to find
some other line of work.‖ 152 Richard Darman, the OMB director, later complained that
Gingrich had intimated that he would support the package, only to renege later on: ―He
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never led people to believe he might bolt.‖ To Darman, Gingrich‘s actions were like ―a stab
in the back.‖153
***************
To Gingrich, however, it was clear that his loyalties lied with the House Republican
Conference, a group that he had done much to transform since his election to Congress in
1978. Cleverly reasoning that ―if you just kept building momentum and you would capture
70 to 80 percent of the incoming freshmen every two years, at some point you have
transformed the whole structure,‖ Gingrich went to work from his position at the NRCC to
involve himself with the campaigns and elections side of House Republican politics.154
In 1986, he received an unexpected boon when he was asked to take over GOPAC, a
political action committee founded in 1979 by former Delaware Governor Pete DuPont.
DuPont had established GOPAC to fundraise and recruit Republican candidates for state and
local offices. His goal was to create a ―farm team‖ of sorts—an army of local officials that
would be able to challenge Democrats for seats in Congress and governorships in the future.
As DuPont put it, ―You can‘t work from the top down with the right guy at the top of the
ticket, you‘ve got to have that army…The GOP is not the majority party today and it won‘t
be until we get down to the governors, mayors and county commissioners.‖155
Fearing that GOPAC would become entangled in his candidacy for the 1988
Republican presidential nomination, DuPont searched for an energetic young conservative to
replace him. ―We were looking for someone who wanted to build the party at the grass
roots,‖ DuPont said. ―Newt seemed head and shoulders above everybody.‖ Over the next
few years, Gingrich transformed GOPAC from a traditional political action committee that
solely doled out campaign dollars to a dynamic training organization that was designed to
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give candidates the wherewithal to run and win on their own. 156 To that end, Gingrich
traveled around the country meeting candidates and potential donors, gradually building a
base for himself and for his cause.
The most important mechanism Gingrich developed at GOPAC was a series of
tapes—audio and video—that he sent to thousands of local candidates around the country.
They would arrive unsolicited, containing hours upon hours of ―tactics and strategies and
ideas and issues, lectures from Gingrich or his political advisors, [and] interviews with other
successful Republicans.‖

In the words of two reporters, ―It was like subscribing to a

motivational course, with Gingrich a cross between Norman Vincent Peale and a Marine drill
sergeant.‖157
―I started getting tapes in 1986 or 1987,‖ said Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), who was
elected to the House in 1990. Boehner popped the tape into his car‘s cassette player. ―I
thought, this is great...If it weren‘t for the tapes, I probably wouldn‘t have run for Congress.
I‘m not sure I would have been comfortable enough understanding the breadth of a lot of
issues and where we should go.‖158 Roger Wicker, elected to the House in 1994 and now a
U.S. Senator from Mississippi, was another GOPAC devotee: ―A great deal of the political
philosophy I brought to Washington was shaped by Newt Gingrich.‖159
GOPAC also provided material on how to talk ―Gingrich.‖ In 1990, the committee
sent over 6,000 state and local candidates a memo entitled ―Language, a Key Mechanism of
Control,‖ which listed 133 words that they should use to describe themselves and their
opponents. Positive words included opportunity, challenge, courage, pristine, principle(d),
care, caring, common sense, peace, and pioneer. Negatives ones included decay, sick,
unionized bureaucracy, greed, corruption, radical, permissive, and bizarre. 160

When
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Democrats heard of this mailing, they were not amused. Gingrich was called ―a modern day
McCarthy‖ by his opponent in the 1990 election; other Democrats were more subtle in their
criticism: ―While the Democrats are dealing with issues, Republicans are playing Scrabble,‖
quipped Democratic National Committee spokeswoman Ginny Terzano.161
Through GOPAC, Gingrich was successful in his goal to recruit and train a
generation of candidates who would talk and think like him. By the early 1990s, Gingrich
and GOPAC were working hand-in-hand with Spencer Abraham—then the executive
director of the NRCC—to recruit candidates for Congress, many of whom won. Combined
with the large number of retirements of older members in the early 1990s, by 1992, the
makeup of the Republican Conference was decidedly younger, more conservative, and more
activist. Following Bush‘s loss of the White House, this energized Republican Conference
would be free to pursue its own agenda.
***************
President Bush stumbled through 1992, running an uninspired general election
campaign that was notable only for its constantly shifting message and inability to define
itself. As early as April, Gingrich wrote the president to urge him to find his voice: ―I am
close to despair about the self-destructive patterns and habits of this administration…We are
inconsistent, uncertain, and unreliable.‖162 To many observers, it was incredible that by the
August Republican National Convention, Bush was down twenty points to a young, southern
governor who was dogged by character issues, especially considering that Bush had enjoyed
record-high approval ratings just one year prior for his handling of the Gulf War.
The Republican Party had been badly fractured since the 1990 budget battle. To
many conservatives, Bush‘s decision to raise taxes to close the deficit forced the party to
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squander an opportunity to reinforce its status among the American electorate that the GOP
was the anti-tax party. The bitter primary battle that Bush faced from conservative Pat
Buchanan and then Buchanan‘s inflammatory speech at the Republican National Convention
declaring that the United States was in the middle of a culture war were symptoms of a party
that had lost its unity and purpose. Registered Republicans bolted the party by the thousands
or simply stayed home on Election Day. In the end, Bush lost the election in a close, threeway race.
Ironically, Bush‘s defeat was celebrated by the young rebels in the House GOP
Conference. ―Oh, man, yeah, it was fabulous,‖ said Rep. Tom DeLay (R-TX), who feared a
second Bush term meant ―another four years of misery.‖ 163
characteristic among Republican members of the House.

DeLay‘s opinion was

Twelve consecutive years of

Republican presidents had not brought about the majority that had eluded the GOP since
1954. In fact, during the Reagan-Bush years, the NRCC had spent $260 million trying to win
back the House, but paradoxically GOP numbers were reduced from 192 in 1981 to 176 in
1993.
Despite Bush‘s defeat, Republicans picked up nine seats in the House.

More

significantly, the freshman class consisted of 110 members—47 Republicans and 63
Democrats—the most since World War II. A record number of retirements had occurred in
the run-up to the 1992 elections as a result of two scandals that broke in early 1992 involving
the House bank and post office. For years, the House bank had allowed members to bounce
checks with no penalties and the post office allowed them to convert their allowances for
stamps to cash. When these scandals broke, a group of seven Republican freshmen—the socalled Gang of Seven—joined together to force the Democratic leadership to release a full
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list of those who had overdrafts, even if it meant releasing the names of Republicans as well.
Memorably, Rep. Jim Nussle of Iowa appeared on the House floor with a paper bag over his
head, claiming he was embarrassed to be recognized as a member of the House.
The 1992 GOP freshmen were largely cut in the Gang of Seven mold. They were
young, conservative, and nearly all of them had benefitted directly from GOPAC materials.
Their impact was immediately felt in early December when the Conference held its
organizing meeting to elect its leaders for the 103rd Congress. In each election, the younger,
activist member won the position, a surprising sweep of the leadership posts that left Bob
Michel as the lone traditionalist in the leadership.
The most surprising victory was won by Rep. Dick Armey of Texas, who defeated the
incumbent chairman of the House GOP Conference, Jerry Lewis of California by a four-vote
margin. Armey had come to Congress in 1984 and had long nurtured the image of an
outsider, at one point living in his office as a demonstration of his disdain for the trappings of
power. ―My heart is in Texas,‖ he said, ―not with the Washington establishment.‖ Lewis
was of the Michel school, a man who preferred compromise to confrontation and often
worked with Democrats closely on the Appropriations Committee.

Gingrich openly

supported Armey in the race, and his election was aided by nearly 30 votes from the
freshman class.

Freshman Ernest Istook of Oklahoma said that Armey‘s victory

demonstrated that ―the majority of Republican members agree we need an aggressive tack to
highlight the differences between Republicans and Democrats on taxes, spending, and
overregulation.‖164
Before his defeat, Lewis was seen as the main challenger to Gingrich for Michel‘s job
as Leader when Michel retired, and he blamed Gingrich for his defeat: ―There‘s little
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question that Newt felt if there was a competitor on the leadership ladder who might be in the
way, it was probably me. So early on, I was moved out of the way.‖165
The result of the leadership races was clear to all—all the positions save the Leader‘s
were filled by activist members, continuing the trend that brought Gingrich to the Whip‘s
position in 1989. It was clear that the House GOP Conference was restless. But in the 1992
defeat, they recognized a valuable opportunity. With the Republican Party in turmoil, they
realized that they had a once-in-a-generation chance to dramatically change the leadership
and convince more moderate members to try a new tack, because the old one, so went the
argument, certainly wasn‘t working.
***************
Expectations were high when William Jefferson Clinton took the oath of office as
president on January 20, 1993. He was the first Democrat to occupy the Oval Office in
twelve years and he enjoyed large Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, the first
president since Jimmy Carter to lead a unified government. Moreover, Clinton had toppled a
president who had seemed unbeatable—George H.W. Bush‘s approval ratings were near 90
percent just a year before his defeat—running on a New Democrat agenda that promised to
deliver results addressing the nation‘s greatest problems in a sensible, moderate way.
Nevertheless, Clinton was a student of history, and he was determined to avoid the
mistakes made by the last Democratic Administration, that of Jimmy Carter. Chief among
Carter‘s problems was his relationship with Congress, where he failed to heed the touchy
sensitivities of the congressional barons and paid for it for four years. Carter‘s ineptitude
relating to the Congress stemmed from his anti-Washington beliefs. To him, Washington
politics was a secondary concern, something that was unsavory and not only a little sordid.
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When then-Speaker Tip O‘Neill met with Carter for the first time, the president-elect
explained his proposed legislative program, whereupon O‘Neill advised him to consult such
and such subcommittee chairs. Carter chafed at the suggestion and cavalierly stated that he
would go over their heads to appeal to the American people. ―At that precise moment Tip
knew they were in trouble,‖ said longtime O‘Neill aide Gary Hymel.166
When he came to the White House, he brought with him a Georgia ―mafia‖ of
advisors, few of whom had any experience in Washington and many with unrealistic
preconceptions. ―Too many of Carter‘s people—especially Hamilton Jordan, the president‘s
top aide—came to Washington with a chip on their shoulder and never changed,‖ said
O‘Neill. ―They failed to understand that the presidency didn‘t operate in a vacuum, that
Congress was fundamentally different from the Georgia legislature, and that we intended to
be full partners in the legislative process.‖ 167 To show his contempt for Jordan, O‘Neill
began to refer to the president‘s chief of staff as Hannibal Jerkin, privately of course, but to
enough friends and members of the press that he ensured word got around.
The Carter Administration couldn‘t even perform the most basic political tasks. Rep.
John Brademas (D-IN), the Majority Whip, had to spell his name whenever he called the
White House.168 Rep. Jim Wright (D-TX) asked the administration for three jobs to reward
supporters; he got one part-time position. No one bothered to inform Rules Committee
Chairman Jim Delaney (D-NY) when his son was dropped from a list of nominees to the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

169

The result was four years of frustration and

discouragement.
Bill Clinton and his staff were determined to avoid the same fate. ―There was a
terrific fear in the first year that he [Clinton] would become like Carter,‖ said Clinton aide
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Paul Begala.170 The day after his election, the New York Times succinctly summed up the
challenge Clinton would face: ―a largely Democratic but freewheeling group of legislators
who hunger for results but chafe at discipline, unaccustomed to dealing with a president of
their own party and used to calling the shots for the party themselves.‖171
To help him manage Congress, Clinton surrounded himself with advisors with close
ties to Congress:

George Stephanopoulos had worked in Majority Leader Richard

Gephardt‘s (D-MO) office; Leon Panetta, initially Office of Management and Budget
Director and later Chief of Staff, had been a Democratic congressman from California since
1977. ―At almost every turn,‖ journalists Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein reported, ―these
advisors urged cooperation, not confrontation, with Congress as the way to steer clear of
Carter‘s difficulties.‖172
During the third week of the transition, Clinton invited Speaker of the House Tom
Foley, House Majority Leader Gephardt, and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell to
Little Rock. As Clinton later acknowledged, ―It was important for me to get off on the right
foot with the Democratic leaders. I knew I had to have their support to succeed.‖173 At the
meeting, the congressional leaders urged Clinton to shelve his campaign promise of
campaign finance reform and welfare reform. Unwilling to alienate his congressional allies,
Clinton agreed, and thus strayed from the centrist message of his campaign before he had
even taken office. The voters were expecting one thing, but Clinton and the congressional
Democrats were about to give them another.
***************
For all the promise Clinton portended on his inauguration day, his first few months in
office did not meet the hype. His first nominee for attorney general, Zoe Baird, had to
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Noah Weiss, College ‘09

WEISS | 63

withdraw her nomination after it was discovered that she had hired illegal aliens as nannies
and had not paid Social Security taxes for them, a scandal the press soon labeled
―Nannygate.‖174 His first two major acts in office were ―to announce a new policy admitting
open homosexuals to the military, which he was soon forced to withdraw, and to shelve the
middle-class tax cut that had been promised in the campaign, replacing it with a substantial
tax increase.‖ 175 Clinton could not even make small, personal decisions without facing
negative results. His decision to visit an expensive Beverly Hills coiffeur for a $200 haircut
while Air Force One blocked two runways at Los Angeles International Airport for nearly an
hour was ridiculed in the press and among the public.176
At the end of his first four months in office, Clinton had not much to show for himself
beyond sinking poll numbers and public dissatisfaction. A Time/CNN poll on June 7, 1993
found that Clinton‘s approval rating was at a dismal 36 percent and fully 50 percent of the
public disapproved of his performance.177 Most disturbing of all for the White House, 58
percent of the public now believed that Clinton was a ―tax and spend liberal.‖178
***************
In addition to his troubles with Democrats, President Clinton confronted a
reenergized Republican Party in full revolt, unwilling to accept him as president. Many
conservatives believed ―they were engaged in a war for the soul of America, and they viewed
the election in 1992 of a draft-dodging, pot-smoking womanizer as an indication that they
were losing the war.‖ 179 Clinton‘s attempt to change the policy on gays in the military
inspired a mass politicization of evangelical Christians, a group that until then had not played
a significant role in electoral politics. The proposed tax increase in Clinton‘s first budget
brought anti-tax Americans back to the GOP. Indeed, Republican mistrust of Clinton went
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so far in 1993 that 93 percent of Republicans believed the federal government ―no longer
represents the intents of the Founding Fathers.‖180
The anti-Clinton sentiment among Republicans was instrumental to the plans of
Haley Barbour, the newly elected Chairman of the Republican National Committee. A
genial Mississippian, Barbour had begun his career as a political operative on the Nixon
campaign in 1968, and had later directed the Mississippi Republican Party and served as
political director in the Reagan White House. Upon taking office as RNC Chairman, he
inherited the chairmanship of a party in shambles. The number of registered Republicans
was down, small donations had dried up, and the party lacked both an identity and a power
base. To Barbour, the lesson of 1992 was clear: ―We Republicans have to stand for
something. For us to succeed, for us to win elections, people have to know what we believe
in, and why, and to feel like we will adhere to those principles.‖181
Barbour began his quest to revitalize the party by commissioning a fifty-question
survey to be sent to Republicans nationwide. He believed that after twelve years in the
White House, Republicans in Washington had lost touch of the issues important to the rank
and file. The secondary goal of the survey was to transform the image of the RNC as merely
a solicitor of donations. ―We had to stop and ask ourselves, ‗When was the last time we sent
out a mailer that didn‘t ask for money?‘ recalled Barbour‘s chief deputy Don Fierce. ―No
one knew.‖182
Of the 400,000 surveys that the RNC sent out, Barbour expected about 5 percent of
them to be returned, but by mid-year, over 20 percent of them had been sent back. Portions
of the survey had been simple ratings but others had been open-ended, and the quality of
responses to the latter type of questions surprised Barbour the most, ―I can‘t imagine how
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many barrels of ink got used on people writing on those surveys…And every single note and
letter was read and recorded. This was a massive focus group.‖ 183 The survey‘s results
stressed a back-to-the-basics approach: lower taxes, smaller government, balanced budgets,
welfare reform, defense spending, congressional reform, among others.
Also instrumental to revitalizing the RNC was Barbour‘s efforts to create a
communications unit.

Under his leadership, the RNC created its own television

programming channel under the name GOPTV, a magazine called Rising Tide, a think tank,
and a fax program called ―Haley‘s Comments‖ that was sent to thousands of Washington
insiders each day blasting Clinton ―every time the president even glanced to his left.‖184
As President Clinton continued his missteps over the first few months of his term,
Barbour ramped up the RNC‘s fundraising operations and was handsomely rewarded. The
message of the appeals was ―red meat…one-hundred percent anti-Clinton,‖ Scott Reed, then
the RNC‘s Chief of Staff, put it.185 One letter attacked Clinton for supporting ―far-out social
concepts of diversity, multiculturalism and political correctness.‖186 Money poured in from
all over the country.
***************
The first major test of Clinton‘s presidency began in the spring of 1993 when the
Administration proposed its first budget. During the 1992 campaign, the president had
promised a middle-class tax cut along with ―investments‖ in social programs, but with the
federal deficit swelling to $300 million, Clinton, in a move that harkened back to President
Bush‘s decision in 1990, was forced to shelve his promise in favor of cutting the deficit.
The president intended to combine a modest tax increase with cuts in social programs,
but he quickly ran into stiff opposition from liberal congressional Democrats when he
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discussed program cuts.

―The discussion was, ‗This chairman won‘t like this, this

subcommittee chairman won‘t like that,‘‖ recalled Begala.187 Not wanted to ruffle feathers
on Capitol Hill, the budget made no significant cuts and called for increasing the top tax
bracket from 31 to 36 percent.
In proposing a budget that contained tax increases, Clinton was wary of the
Republican whip Newt Gingrich.

After all, Clinton observed, Gingrich had ―skewered

President Bush for signing the Democrats‘ deficit-reduction package in 1990 [because it
contained a moderate tax increase]...I could only imagine what he intended to do to me.‖188
Republicans were ecstatic when the budget was proposed.

In Gingrich‘s eyes,

Clinton‘s budget proved that ―Clinton was not the moderate New Democrat he had promised
during the campaign but just another old liberal Democrat who campaigned as a
moderate.‖189 The tax increases contained in the budget enabled Gingrich to get the entire
Republican Conference to oppose the budget, and they were helped by moderate Democrats
who felt abandoned by the promises of Clinton‘s campaign. ―We were achieving pretty fair
unanimity in our conference…because it was easy to be against [what] the Administration
wanted when it went hard left,‖ recalled Rep. Bob Walker (R-PA). ―Centrist Democrats
became in play for us because…the Democratic proposals were unsupportable in their
districts.‖190
The Republicans, however, were not content with just opposing the Clinton budget.
In late February, the Conference had gathered for a retreat in Princeton, New Jersey to plot
their strategy for the year. There, the younger activist members continued to make their
mark on the Conference: ―A core group of members, Jim Nussle, John Boehner, and Martin
Hoke, stood up and were saying, ‗We have to be for something, we cannot just be against
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Bill Clinton. We have to provide an alternative vision of government,‖ remembered Ed
Gillespie, who was then Conference Chairman Dick Armey‘s press secretary. 191 At the
conference, it was decided that the House Republican minority would write a budget under
the leadership of the Budget Committee‘s ranking member, John Kasich (R-OH). Although
the Republicans‘ budget was later defeated, the idea of a minority writing its own budget was
unprecedented, and showed that Republicans were not blindly opposing Clinton.
On August 5, after months of wrangling, Clinton‘s budget bill passed by a single vote
in the House, as President Clinton personally called dozens of members to ask for their votes,
a tactic rarely employed by a president. All 175 Republicans voted against the bill and they
were joined by 41 Democrats. The next day, the Senate passed the budget 51-50, with Vice
President Al Gore casting the deciding vote. Clinton had gotten his budget, but it had been a
Pyrrhic victory. The struggle left a lasting image of chaos between Democrats. On the other
side of the aisle, Republicans ―felt strength in unity and had a weapon for the next election to
use against those Democrats who had supported the president.‖192
Democrats paid for Clinton‘s first-year blues that November, as Republicans elected
governors in Virginia and New Jersey and mayors in New York City and Los Angeles.
Much of the problem with the Clinton presidency was that he continued to allow the
Democrats in Congress to shape his agenda.

At different points in the year, Clinton

complained that he felt tied to Congress ―like Ahab to Moby Dick, with the same results.‖193
Paul Begala was even more frank: ―We took Secretariat and hooked him to a f---ing
plow.‖194 Only President Clinton‘s victory in passing the North American Free Trade Act, in
which Republicans delivered the deciding votes and Newt Gingrich played a crucial role,
prevented an entire year of frustration for the new president.
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Noah Weiss, College ‘09

WEISS | 68

***************
In October 1993, Bob Michel announced his retirement from the House effective at
the close of the 103rd Congress. First elected in 1957, Michel served as the Republican whip
from 1975 to 1981 and as leader from 1981 to 1995. Genial and respected on both sides of
the aisle, Michel was, according to Rep. Denny Hastert, ―unassuming and unfailingly polite,
he led by quiet example.‖ 195

To younger Republicans like Tom DeLay, Michel‘s

announcement signaled that ―the ‗old bulls‘ of the Republican Party were letting go of the
controls.‖ 196 Privately, they celebrated his decision, because they believed that younger
leadership could finally bring the GOP to the majority. ―As soon as Bob Michel retires,‖
recalled Dick Armey, ―I know a majority is possible, because the old bulls are going to get
out of the way.‖197
Michel and Newt Gingrich had worked side-by-side since Gingrich‘s election as whip
in 1989, but tension between the two leaders was always present.

Whereas Gingrich

represented the more conservative, activist side of the party, Michel was of the older,
accomodationist wing, more willing to compromise than confront. As the composition of the
GOP Conference became younger, however, Gingrich became the de facto leader, and finally
in August 1993 Gingrich instructed his staff to inform Michel that Gingrich would challenge
him for his post if he didn‘t leave Congress in 1994. ―We let him [Michel] know we were
running and to make plans accordingly,‖ remembered Tony Blankley, Gingrich‘s spokesman
at the time. ―Yes, he was given the old heave-ho.‖198 Even Democrats took notice. As
former Speaker of the House Tom Foley explained, ―It was an open secret that he [Gingrich]
had threatened Michel that, if he ran for Leader again, that he would oppose him.‖199
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Following the announcement, Gingrich quickly locked up his position as Leaderdesignate and began to take day-to-day control of the House Republican Party. Michel was
still consulted on all important decisions and acted as the leader, but ceded to Gingrich the
informal reins of power. ―To his great credit, Michel presided over one of the smoothest
transitions of power I‘ve ever witnessed,‖ remarked Armey. ―He kept his hand in the big
decisions but began to delegate responsibility for day-to-day decisions to the leadership at
large and Newt in particular. This gave us a chance to form our own strategy—although
always with Bob Michel‘s approval and support.‖ 200 As Gingrich aide Jack Howard
remembered:
―With each successive election—84, 86, 88, 90, 92—there was a new wave of
Republicans that would come in, sometimes more sometimes not as many. By
1993, it was pretty clear that the people aligned with Newt had a majority in
the Republican Conference. So Newt, from that standpoint, had somewhat of
a mandate to lead an effort like that. And Bob Michel gradually became Newt
more responsibility especially as it became clear that Newt would become the
presumptive Republican leader.‖201
Soon after the leadership elections following Michel‘s announcement, Armey,
Gingrich, DeLay, Robert Walker, and NRCC Chairman Bill Paxon (R-NY) began to have
dinner meetings to plan their strategy to win the majority. ―It was basically just five or six of
us that met for dinner usually down in the basement of a taco place on Capitol Hill,‖ Bob
Walker explained. ―Newt put together this very small group of us who basically plotted the
1994 election.‖202 ―It truly had the feel of a guerrilla operation,‖ recalled Paxon. ―We were
the minority of the minority.‖203
The five men had little in common. The only true friends were Gingrich and Walker,
who had founded the Conservative Opportunity Society together in 1983. In fact, rivalries
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existed in the group as well. DeLay and Walker were both candidates for the whip position
that Gingrich would soon vacate. ―They could have been petty and tried to undercut each
other,‖ Armey said, ―They did just the opposite.‖ The meetings were also the beginning of
the relationship between Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey, a partnership that would
eventually become quite close and would lead the Republicans to the majority. As Gingrich
aide Len Swinehart recalled, ―Newt concluded that in a post-Michel conference, if he and
Armey were together, they could get the conference to do anything.‖204
In his first year as Republican Conference Chairman, Armey had done a lot to
revitalize his position. As his former chief of staff and Conference Executive Director Kerry
Knott explained, ―There was no real map as to what the Conference Chairman should do
besides hold meetings once a week. So we decided to make this the communications and
coalitions hub of the Conference. Ed Gillespie, who was our communications director, and I
began to think about how we could get all Republicans to focus on a few key issues?‖
Armey, Knott, and Gillespie created Conference publications, a blast fax capability, talking
points, and other materials to keep people on message.
The dinner meetings were primarily political; that is to say that they dealt with the
elections but still combined some of the old tactics of the COS. ―Most of the meetings were
about the election, but mainly about using the legislative process to frame the election,‖
Walker recalled. ―It was out of those meetings that we began to discuss, ‗OK, how do we
frame our agenda in a way that is attractive to the American people?‘‖205
In the beginning, the group believed that a fifteen to twenty seat gain in the 1994
elections was realistic, and that a majority would not be within reach so soon. An October 21,
1993 memo from Armey to Gingrich explained, ―We have a great chance to pick up seats
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(although I believe realistic gains are fifteen to twenty rather than the wild numbers we hear
others suggest).‖ Yet unlike in previous years when the GOP leadership merely assumed
minority status, Armey urged Gingrich to begin planning for a majority:
―I would like for you and the rest of the leadership to propose a
comprehensive plan (well thought out and prepared in advance) for House
Republicans to reach the majority. At this point, I‘m afraid that a large
number of our Members just don‘t understand the intensity and sheer effort
that will be required for us to be successful. We need to lay out a plan and
sell them on it. I believe most of our Conference is hungry for direction and is
hungry for a full scale effort to try to gain control of the House. It may take a
long time to persuade our Conference that the sacrifice it will take is
necessary, but I believe we can do it.‖ 206
On January 28, 1994, the GOP leadership got their chance when the Republican
Conference gathered for their annual retreat at Salisbury State University in eastern Maryland.
Usually, these retreats were plush affairs, complete with banquet rooms, fancy hotels,
lobbyists, donors, and press. This time, however, the Conference, as Armey recalled, ―stayed
in student dormitory rooms, ate in student cafeterias, and met in a large room in the student
union building working out our plans to rebuild the Republican Party.‖207
The Republican Conference was restless, and certainly not as willing as Gingrich and
Armey to admit their failings. As Republican pollster Frank Luntz recalled:
―I had Gingrich and Armey constantly telling me, ―Don‘t kiss up to these guys,
don‘t suck up to them. They need to be told the truth. They need to be told
how much trouble they‘re in. Shake them up, Frank.‖ So I let loose, and I
went way overboard…I remember getting into an argument with Tom DeLay
where he said, ―Frank, it was a Republican landslide‖—this was after the 1993
elections where Republicans won the governor of New Jersey, they won the
mayor of LA, they won the mayor of New York, they won all over in 1993.
And I said, ―No, sir. It was not pro-Republican, it was pro-challenger, antiincumbent.‖ There were 104 members in the room and they were really
pissed at me.208
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Because of the victories in 1993, many Republican congressmen were content on
running on an anti-Clinton platform.

After all, the president‘s popularity was low,

confidence in his administration was even lower, and Republicans were on the favorable end
of a historical trend that stated that the party out of power in the White House gained
congressional seats in the midterm elections.

However, in the dinner meetings, the

leadership had decided that a solely anti-Clinton campaign would not allow them to pick up
enough seats to gain a majority.

―All you had to do was run against the Clinton

Administration and you were going to pick up seats, which was where most of the
Republican Conference was,‖ recalled Bob Walker. ―What this small group said was if all
we do is run against the Clinton Administration, all we will have at the end of the day is a
victory based upon the fact that we weren‘t friends of Bill Clinton. What we need is to bring
the election based upon a set of principles that we have laid out that we are going to pursue
should we become the majority.‖209
To this end, the GOP leadership brought with them to Salisbury the idea of forming a
mission statement and developing a specific legislative agenda to run on that November.
Many younger members were enthusiastic about the idea, but most of the Conference was
indifferent or, worse, opposed. The leadership faced the strongest opposition from the more
senior Republican ―Old Bulls.‖ ―None of them believed we were going to win the majority,
so they thought, What was the point?‖ Gingrich aide Dan Meyer later explained. ―Even as a
campaign tactic, they thought, ‗What‘s the purpose? Because we aren‘t going to win the
majority anyway.‘‖210
Nevertheless, Gingrich and Armey were unperturbed, because Gingrich‘s strategy, as
his staffer Jack Howard later explained, didn‘t require 100 percent of the members to buy
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into it: ―Newt‘s theory was, he said, ‗If we can get 20 to 30 percent of the members to buy in
to this, you might have 10 percent who will be hard-core against but the rest will just sort of
go along.‖211 However, Gingrich did pull off an important victory at Salisbury when he won
adoption of a mission statement that united the Conference behind the common goal of
becoming a majority party in 1995. As Armey later remarked, ―This may sound simplistic,
but House Republicans had never before really operated as a team to accomplish a common
goal.‖ 212 The mission statement included fealty to five politically conservative values:
individual liberty, limited government, economic opportunity, personal responsibility, and
security at home and abroad.
The Salisbury retreat was truly one of the important turning points in the campaign to
make the Republican Party the majority party in the House of Representatives.

The

Conference went through a significant bout of soul-searching over that weekend, taking the
time, as Rep. Deborah Price (R-OH) put it, ―to take a hard look at who we were as a party,
where we were going, and what we stood for.‖213 ―It was there that the feeling started to
come together that this election should be more than just about us taking power or being
against the Democrats.

We needed a positive agenda,‖ recalled NRCC Chairman Bill

Paxon.214
Near the end of the retreat, Gingrich and Armey persuaded the Conference to develop
a concept for the fall campaign tentatively titled, ―Ten Things House Republicans Will Do If
We Take Over the Majority.‖ Eventually, this concept would become the much-heralded
Contract with America, the campaign and governing plan of the House Republicans in the
fall campaign and beyond. In the aftermath of the Salisbury retreat, the Contract, although it
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had not yet been named, would become the centerpiece of the efforts of Gingrich, Armey,
and the rest of the Republican Conference.
The retreat was also a personal victory for Gingrich. Salisbury was the first time that
he was on his own, without Michel, and truly had to lead his fellow Republicans. ―In a lot of
ways, that‘s sort of where Newt‘s leadership was the most difficult and on display,‖ recalled
Howard. ―He forced them to do things broader than just the legislative component of the
Contract with America. He forced them to do things they had never done before, like a
vision statement that described who the House Republicans were, what they stood for, what
their vision for America was, and what strategies they were going to employ to make that
happen.‖215
***************
The first three years of the 1990s were truly years of self-discovery for the House
Republican Party. Following the activist model set by Gingrich in the 1980s, and willing to
trust his leadership by electing him Whip in 1989, the House Republicans continued to move
in an activist direction during the presidency of George H.W. Bush. The budget battle of
1990 and the eagerness that many in the Conference displayed to challenge a president of
their own party enabled House Republicans to form their own political identity in a way that
they had not been able to do since Ronald Reagan first took office in 1981. The Conference
was restless; it was tired of blindly following the lead of the White House and sacrificing its
own creativity in favor of helping the president.
Although the 1992 election was widely viewed as a fiasco for the Republican Party,
Gingrich and the House GOP wisely saw this setback as a momentous opportunity. Freed
from the paternalism of a Republican president, the House Republicans were able to put the
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autonomy they had created for themselves during the last years of the Bush presidency to
work during the presidency of Bill Clinton. Upon Clinton‘s inauguration, the House GOP
was immediately ready to perform the role of an opposition party, a role that Gingrich and
the Conservative Opportunity Society had been practicing against the House Democratic
leadership for over a decade and one they were only happy to reprise on a much bigger scale.
Indeed, Clinton provided an easy target. After running a campaign that stressed
centrism, working together, and sensible solutions, Clinton quickly disappointed the
American people by failing to deliver on his campaign promises. His intense desire to avoid
the congressional troubles of the last Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, caused Clinton to
acquiesce to the policy preferences of the decidedly more liberal congressional wing of his
party, a group of people who, under Republican presidents for the previous twelve years,
were not used to taking orders from anyone but themselves. The upshot of this relationship
was sinking popularity, images of disorganization and chaos, and the destruction of the
desperately wanted Clinton image of a centrist New Democrat in favor of a new image as a
―tax and spend liberal.‖ Republicans couldn‘t have been more delighted.
More importantly, however, was the unity that the House Republicans would come to
experience as a result of their position as the minority party in relation to the House of
Representatives as well as the White House. The disillusionment and disaffection that the
national Republican Party was going through forced the House GOP Conference to genuinely
take a look at who they were and what they stood for. This soul-searching, on one hand,
manifested itself in the election of activists to the leadership in December 1992. Although
the whole Conference didn‘t agree with the activist and conservative tendencies of Dick
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Armey and Tom DeLay, enough members, moderates included, were willing to give them a
shot to lead the Republican Party in opposition to President Clinton.
Over the course of 1993, as it became clear that Clinton was having significant
trouble in his first year as president, the House Republican Conference grew more confident
in their chances for a large gain in the 1994 midterms. They had history on their side—the
opposition party on average gained twenty seats in a president‘s first midterm—but more
than that, their leaders believed that this might be the best chance in forty years to win the
majority. Beginning with the dinner meetings and continuing at the Salisbury retreat, these
leaders began to put together a plan to unify the entire Conference behind a plan to win the
majority only two years after they had been roundly trounced on the national stage.
Going into 1994, the Republicans had all the momentum.

Perhaps the greatest

victory of the year for them was convincing enough of the Conference that the centerpiece of
the 1994 campaign could not just be an anti-Clinton message, but rather a positive message
that espoused their ideals and ideas directly to the American people. Clinton‘s unpopularity
would take them halfway to a majority, but only a positive message would get them all the
way there.
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CHAPTER 3:
PUTTING THEIR NAMES ON THE LINE

On the morning of September 27, 1994, as the sun poked through the previous
evening‘s rain clouds, a group of 367 Republican candidates for the House of
Representatives left the Grand Hyatt hotel to make their way down 10th Street and
Pennsylvania Avenue to the United States Capitol. It had rained until 2:00 a.m., threatening
the precise choreography of an event that had been planned for nearly eight months. Indeed,
September 27 had been picked for two reasons: it was six weeks before Election Day and
Newt Gingrich‘s long-range weather forecaster in Georgia had assured him in February 1994
that it would not rain that day. Thankfully for the candidates, he turned out to be right.
By midmorning, the candidates began to assemble on the steps of the West Front of
the Capitol. To the casual observer, the scene might have looked like a Fourth of July parade.
Flags were waving, bands were playing patriotic music, and speakers were tirelessly
climbing the podium to give speeches exalting America. People crowded around and the
press covered the event with rapt attention. Behind the mass of candidates was an enormous
backdrop emblazoned with the words ―Contract with America.‖
The event was meticulously planned and geared toward the media. Press secretaries
wore red ―Contract with America‖ hats and stood by to answer questions from candidates or
the media. Information packets had been prepared for the press containing candidates‘
names, biographies, copies of the Contract with America, locations of where to get full-text
bills, and other information. Organizers had determined that exactly nine cameras would be
needed to capture every moment. Four lines were formed for candidates to come forward to
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sign the Contract with America, the Republicans‘ 1994 campaign pledge, each of them
pausing for just a moment for a camera to capture the image for the folks back home. The
ceremony was so precisely choreographed that its planners had built in time for ―podium
movement‖ so that everyone would be in their proper places as speakers ascended and
descended the rostrum.216
Over 185 Republican challengers had come to Washington to sign the Contract,
displaying their unity and fidelity to the principles of the document merely by showing up. A
telltale sign was the fact that over forty of their Democratic opponents had thrown them
mock goodbye parties and ran advertisements claiming that the Republicans were flying to
Washington to join Newt Gingrich‘s army.217
For Gingrich, who had been dreaming of this day since the fateful Capitol Steps
Event of 1980, the public signing of the Contract with America marked the last phase in his
decade-long struggle to create a Republican majority in the House of Representatives. As he
confidently ascended the podium to give his speech, he could not help but to immortalize the
significance of the day in his typically grand terms: ―If the American people accept this
Contract,‖ he proclaimed, ―we will have begun the journey to renew American civilization.
Together we can renew America.

Together we can help every American fulfill their

unalienable right to pursue happiness and to seek the American dream. Together we can help
every human across the planet seek freedom, prosperity, safety, and the rule of law. That is
what is at stake.‖218 Though these words may have been overly extravagant, Gingrich truly
believed that the direction of American society hung in the balance.
Between the Salisbury Retreat and the unveiling of the Contract with America on
September 27, Gingrich and his colleagues in the Republican leadership had tirelessly
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worked on the positive agenda that they believed would be instrumental in bringing the
House Republican Conference the thing that had eluded them for four decades—a majority.
Aided by a political climate hostile to President Clinton and an electorate aching for
politicians to be held accountable to their promises, the Contract with America, they hoped,
would provide the spark that would bring them control of the House.
***************
From his early days in Congress, Newt Gingrich had been a firm believer in
nationalizing elections; that is to say framing them as referenda on national issues such as
taxes or defense spending or welfare rather than on the earmarks a particular congressman
brought home to his district. From the early days of the Conservative Opportunity Society,
Gingrich and his cohorts had attempted to bring local attention to national issues, but to no
avail. Before 1994, it seemed like Tip O‘Neill‘s maxim of ―All politics is local‖ held sway.
However, Gingrich believed that this time would be different, not the least because of
the Clinton Administration‘s policies and unpopularity. He believed that the voters were
restless, and that the frustration with national issues that won Clinton the White House in
1992 had not been addressed. Above all, Gingrich believed, the voters were crying out for
politicians to be held accountable for their promises. The disappointment resulting from
Clinton‘s quick scrapping of his middle class tax cut in early 1993 in favor of an enormous
tax increase served to further sour the electorate on political promises. With a Contract with
America, Gingrich hoped that he would be able to show voters that if they gave the
Republican Party a chance to be the majority party in the House of Representatives,
something that had not occurred in four decades, the GOP would be the party that would
make good on its campaign promises.
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Yet he realized that merely running on anti-Clinton sentiment would not bring the
Republicans the forty-seat gain they would need to win a majority. Instead, Republicans
would have to create their own alternative agenda to complement their attacks. ―I‘ll give
Newt a lot of credit for this,‖ Armey‘s top staff member Kerry Knott said. ―He said we can
run a purely negative campaign against Clinton in ‘94 and pick up a decent number of seats,
but somewhere along the way it switched to where we thought, ‗Hey, if we were to put a
positive agenda together with the negative attacks on Clinton that might be enough to
actually make it all the way there.‘‖ 219 Years later, Gingrich agreed: ―You had to have
something of this scale to beat the Democratic majority.‖220
Working from the five values spelled out in the mission statement adopted at
Salisbury, Gingrich assigned Dick Armey to develop the specifics of the ten-point Contract
with America, although it did not yet have a name. ―Newt had this idea, ‗We‘re going to
announce this agenda on the steps of the Capitol before the election and give everybody
chapter and verse. I don‘t know how we‘re going to do it, but Dick, take this over and make
it happen,‘‖ Knott recalled.221 As Armey later remembered, ―My first reaction was to recall
Tevia‘s line in Fiddler on the Roof, ‗How did I come by this great honor?‘ But my staff and
I had already learned that one of Newt‘s guiding principles was to ‗import knowledge, export
work.‘ In fact, the arrangements served us both well.‖222
Armey charged his chief of staff Kerry Knott to draft and coordinate the overall plan.
They began by brainstorming ideas based on the five broad values and came up with
hundreds of policy options. These options were then distilled into a questionnaire and sent to
all Republican incumbents and challengers.

Pollster Frank Luntz was contracted to

implement this survey, and about 70 percent completed it. The survey showed broad support
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Noah Weiss, College ‘09

WEISS | 81

for, among other things, congressional reform, balanced budget, tax cuts, welfare reform,
defense, crime control, term limits, a line item veto, anti-abortion, and school prayer. Luntz
and other pollsters then conducted polls and focus groups around the country to test the two
dozen or so items the survey supported. As Bob Walker later explained:
―We said well if it doesn‘t poll at 60 percent--it had to poll at least 60 percent,
you had to show us good definitive polls that what you were proposing could
meet the 60 percent test—then we didn‘t put it in the Contract because part of
our goal here was to go to the American people and say, ―We‘re entering into
a contract with you to do things that you absolutely want to have done.‖ If, in
fact, what you did was put everybody‘s favorite item in, even if it was polling
at 30 percent, the American people would say well I agree with this, but this
thing over here, I wouldn‘t want a contract that says they are going to do that.
So it was very important to the idea of the Contract to have things that were
shared by the vast majority of the people. Most of the things in the Contract
were polling at 75 or 80 percent‖223
To meet the 60 percent test, social issues like abortion and school prayer were
immediately taken off the table.

Although it was clear that many of the most ardent

supporters of the Republican Party were strongly in favor of these items, Gingrich and the
rest of the leadership decided to err on the side of unity. ―The point was to unite the party in
a referendum on the scope and cost of government,‖ said Armey.224
Moreover, the authors of the Contract did not want to turn off independent voters,
especially those that had voted for Perot in 1992 (who ran on an anti-government platform
that the rest of the Contract was designed to address). ―I can say there was a conscious effort
to attract the Perot vote in the ‗94 campaign, and one of the ways that manifested itself was
there were no social issues in the Contract,‖ Joe Gaylord, one of Gingrich‘s top political
advisors, recalled. ―Gingrich was very strong in saying, ‗We don‘t want to turn anybody off
with the Contract, so why would we put the most controversial things in there?‘‖225 The
issue that social conservatives most wanted in the Contract was school prayer, but Gingrich
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successfully prevented it from inclusion. As Luntz recalled, ―Gingrich said to me, and I
quote, ‗No way, I do not want Al Hunt running an op-ed claiming that Republicans are
religious fanatics. I‘m not going to give him that opportunity.‘‖226
Eventually, however, social conservatives were persuaded to sign and support the
Contract (and by extension, the Republicans). As Bob Walker later explained:
―If we‘re in the majority, obviously these issues that you‘re concerned about
will be on a friendlier stance with a Republican majority than they ever have
been with a Democratic majority. So the fact that you don‘t have it in the
Contract doesn‘t mean those items aren‘t going to be pursued and are going to
be ignored. It simply means that during our first 100 days when we are
implementing the Contract, we are going to focus on it and the other items
will come later.‖
Social conservatives understood the reasoning behind this argument, and pledged
heavy support for the Republicans in November. Although the Christian Right was still a
minor player in national campaigns in the early 1990s, they were effective in turning their
supporters out to vote. On the Sunday before the election, over 33 million voter guides
published by the Christian Coalition (which stopped just short of endorsing candidates, but
were clearly favorable to Republicans) were passed out in over 60,000 churches
nationwide.227
Although Al Hunt never wrote a column attacking the relationship between
Republicans and the Christian Right, Democrats ironically did a lot to solidify the bond
shared by the two groups.

Rep. Vic Fazio (D-CA), the chairman of the Democratic

Congressional Campaign Committee, criticized Republicans for what he called their
willingness to turn over their party to the ―intolerant religious right,‖ an approach that
backfired by merely intensifying evangelical opposition to the Democratic Party. Eventually,
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evangelical Christians represented 20 percent of the votes cast on Election Day and they
voted by a three-to-one ratio for Republicans.228
As the chief architects of the Contract debated which items to include over the spring
and summer of 1994, it was clear to them that the number of items was nearly as important as
which proposals to include. Luntz took this issue into the field as well. The first focus
groups were done with a contract of three items, but the scarcity of items was rejected by
voters. Ten was quickly settled on as the optimal number. It was neither too few nor too
many, rather a number that inspired respect at the same time as it inspired possibility. Ten
was a symbolic number as well. It drew comparisons to the Bill of Rights—the first ten
amendments to the Constitution—and to the Ten Commandments.

Above all, GOP

strategists were realists—they knew voters would reject a list of more than ten items as the
normal laundry list of promises that seemed to be broken year after year. However, by
choosing to include ten, Republicans hoped that they could get voters to take the Contract
seriously. As GOP pollster Brian Tringali recalled, ―Voters expected ten things. Three
wasn‘t enough. Ten things sounded as if it was ambitious enough but not too much. No one
was interested in more than ten things, because that sounded like too much and too hard to do.
The focus groups showed that voters actually took it seriously.‖229 The decision to promise
to accomplish the items in the first 100 days of the 104th Congress was made on similar
reasoning.

Ever since Franklin Roosevelt‘s first 100 days of his presidency, the

accomplishments of the 100 days have been a measure of a new presidency. Gingrich
wanted it to become a measure of a new Republican Congress as well.
Once the ten items—balanced budget and line–item veto, crime, welfare, senior
citizens earning limit, family responsibility tax cuts, defense, legal reform, slashing
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government regulations, and term limits, along with the institutional reforms of the House of
Representatives—were decided, Knott organized working groups to draft specific legislation
on each of these broad policy areas. By September, each of the ten items was backed by an
already written and prepared bill, available for the public to look at before Election Day.
This was an important difference from years past, and it played into the Republican theme of
accountability and their goal of running a positive, ideas based campaign. Usually, political
promises are reinforced by nothing except the word of the particular politician that is making
the promise. However, by having completed bills ready to be introduced and available for
the public to examine before the election, Republicans were able to effectively portray
themselves as a party that would fulfill their promises, rather than just use them to get elected.
―We made an early and controversial decision to draw up plans for the actual bills that would
make up the Contract—fine print and all,‖ Armey recollected. ―We felt that with the value of
a politician‘s or political party‘s word at its lowest point ever…we had to be as explicit as
possible.‖230
When forming the working groups, Knott generally avoided working with the most
senior members, since many still believed that the Contract was a waste of time. ―The old
guys, the old bulls, they were laughing at us,‖ Armey recalled. ―But they didn‘t do it
publicly. The fact of the matter is, we must have looked like a bunch of Don Quixotes to a
lot of people.‖231
Instead, Knott concentrated on younger members, especially those who were less risk
averse and more willing to create and test new ideas and concepts:
―We created lots of working groups. We got members who were not the
ranking Republicans on the committees—we intentionally bypassed almost
every one of them because we knew they would give us old, worn out ideas
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and their staffs would resist anything innovative—so we went and found
members who had new ideas…Fortunately the committee staff and the
ranking members virtually ignored us because they didn‘t think this was a
serious effort, so we were able to cobble together pretty good ideas that
members came up with, staff came up with, and think tanks had come up
with.‖232
By April, the groups had been formed and they were hard at work crafting specific
policy under the broad headline of their particular issue. By June, Armey sent out a memo
delineating the timetable for completion of the working groups‘ work:

―First cut,

immediately; second cut, July 15; final cut, August 12; full GOP Conference approval,
September 9.‖233
Ironically, had the old bulls taken the Contract more seriously from the outset, it
would have been very likely that the final product would have been much different than what
was actually produced. The older members typically were more risk-averse, more willing to
compromise with the Democrats, and less conservative than the members chosen to write the
Contract‘s planks.
By June, nevertheless, the old bulls were taking the Contract seriously, and most were
even excited about the fall campaign. This abrupt change came as a direct result of the
special elections in Oklahoma and Kentucky in May. In both elections, the GOP candidates
had managed to achieve come-from-behind victories in convincing fashion in districts that
had traditionally voted Democratic. The victories turned the most reticent old bulls into
passionate freshmen, ready to commit to the cause wholeheartedly. ―The night we won that
special election in Kentucky,‖ Paxon recalled, ―the members came over for a big party and
they were crying because they were so happy. It really provided a spark for a lot of our
members to get enthused.‖234
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***************
Equally as important to building a Republican House majority as the ideas that were
to become the Contract with America was the money that the party would have to raise to
support their candidates through the fall elections. This realm of strategy was based in the
National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) under the leadership of its chairman,
Rep. Bill Paxon (R-NY), and its executive director, Maria Cino.
Founded in 1866, the NRCC is the political arm of the House Republican Conference,
generally responsible for giving support to Republican incumbent and challenger candidates
for the House of Representatives. The NRCC provides financial assistance, research services,
communication strategy, voter registration and turnout programs, and other services to
candidates. Its chairman is elected by the House Republican Conference, and therefore for
much of its history, the NRCC served as an incumbent support committee and put much of
its financial resources behind incumbents. This was especially true under the chairmanship
of Rep. Guy Vander Jagt (R-MI), who chaired the committee from 1976 to 1992.
The NRCC under Vander Jagt was notoriously ineffective. ―Vander Jagt had been
chairman for 18 years, and over time the NRCC had basically become a committee for
incumbents,‖ Cino said. ―Under my predecessor,‖ recalled Paxon, ―it was a bizarre operation
over there. He was very hands off, he had a fundraiser who was very controversial, he had
an Executive Director who was asleep at the switch forever, and as a result they were
complicit, in my opinion, in why we could never win a majority.‖235
During Vander Jagt‘s tenure, the committee came under heavy criticism for using its
resources ineffectually and wastefully. Between 1980 and 1992, the twelve years in which
Republicans controlled the White House, the NRCC had spent $260 million to try to win
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back the House and had a net drop of seats (from 192 to 176) to show for their efforts. In the
words of Ed Rollins, who was in charge of the committee for the 1990 cycle, ―We‘ve spent a
decade now in which the three buildings—the one I work in [NRCC], the one next door
[RNC] and the Senate committee [NRSC]—have raised and spent over a billion dollars.
That may have kept us somewhat in a minority status or it may have protected us from
further annihilation. I can‘t say which.‖236 The committee was so ineffectual that one NRCC
staffer said, ―We should blow the place up.‖237
At the outset of the 1990s, the NRCC had been so badly run that it was nearly
drowning in debt. The bureaucracy had grown so large that it seemed to many Republican
candidates that for every dollar contributed to the NRCC, there was one less dollar for
Republican candidates at the grassroots. Following Rollins‘ resignation (unsurprisingly as a
result of his disagreements with the way the committee was run), the NRCC went through
several sets of leadership and staff, growing more and more bloated each time. Echoing the
thoughts of many Republicans, Rep. Mickey Edwards said, ―I‘ve been saying for years that
Democrats have been winning elections in the House because they don‘t have an NRCC.‖238
By 1992, when Paxon was elected to replace Vander Jagt as chairman, the committee
was over $4 million in debt, had a bloated staff of over 100 people, and had hundreds of
outside consultants on the payroll. If the NRCC was ever going to help the Republicans win
a majority, it had to first clean up its own house, a task that Paxon took to with relish. He
first brought over his personal office‘s chief of staff, Maria Cino, to be Executive Director,
and the two of them began cleaning house at once. The first thing they had to address was
their massive debt. ―We had no money. We were one month away from bankruptcy several
times. We had our bank wanting to call in our loans. Fortunately, we had a member who
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was a former banker who helped us renegotiate our loans. We kind of hit the valley of the
shadow of death in the summer of 1993,‖ Paxon said.239 ―We struggled for the first six to
eight months really trying to figure out how we keep ourselves afloat,‖ Cino remembered.
―We had no money; we were running in the red…Along with a $2 million loan to the bank,
we owed about $2.5 million in accounts payable to pollsters, media firms, and
consultants.‖240
Another problem was the enormous number of staffers the NRCC had on the payroll.
Paxon and Cino took an approach in which no person‘s job was safe and went through a
systematic reorganization of the committee‘s functions and personnel. As Cino recalled:
―We looked at every organization and said, OK, what do we do that‘s
unnecessary? For example, we had a TV studio. Well, the fact is that the TV
studio was outdated, and we could not afford the equipment changes. What
was happening was no one was using our studio because it was better and
cheaper to go rent a studio somewhere else. So we were trying to maintain it
for a couple of members. It was ridiculous! So we got rid of the TV studio
and its staff…I basically looked at every single thing we did and said, OK
how can this be done more cheaply and how do we run like a business and not
like a fat and bloated committee?‖241
In the one year between the 1992 election and the following December, the
committee‘s staff was down from over 100 to 25 and was not using any outside
consultants.242 Among the staff members let go was Wyatt Stewart, the finance director, who
had co-ownership of the direct-mail fundraising list, a dicey situation that was handled with
care by Paxon and Cino. The result of the personnel cuts was a leaner, more dynamic, and
streamlined NRCC. In place of the hired help, Paxon and Cino turned to members of the
Republican Conference. As Paxon recalled, ―We literally put together dozens of committees
of members who would come over every day…Members took back ownership of the NRCC.
We had members making calls, writing checks, and participating.‖243 ―When we got there,
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we put together an Executive Committee of twelve members of Congress that we met with
every few weeks to report where we were,‖ said Cino. ―We had an Audit Committee, an
Incumbent Support Committee, a Fundraising Committee, a Candidate Recruitment
Committee, and so on. We wanted members dealing with members.‖244
Under Paxon‘s leadership, the NRCC also revolutionized its fundraising operation,
arguably the most important task of all the Hill committees. ―Up until then, the NRCC had
generally collected money through direct mail all across the country. They never asked the
members to do anything—not recruit candidates, not campaign, not contribute money.
Actually, Vander Jagt would hand out checks to members who were even unopposed. So,
members loved it; they weren‘t asked to do anything politically and they got a check!‖ he
said. 245 Once he took charge, Paxon immediately discontinued this system and instead
decided to institute a dues system for members of the Republican Conference. Freshmen
would be asked to give a minimum of $2,500, rank and file members $5,000, and ranking
members and members of the leadership $7,500. ―We said to the members, no more checks,
you are going to help us,‖ Paxon recalled. 246 ―We told incumbents, well, if you‘re an
incumbent you should be able to raise your own money,‖ Cino said. ―In addition to that, we
said, if you ever want to be in the majority, you should pay us.‖247 This money formed an
―incumbent support program,‖ which would be used to fund Republican incumbents whose
reelection bids were in trouble. ―It was like an insurance policy,‖ Cino said, ―you hope, like
insurance, that you never have to use the money, but if you do, we‘ll have it for you. But
then, any additional money we raise will not go to incumbents, it will go to challengers.‖248
To dissuade members from asking for their incumbent support funds back, Paxon and Cino
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established a peer review committee composed of a dozen members who would have to
approve any withdrawals from the incumbent support account.
Although the plan was favored by the leadership, it met with stiff opposition from
many members, who, because of the campaign finance rules of the era, viewed their
campaign accounts as their own money. ―Members were very upset at me. They saw their
campaign accounts as their personal fiefdom because back then if you left Congress you
could keep that money for yourself…Literally, we had members scream at us or cry over
making these contributions,‖ Paxon remembered.249 Eventually, peer pressure took hold. It
was well known who had money in the bank and who was running unopposed, and over time
as the excitement and anticipation of big gains in 1994 became more pronounced, it was
easier for the NRCC to collect money. In the last six months of 1993, the committee raised
$210,460 from GOP members.250
This fundraising program was only one of the many that Paxon and Cino instituted to
fund the 1994 campaign. A separate fund was created for challenger races, and Paxon and
Cino relied heavily on ranking members and those in safe districts to contribute from their
own accounts or call their own donors to give directly to a particular challenger. As Cino
recalled, ―We would say, here are ten of the closest races, would you please max-out
[contribute as much money as legally allowed] to these ten?‖251 Moreover, the NRCC began
to ask national Republican figures who were outside of the Congress to help out with
fundraising. Former Presidents Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush all
signed NRCC fundraising appeals, and so did people like former Vice President Dan Quayle,
former HUD Secretary Jack Kemp, and former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.252
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The NRCC finally paid off their debt eighteen months after Paxon took charge in
June 1994. By that time, the NRCC had completely revamped its operations to be ready for
the fall campaign. The NRCC then turned its attention to raising money for challenger and
open-seat races.
In the aftermath of the Oklahoma and Kentucky upsets, Gingrich and the leadership
decided to take advantage of the widespread enthusiasm within the Republican Conference to
raise money for non-incumbent Republican candidates. On July 18, Gingrich sent a memo to
all members of the Conference outlining an ambitious fundraising strategy whose goal was to
raise an astonishing $8.5 million by Election Day. He rested his reasoning on a quote from
legendary football coach Vince Lombardi: ―The team that doesn‘t break in the fourth quarter
wins.‖
Gingrich laid out four fundraising options for each member: 1) Commit 148,000 for
challenger and open seats; 2) Raise $50,000 for the NRCC; contribute $5,000 to
challenger/open-seat candidates; 3) Do both 1 & 2; or 4) Design a fundraising program based
on your personal strengths and interests that will yield $65,000.253 This was the first time
that incumbent members had been ordered to fundraise for challenger candidates.
Although there was some grumbling about the requirements, the opposition was
remarkably tame. Describing the plan, Gingrich political advisor Joe Gaylord said, ―This is
not a go-or-no proposition, this is a go proposition. How you want to be helpful and how you
can make it better will be smiled upon. You can be an asshole and be opposed, but this is the
gamble that we‘re staking this election on.‖254 Gingrich got strong support from the old bulls.
Thomas Bliley of Virginia, ranking member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, raised
half a million, and so did Bill Archer of Texas, who was ranking member of Ways and
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Means. John Kasich, ranking member on the Budget Committee, and Pat Roberts, ranking
member on Agriculture, raised several hundred thousand each. By Election Day, 130 of the
178 House Republican incumbents had made contributions totaling $5 million, compared to
only $50,000 in 1992.255
As the summer progressed, the working groups continued to fine-tune their policy
proposals for eventual inclusion in the Contract. The work was going well, and Armey‘s
deadlines were going to be met with no problems. By that time, however, outside events had
conspired to further strengthen Republican chances of a big win in November and served to
create even more fertile ground for the unveiling of the Contract with America.
***************
Throughout the first year of his presidency, tensions between Bill Clinton and the
Democrats in Congress had been on the rise. This was especially evident in the debate over
the North American Free Trade Agreement, when dozens of liberal Democrats refused to
back the president. In fact, Clinton had to rely on the Republicans and Newt Gingrich to pass
the bill. ―If NAFTA passes,‖ USA Today wrote, ―Clinton will owe thanks to Minority Whip
Newt Gingrich.‖256 Eventually Gingrich brought along 132 GOP votes, more than half of the
234 the bill received.
The great battle of the first half of the Clinton presidency, however, was the
congressional debate over his health care plan, and in this debate, tensions between House
Democrats and the White House exploded. By the time Clinton took office, the health care
issue had quickly become one of the nation‘s top domestic priorities. Over 40 million
Americans were uninsured and skyrocketing costs posed an enormous problem to
government and business. In a special election to fill a U.S. Senate seat in Pennsylvania in
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1991, health care was revealed to be an issue that strongly appealed to suburban voters,
precisely the demographic that Clinton needed to capture in 1992.

Thus, one of the

centerpieces of his presidential campaign was health care reform, promising action within the
first two years of his presidency.
Once Clinton took office, he appointed his wife Hillary and Ira Magaziner, an Oxford
classmate of the president‘s, to lead the his Task Force of Health Care Reform, which drafted
a plan that combined government intervention with cost-saving managed competition. The
plan was unveiled in September 1993, but had been in the works for almost a year. Almost
immediately, it was assailed by the Republicans, with Newt Gingrich calling it ―culturally
alien to America,‖ and consisting of ―1,300 pages of red tape.‖257 One of the major problems
with the bill was that it was simply too big and unwieldy. Clinton was urged by many
Democrats and Republicans to split the bill into four smaller bills and work to pass one a
year in each year of Clinton‘s term. As Democratic strategist Peter Fenn recalled, ―The
health care bill was too complicated. No one could work out all the details. And some of us
told the White House, ‗If you‘re thinking about doing health care in ‗94, you‘re going to get
whacked. You won‘t get it done.‘‖258
Clinton ignored this advice and tried to push his comprehensive plan through
Congress as quickly as possible, an outcome that was clearly impossible given the nature and
size of the bill. As House Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA) recalled, ―I remember Ira Magaziner
coming up and saying that there were 740 decisions on the decision tree—this is industrial
policy-speak—that had to be made before the bill could be drafted. This was April [1993].
And they wanted the bill passed by Christmas. It was totally unrealistic.‖259 One of the
reasons for this was the fragmented nature of the legislative process on Capitol Hill. The
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Clinton Health care Plan was sent to five House committees and two Senate committees,
each for its own sessions of hearings, markups, and amendments. This fragmented process
gave the bill‘s opponents multiple points from which to attack and denied its supporters the
ability to mobilize around a unified effort. The problem was compounded by the lack of
unity within Democratic ranks. The passage of NAFTA had ruffled a lot of Democratic
feathers, and the party was divided on its support for the individual elements of the health
care proposal. Also, moderates, most notably Rep. Jim Cooper (D-TN), proposed their own
versions of health care reform that siphoned off support from the Clinton bill.
The long, drawn-out battle gave outside interest groups time to mount a full scale
attack on the plan. Businesses, including Pizza Hut and JCPenny, conducted a massive
letter-writing campaign to assail its tax and employer mandate aspects. Health care interest
groups launched a devastating ad campaign that included the famed ―Harry and Louise‖ ad
that featured a middle class couple fretting over the complexity and bureaucratic nature of the
Clinton plan.

These ads seized on the main reason for its tepid public support—its

complexity. The bill was too big, too hard to explain, and too radical to be done all at once.
―The bill was a radical bill,‖ Speaker Foley recalled. ―It was an attempt to do a dramatic
remake of the entire health care system of the United States, which was occupying 14 percent
of the GDP, for God‘s sakes!‖260
Building from a solid base of opposition among the public at large, the Republicans
pounced.

―It was a vastly more aggressive Republican Conference that the Clinton

Administration was up against than anything anybody had seen prior to that,‖ explained Bob
Walker. 261 United after Salisbury and energized by their secret work on the Contract with
America and the special election victories in May 1994, the Republicans gleefully attacked
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the Clinton health care program in the spring and summer. Initially, Bob Dole and Bob
Michel had shown willingness to compromise, but as the political tide turned against Clinton,
the entire Republican Party resolved to oppose any health care plan by any means available.
This was simple politics; the Republicans did not want to give Clinton and the Democrats
anything to run on in 1994.
As part of the steps to organize opposition to the Clinton plan, Republican strategist
William Kristol, who had served as former Vice President Quayle‘s chief of staff, sent a
memo to top Republicans in which he argued against compromise with Clinton: ―The first
step…must be the unqualified political defeat of the Clinton health care proposal.

Its

rejection by Congress and the public would be a monumental setback for the president…and
a watershed in the resurgence of newly bold and principled Republican politics.‖262 Gingrich
and Dole adopted this position. Gingrich opposed any amendments to the bill in the House
for fear they would garner additional support. Dole led a filibuster in the Senate that
prevented a vote. After over a year had passed, it was declared dead in September 1994.
Much like the budget bill the year before, the failure of health care reform drove the
president‘s approval ratings into the low forties. The public‘s image of the Clinton White
House was a government that was too bureaucratic, too fragmented, too disorganized, and
too radical. Additionally, the failure of Clinton‘s health care plan reinforced the idea of
promises broken in the Clinton Administration, especially since the bill was to be the
centerpiece of Clinton‘s domestic program.

These feelings drove them directly to the

Republicans. ―I always said Hillary‘s health care plan had more to do with us winning the
majority in ‗94 than the Contract did,‖ said Armey. ―Because I think the Democrats in ‗93
and ‗94 scared the devil out of the American people. They did a grievous overreach.‖263
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Following the president‘s failure to pass his health care bill, he turned to another issue
he believed would brandish his moderate credentials—crime.

Republicans had been

assailing Democrats as soft on crime for years, and the Willie Horton ads used in 1988
against Democratic presidential nominee Michael Dukakis underscored the Democrats‘
vulnerability on this issue. In the 1992 campaign, Clinton had charted a middle course by
vocally supporting the death penalty and talking tough on crime. In 1994, he sought to
implement a crime bill that included funds for hiring 100,000 new police officers.
Nevertheless, Newt Gingrich and the Republicans decided to reframe the debate on
the crime bill by focusing on two of its more controversial issues: the assault weapons ban
and $7.3 billion for ―crime prevention programs,‖ which conservatives basically saw as pork
barrel spending for liberal projects. The assault weapons ban was the most important facet of
the bill, and Gingrich was successful in raising the ire of gun owners around the country, and
especially the ire of National Rifle Association, an interest group committed to protecting
individuals‘ right to bear arms. The NRA would eventually spend millions of dollars during
the fall campaign to defeat Democrats who had voted for the crime bill, and was largely
successful in their efforts.
Although Clinton was desperately trying to steer a moderate course, he and his staff
could simply not stay ahead of the issues, shape the debate, and receive credit for their
victories during the first two years of his presidency. The success that Republicans had in
redefining his agenda, controlling the terms of debate, and blaming Clinton for the legislative
process‘ failures was indicative of a White House that was unfocused at best and ineffectual
at worst. As historian Steven Gillon writes, ―Even when Clinton won—on the budget,

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Noah Weiss, College ‘09

WEISS | 97

NAFTA, and the crime bill—Gingrich either managed to share credit with the White House
or force the president to pay a heavy political price.‖264
Clinton placed much of the blame on the media, which he said gave him unfair
treatment. To a point, he was right; a study done by the Center for Media and Public Affairs
found that 62 percent of the evaluations of the Clinton presidency on the network evening
newscasts were negative. 265 However, as political scientists James Ceaser and Andrew
Busch have written, Clinton‘s ―problem with public centered on the discrepancies between
the principles he processed in the 1992 campaign and his actions in office.‖ 266 The
abandonment or half-hearted pursuit of his campaign promises in 1992 did not sit well with
the public, bringing Clinton‘s approval ratings to only 40 percent in a September 1
Time/CNN poll, the lowest level at this point in a presidency in four decades.267
***************
Instrumental to the negative perception many voters had of President Clinton‘s
performance in the White House was the growing prominence of the so-called alternative
media, and especially of talk radio. For years, Republicans had decried the supposed liberal
bias of the traditional media elite—the newspapers and television shows. But in the late
1980s and 1990s, as the alternative media grew, Newt Gingrich and other top Republican
strategists realized the reach and power of mediums such as C-SPAN and talk radio.
Talk radio originated in the late 1950s, but for most of its infancy it was a rarity on
the air. As political scientists Louis Bolce, Gerald De Maio, and Douglas Muzzio write, ―In
1960, only two radio stations, KABC in Los Angeles and KMOX in St. Louis, had talk
formats. By 1995, 1,130 (one in nine) stations devoted the bulk of their programming to
news/talk.‖268 An explosion of talk stations had occurred in the 1980s when new satellite
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technology allowed for much cheaper operations. The number of stations devoted to talk
quadrupled in the decade.
The growing popularity of talk radio reflected the declining faith in the mainstream
media. The down-to-earth nature of the hosts and the participatory nature of the format gave
average Americans a chance to voice their views and interact with the news in a way that the
Olympian broadcasters on the nightly news could not. Whereas many Americans viewed the
mainstream media as elite and aloof, talk radio offered solidarity and reinforcement to those
discontented with their government, and reassured them that they were not alone.
House Republicans were the first to realize the vast potential of talk radio. Its appeal
was obvious—just like House Republicans were treated like second-class citizens by their
Democratic colleagues, the mainstream media scorned talk show hosts as beneath them.
Talk radio also offered House Republicans a huge microphone; it was rare during their long
stint in the minority for a rank-and-file Republican to get on Meet the Press or Face the
Nation, but any congressman could easily call into a talk show and have his views broadcast
to millions.
In 1992, when Rep. Tom DeLay (R-TX) took charge of the Republican Study
Committee, the RSC began a program called ―Talk Right‖ in which the committee used blast
fax technology to send talk show hosts GOP talking points on current issues and offering
members of Congress that the hosts could interview live. Although these relationships
started slowly, after President Clinton took office in 1993, talk shows became one of the
premier platforms in the country for conservatives to voice their dissatisfaction with the
Administration, and Newt Gingrich and the other Republican leaders made a concentrated
effort to court hosts‘ support.
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By 1994, the unquestionable king of talk radio was Rush Limbaugh, whose show was
broadcast on 659 stations and reached 20 million Americans each week, four million at any
given moment. Limbaugh‘s meteoric rise was nothing short of incredible. Born in smalltown Missouri, Limbaugh tried college, but dropped out after a year to pursue a career in
radio. After being fired from stations in Pittsburgh and Kansas City, a desperate Limbaugh
took a job selling group tickets for the Kansas City Royals baseball team. He finally got a
break in 1984, when a radio executive out of Sacramento was impressed by his style and
needed someone to fill the time slot of a recently fired host. This time, he found success, and
within four years, Limbaugh had moved to New York and launched his nationally syndicated
program.
The key to Limbaugh‘s success was his style, a unique blend of satire and
commentary. There was an effortless populism to him. He flipped back and forth from
football to the deficit, Tom Clancy novels to defense spending, all in a witty yet insightful
manner that brought listeners to him and together in a way that other hosts could not match.
As reporters Dan Balz and Ron Brownstein write, ―On any given show he might denounce
the mainstream media, lacerate the latest bit of liberal lunacy, or recast Vice President Al
Gore, a frequent nemesis, as the star of a new movie: Forrest Gore, the adventures of ‗a man
with a room temperature IQ.‘‖269
Listening to Rush Limbaugh was like an epiphany to many conservatives, who
believed especially in 1993 and 1994, when Democrats controlled all branches of
government, that there was nowhere to turn. ―For the first time, our voters [conservatives]
were able to suddenly realize, ‗Hey, I‘m not alone out here,‘‖ recalled Bill Paxon. ―I can
remember the first time I heard Rush Limbaugh.

It was an epiphany to finally hear
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somebody who was giving voice to my concerns. This was people calling in saying, ‗Hey,
I‘m out here.‘ ‗So am I, we‘re together.‘‖270
Additionally, the entertainment aspect of talk radio brought many new converts to the
conservative cause. Talk show hosts took dull issues that had been floating around for years
and repackaged them in a fresh, engaging way. ―The truth,‖ said Wall Street Journal writer
John Fund, ―is that he [Limbaugh] took ideas that had been current in the conservative
movement for decades, popularized them, made them entertaining, and brought an entire
non-policy audience‖ to the conservative movement.271
Throughout the 1994 campaign, Gingrich cultivated his relationship with talk radio
hosts. He faxed information to Limbaugh and others, which was then read on the air. He
was interviewed almost daily on syndicated shows. Most important to Gingrich and other
top Republicans, talk radio and other alternative media brought the Republicans‘ message to
the people unfiltered by the traditional media elite. ―Without C-SPAN, without talk radio
shows, without all the alternative media, I don‘t think we‘d have won,‖ Gingrich told
reporters after the November election. ―The classic elite media would have distorted our
message.‖272
***************
The message, of course, was embodied in the planks of the Contract with America,
which by the summer of 1994, was going through its final permutations. Although the
Contract‘s content can be truly said to be the product of the members of the House
Republican Conference, the responsibility for its language, form, style, and format was given
to a team of pollsters and consultants. The final version of the Contract with America
appears on the next page:
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Noah Weiss, College ‘09

WEISS | 101

The first surveys began in mid-July under the direction of the ambitious pollster
Frank Luntz, who had worked on the presidential campaigns of Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot
in 1992, and the pollsters of the Tarrance Group, a Republican polling firm based in
Washington, DC. The first item on their agenda was to test the name of the document, the
―Contract‖ with America. The exact origin of who said Contract when and where is unclear,
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but in focus groups and polls, it consistently scored much higher than the other options:
platform, pledge, promise, etc. The reasoning behind this was sound. According to a memo
that Ed Goeas of the Tarrance Group wrote on August 30, 1994, ―The most important
concept revealed in the focus groups was accountability. Respondents felt that government
and Congress are no long held accountable for their actions.‖ 273 The idea of a Contract was
designed specifically to harness this anger at government, and voters polled reacted
positively to this metaphor. As Luntz described in a September 2, 1994 memo, ―To say that
the electorate is angry would be like saying that the ocean is wet. Voters in general and
swing voters in particular have simply ceased to believe that anything good can come out of
Washington…The Contract is different…The idea that candidates—incumbents and
challengers alike—would sign on the dotted line is highly appealing to the voters we wish to
reach.‖274 To emphasize his point, Luntz bolded and underlined the last sentence.
Crucial to the idea of a Contract was the need for an enforcement clause, a penalty
that voters could exact on House Republicans if they did not keep their words.

The

consultants tested several options, including, in the penultimate version, ―Republicans are
listening, we‘re ready to act,‖ but eventually chose ―If we break this contract, throw us out.
We mean it.‖ The simplicity and directness of the statement scored extremely well in polls
and focus groups, and voters indicated that they would accept the Contract if it were made on
these terms. In the same September 2 memo, Luntz highlighted the effect of the enforcement
clause in bold and underlined text: ―While the notion that politicians would actually sign
their name to a promise is valuable, what truly sets the Contract apart from past political
documents is the ‗If we don’t accomplish what we’ve pledged, throw us out—we mean it’
clause. This graphically demonstrates our seriousness, and it will surely appeal to swing
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voters on Election Day.‖ 275 Emphasizing the accountability theme, the Contract also
included check boxes labeled ―Done‖ alongside each item so that voters could keep track of
the Contract‘s progress. As Gingrich said, ―Come January, [people will] be able to tune in to
C-SPAN and say, ‗These guys are for real.‘―276
The focus groups and polls were also targeted toward the wording of the Contract
items.

From the policy language composed by the working groups of Republican

congressmen, a group of consultants distilled the language into two competing versions that
were then tested in polls and dial sessions. In each case, Republicans strove to make the
Contract sound like what an average American could read and identify with it and therefore
used phrases such as, ―we hear you loud and clear,‖ ―common-sense reforms,‖ and
consistently started the individual planks with the first person plural ―Let‘s‖ or ―We.‖ We
were ―consciously editing against the New York Times,‖ Gingrich later recalled.277 As Luntz
remembered:
―Dials told us exactly which trigger words to use. Which words caused an
immediate reaction.
Accountability.
In 1994, you said the word
accountability, people paid attention to you. You said common sense, people
paid attention to you. You use the word conservative, yeah it‘s political, it‘s
good, but common sense is so much better. Conservative is ideological,
common sense is American. The people I was reaching out to wanted things
that were American. They didn‘t want ideology, they didn‘t want partisanship.
They wanted action.‖278
Polling data also determined the order in which the planks were listed. The most
popular item, the balanced budget amendment and the line-item veto, was placed at the top
followed by items in descending order of importance to swing voters (although all the items
were supported by at least 60 percent of the public). The exception to this rule was the last
item, congressional term limits, which was in fact the second most popular item, but was
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placed at the bottom to bookend the document. ―The best stuff was at the top and the
bottom,‖ Luntz recalled. ―I discovered that people will read the top of an ad then the bottom
of the ad and only then do they decide to go to the middle. They don‘t read straight down.
So that‘s why the balanced budget amendment was the top one and term limits was the
bottom one, number one and number two.‖279
Interestingly, the word Republican is only used twice. At first glance, its absence
seems strange from a partisan political document. However, throughout the testing of the
proposed Contract with America, the one thing that all participants agreed on was their
dislike for the word Republican. As Luntz noted in a memo to the House GOP leadership,
―Not a single focus group participant liked the word Republican—not even the registered
Republicans! In fact, if the focus group had its way, the word Republican would have been
removed from the text in its entirety. Again, any appeal to partisan politics draws an equally
strong negative reaction from the very voters we need to win over.‖ 280 Therefore, the
absence of the word Republican was a conscious strategy to ensure that the party portrayed
itself as above the partisan struggles by which voters had become disillusioned.
The final version of the Contract was published in the October 22, 1994 edition of TV
Guide magazine. Although TV Guide had never before been used for a national political
advertisement, Gingrich and other Republican leaders were attracted by its large circulation,
and they speculated that an advertisement there would likely be seen by each member of the
household several times over the course of the week. The ad was printed on card-stock so
that it would be easy to find and tear out. ―Why TV Guide? It was the only magazine where
people would see it seven times over a week-long period. Every time you open it up, you‘d
find the Contract,‖ said Luntz.281
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The Republican National Committee, reenergized and well-funded after two years of
Haley Barbour‘s reconstructive efforts, paid for the $1.6 million cost of the advertisement.282
Barbour had agreed to commit RNC funds after a meeting with Gingrich in late February in
which Gingrich told Barbour of his plans to nationalize the election through the Contract.
Intrigued by the idea, Barbour pledged heavy financial support, and promised to enlist
outsider pollsters and consultants to help Gingrich. In fact, Barbour became a trusted player
within the House Republican Leadership and assisted Gingrich, Armey, and company with
the political side of their election strategy.
***************
On September 27, 367 House Republican incumbents and challengers gathered on the
West Front of the U.S. Capitol to publicly sign the Contract with America. It was a madefor-TV event, complete with flags waving, a band playing, cameras rolling, and enthusiastic
Republican leaders proclaiming that this was the first step toward a better future for America.
For over a decade, since the Capitol Steps event of 1980, Gingrich had dreamed of
this moment. Indeed, the event could not have gone better. Hundreds of candidates were in
attendance, the network news shows were planning a special feature, and the choreographed
speeches went off without a hitch. Even the weather had cooperated; after a night of rain, the
day dawned sunny without a cloud in the sky. In fact, September 27 had been a date picked
by Gingrich nearly a year prior. ―About a year before, I remember one day Newt said, ‗We
need to announce this and I think September 27 is a good time for it. It‘s close enough to the
election but far enough from it that we can grab the message. I‘ve talked to my long range
weather forecaster, and he assures me that it‘s going to be a beautiful day,‘‖ remembered
Kerry Knott.283
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The Contract was a revolutionary document, not only because it directly took on Tip
O‘Neill‘s accepted maxim that ―all politics is local,‖ but also because it dramatically shaped
the national debate in the weeks leading up to Election Day. Republican candidates—
incumbents and challengers alike—took the Contract very seriously. Many of them ran their
campaigns on it and included it in advertisements, mailings, and speeches. For example, in
Nebraska‘s Second District, the Republican challenger Jon Christensen featured the Contract
in his district. ―The Contract became part of our daily activities. I started talking about the
Contract with America and the ten things we‘re going to do in the first 100 days. We told the
voters, ‗If you elect me, this is what we‘re going to do.‘‖284
For many candidates, including Christensen, the Contract was not their entire
message, but rather provided them with a framework within which they tailored their
message to their districts. In Erie, Pennsylvania‘s 21st District, Republican nominee Phil
English was running for an open seat in a blue-collar, Democratic-leaning district, and thus
had to tailor his message to appeal to the electorate: ―We found it very advantageous while
signing on to the Contract with America, to emphasize at the same time we have a slightly
different position on welfare reform, a slightly different position on health care reform. In
effect, we used the Contract with America as a framework and a series of themes while we
were also able to insert some of our own details.‖285
The thing that most impressed many Republicans was the fact that the candidates
were willing to sign their names on the dotted line and commit themselves to an ambitious
policy agenda before they were even elected to a majority. ―The Contract with America was
nothing new,‖ recalled Republican J.C. Watts, who was running for an open seat in
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Oklahoma, ―but it was a savvy idea by the leadership, who were willing to put their fate on
the line, rather than just criticize the Democrats.‖286
Almost immediately after the Contract was unveiled, Democrats began attacking the
Contract, labeling it a ―Contract on America‖ rather than a Contract with America. Their
main criticism of the Contract was that it seemed to be missing its price tag and would result
in huge budget deficits (especially as a result of its planks to cut taxes and raise defense
spending). According to them, the Contract was a return to the politics of Reagan, whose
supply-side economic policies had doubled the national debt in the 1980s. ―If you like
Ronald Reagan‘s supply-side economics, you will love this riverboat gamble,‖ said Rep.
Robert E. Wise Jr. (D-WV).287 This was an argument that Republicans gladly engaged since
the former president continued to hold high popularity ratings among the public. ―I‘d
welcome a contest between Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan. It‘s ‗reinvent government‘
against ‗re-limit government,‘‖ said GOP activist William Kristol, noting the two presidents‘
buzzwords. 288 Even President Clinton came out publicly against the Contract, saying
Republicans were ―trying to abolish arithmetic.‖289
Initially, many Democrats believed that the Contract was a huge boon to their
electoral chances. Up until its unveiling, the campaign had centered around the unpopularity
of Bill Clinton, a charge that Democrats could do little to refute. However, after the Contract
was signed, Democrats now had specific policy proposals to which they could tie their
Republican challengers. Rep. Vic Fazio (D-CA), chairman of the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee remarked, ―We‘re able to go back on the offensive in district after
district...Our Democratic candidates will be asking them to explain this and calling them to
account.‖290 Stan Greenburg, Clinton‘s pollster, argued, ―The Republicans had positioned
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themselves rather nicely by being an angry voice out there…They made the mistake of
giving that voice some content that people don‘t want to be reminded of.‖291 By suggesting
that Republicans would have to make cuts in Social Security and Medicare in order to fulfill
their promises of tax cuts and increased defense spending, Democrats went on the offensive
in a way that was impossible beforehand. ―There is not a night that I don‘t thank God for the
Contract,‖ said Paul Begala, a Democratic consultant and political adviser to President
Clinton. ―It is the greatest gift to the Democratic Party since Medicare.‖292
Many Republicans were also critical of the plan for the same reasons. They believed
that the Contract was unnecessary at best and damaging at worst. If the party was going to
pick up seats merely by opposing Clinton, why open up to Democratic attacks on specific
policy proposals? ―If I were a Democrat in a closely contested district, I‘d be in church right
now giving thanks,‖ said Rep. Fred Grandy (R-IA), who was not running for reelection to the
House in 1994.

―The one thing we‘ve nailed Clinton on has been his propensity to

overpromise and to underdeliver, and here we are doing the same damn thing.‖293
By many accounts, the first ten days after the unveiling of the Contract were, in the
words of one party official, ―terrible.‖

For the first time in months, Democrats had

something to attack, and they seized the offensive with a fury. Republican candidates
flooded the RNC and NRCC with telephone calls seeking advice on how to beat back
Democratic attacks, complaining that they were feeling the heat for the first time in months.
In the words of RNC official Barry Jackson, the candidates ―all got home and the missiles
just kept coming.‖ 294 The initial days were so tough for some candidates that some
Republican consultants counseled them to drop the Contract and go back to an all-negative
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anti-Clinton strategy. ―Clinton and Congress—out of step and out of touch‖ was one of the
messages proposed.295
Nevertheless, Gingrich, Armey, and the rest of the Republican candidates who signed
the Contract believed in its underlying message:

that Republicans were willing to be

accountable for their promises and give the American people ten bills that would, in their
opinion, improve the country. On television, on the radio, to their voters, and in their
literature, the candidates talked about the Contract. They knew that the Contract was merely
giving the American people what they wanted.
The Contract‘s impact, ironically, was enhanced by the reaction it received from
Democrats. In a way very similar to the publicity Tip O‘Neill brought Gingrich and Bob
Walker during the Camscam debacle in 1980s, the massive attack that Democrats waged on
the Contract brought it a level of publicity that Gingrich could only have dreamed of.
Especially important was the attention from President Clinton himself. As Gingrich later
recalled, ―The Friday before the [September 27] event, Tony Blankley, my press secretary,
received a surprise phone call from a White House reporter. The president was about to
launch a full-scale attack on the Contract. What was our reaction? Frankly, we were
overjoyed. The White House response ensured the Contract would be the subject of the
weekend talk shows. Coverage was certain to skyrocket. The White House counterattack
had turned a potential inside-page photo opportunity into the centerpiece of the campaign.‖296
Gingrich was right; the day after the Contract‘s unveiling, the New York Times published a
story on page 16; after Clinton and the Democrats had attacked it, the Contract became front
page news.
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Even more crucial was television coverage. As Blankley remembered, ―One of the
top producers for NBC Nightly News told me the day we had the Contract story it would be
nothing more than a short anchor-read story accompanied by a flash of video showing all the
Republicans on the Capitol steps. Then the White House attacked and we became a real
story.‖297
As the Contract made waves in districts around the country, Republicans in the House
and Senate continued to deny President Clinton and congressional Democrats the victories
they needed to campaign on. Their strategy was simple: just say no.
Despite the best efforts of Gingrich, Armey, and the rest of the Republican leadership,
the majoritarian nature of the House, especially with Democrats increasingly relying on
closed rules to limit amendments and debate, denied the Republicans the opportunity to stifle
the Administration‘s agenda in the House. However, Gingrich found an unlikely partner in
Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, a man with whom Gingrich had never really had a
productive relationship.
Taking advantage of the Senate‘s rules providing for unlimited debate, Dole and his
Republican colleagues employed a tactic known as the filibuster to kill most of President
Clinton‘s legislative agenda. The filibuster—essentially talking a bill to death—has its roots
in the 19th century, but was not significantly used until after the Civil Rights debates of the
1960s. The tactic was used over ninety times by the Democratic Senate minority in the
1980s, but truly came into widespread use during the first two years of Clinton‘s presidency.
In contrast to the 16 times the filibuster was used in the entire 19th century, during the 103rd
Congress, Dole and his colleagues employed the tactic over sixty times.298 Among the bills
blocked were Clinton‘s health care plan, a labor law reform bill favored by organized labor,
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and Clinton‘s 1993 stimulus package. This led the Washington Post to comment, ―The
filibuster threat has hindered Clinton like no previous U.S. president because Bob Dole has
expanded its use with impunity.‖299
Many legislators in Congress were happy to go home without having acted on much
of the Administration‘s legislative agenda, even some Democrats in close races. ―What was
striking about the end of the 103rd Congress was the large number of members who were
happy to go home empty handed,‖ said American Enterprise Institute congressional expert
Norman Ornstein.

When Dole and other Senate Republicans were criticized for their

obstructionist tactics, Dole, characteristically, fired back, ―We make no apologies for parking
in the middle of the political intersection if we have to park there to protect the American
taxpayers from bad legislation.‖ Senator Phil Gramm, who was chairman of the National
Republican Senatorial Committee (the NRCC‘s counterpart in the Senate), was more succinct,
―No is the right answer when the question is more taxes, more spending, more government,
more business as usual.‖ 300
By denying the president and incumbent Democrats victories on their central issues,
the Republicans accomplished several goals. First, they were able to portray Democrats in
general and Clinton in particular as politicians that could not come through on their own
promises. This reinforced the accountability message that the GOP strove to drive home
with the Contract with America. Only Republicans, they claimed, could be counted on to
deliver. Second, by dragging the Administrations initiatives along for months at a time,
Republicans were able to drive wedges within Democratic ranks and create the public
perception that the Democrats were a chaotic and disorganized majority. For all the efforts
made by Clinton to disassociate himself from the comparisons to Jimmy Carter, these public
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perceptions only served to bolster them. Finally, the lack of a positive Democratic agenda to
run on left the party with only one viable campaign option: attack the Republican Contract,
which played right into the Republicans‘ hands. After all, as Dick Armey later recalled,
―everything in the Contract had the approval of the American people. The whole idea
implied prior agreement.

You don‘t ‗contract‘ something with people that they don‘t

want.‖301
The trouble signs for the Democrats had been brewing for months before Election
Day. Primary results all over the country put Democrats in a state of near panic. In the
Oklahoma primary on September 20, eight-term Democratic incumbent Mike Synar lost his
primary to a 71-year old schoolteacher with no prior political experience.

Even more

worrisome was that Synar outspent his opponent by a twenty-to-one margin. In Washington
State, House Speaker Tom Foley had a surprisingly poor showing in his primary. This led
Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) to remark, ―Well, there‘s near panic out there.

Great

commotion, great concern that some of the stalwarts of the party are in trouble.‖302
As they had done in previous congressional elections, the Democrats took the
traditional approach to winning their majority:

fighting district-by-district and taking

advantage of the power of incumbency. ―We were running the campaign in the traditional
manner, really. We were running it in a way that was building on incumbency and using the
power of incumbency to protect as many of our members as we could,‖ recalled Rep. Vic
Fazio (D-CA), the chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. 303
Nevertheless, Democrats were also at a disadvantage using this strategy because many of
their members were retiring. ―We had some members, however, that were retiring in districts

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Noah Weiss, College ‘09

WEISS | 113

that were becoming increasingly Republican and we had a frankly reduced chance for
pickups in that environment [as a result of Clinton‘s unpopularity],‖ said Fazio.304
By September, the president‘s popularity was so low that many Democrats feared him
coming to their district. Rep. Don Johnson (D-GA) told the press that he didn‘t want Clinton
to campaign in his district unless he endorsed his opponent.305 Nevertheless, Clinton was
quite active on the campaign trail during September and the early part of October, attacking
the Republican Contract with America, telling a crowd in Rhode Island, for example, that the
Republican promises will result in a 20 percent cut in Social Security and Medicare, and a
crowd in Michigan that the Republicans were trying to drive down turnout: ―They want to
drive down voter turnout, diminish confidence in the political process and give the election to
the extremist element in their own party. That‘s their whole goal.‖ 306 As a part of a $2
million advertising campaign in October, the Democratic National Committee unveiled an ad
in which they charged that the Contract made $1 trillion in promises: ―A trillion dollars in
promises,‖ an announcer in the advertisements declared. ―How will they make up the
spending gap? Explode the deficit again? Make devastating cuts in Medicare?‖307
The attacks against the Contract using Social Security and Medicare, however, would
soon begin to sound hollow. On October 23, 1994, the Washington Post broke a front-page
story about a secret memo written by White House Office of Management and Budget
director Alice Rivlin on October 3 outlining several hard choices President Clinton would
have to make over the next two years of his presidency if the president wanted to fulfill his
goals of increasing spending in areas like technology and job-training, of providing universal
health insurance, of reducing the deficit, and perhaps even of allowing a tax cut for middleclass working families. ―There are only three possibilities,‖ her memorandum asserted, ―all
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of them tough.‖ The possibilities are to raise taxes, cut spending for specific Government
programs or reduce entitlements.308
Although Clinton publicly stated that the memo was merely cataloguing possibilities
that could arise in the future, it was immediately attacked by Republicans, especially in
relation to its seemingly hypocritical nature. ―What is cravenly hypocritical,‖ said GOP
strategist William Kristol, is that at the same time Democrats are ―publicly and falsely
accusing Republicans of plotting a similar assault on entitlements‖ they are discussing doing
the same. 309 ―This administration has given hypocrisy a new name. While they‘re out
blasting Republicans with phony pre-election rhetoric, they‘re considering a big menu of tax
increases on top of the world‘s largest tax increase ever [referring to the 1993 budget],‖
charged Bob Dole. ―The American people have heard enough election-year double talk from
this administration.‖310
In the wake of the Rivlin memo, made public just two weeks before Election Day, the
Republicans started to pull away significantly. By the latter part of October, Republicans
took a 47 percent to 44 percent advantage over the Democrats in the generic Congress vote
(i.e. Will you vote for the Democrat or the Republican for Congress in the coming election?),
the first time since 1953 that the Democrats had not enjoyed an advantage in this poll. In late
October, President Clinton seemed to be only too glad to leave the country for a trip to the
Middle East to oversee the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. The foreign
policy successes steadily improved his approval ratings, which were back over 50 percent by
October 31, the day he returned to the United States. Clinton wanted to go back on the
campaign trail to help his fellow Democrats, despite the advice of his pollster, Dick Morris,
who told him to stay off the campaign trail so that he remained ―presidential:‖ ―Go back to
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the Middle East. Don‘t campaign for anyone; it will lower your approval ratings, and you
will drag everyone down to defeat.‖ 311 Clinton ignored the advice, and went back to
campaigning. Within a few days, his approval ratings were down again. Although Clinton
had hoped that his presence on the campaign trail would energize Democrats, it in fact did
the opposite, sending ―one last jolt of electricity through the entire conservative coalition.‖312
Republicans decided to make the last week a relentless barrage of anti-Clinton messaging,
once again reinforcing the nationalization theme of Clinton or not Clinton. ―If he had stayed
in the Middle East,‖ RNC operative Don Fierce said, ―I don‘t know how we would have
closed.‖313
By the last week of the campaign, most political observers agreed that the Senate
would go to the Republicans, but that the GOP was unlikely to reach the forty seat gain they
needed for control of the House. ABC News predicted a Republican gain of about thirty
seats, although they did acknowledge that forty was possible. Out of the seventy races too
close to call around the country, fifty-three of those seats were held by Democrats.314
Up until the last days before the election, Democratic leaders still contended that the
election depended on local matters, even while attacking the Contract with America. Tony
Coelho, the former congressman and at the time a Clinton political advisor, said, ―We don‘t
think these are going to be national elections, we think that basically they‘re going to be
local--state by state, district by district, governor by governor.‖315 Nevertheless, the main
Democratic attacks continued to target the Contract with America, bringing more and more
publicity to the document. In the final days of the campaign, the Contract was everywhere,
on both the Democratic and Republican sides.
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Finally, on Election Day, the Republican landslide came.

The results were

astounding. The Republicans picked up fifty-four seats in the House of Representatives to
give them a 230-204 majority, their first in four decades. In the Senate, the GOP captured
eight seats on Election Day and immediate added another when Senator Richard Shelby of
Alabama switched parties to the Republicans, giving the GOP a 53-47 Senate majority, their
first since 1986. These results were mirrored in the states. The Republicans won twelve
governorships to give them their first majority of statehouses since 1972 and twenty state
legislatures switched party control, the first time in fifty years that the GOP controlled a
majority of legislatures.
In a year that was notable for its ferocious anti-government mood, even more striking
was the fact that not a single Republican incumbent that was seeking reelection in the House,
Senate, or as governor was defeated. On the other hand, thirty-four incumbent House
Democrats were defeated, the highest number and percentage loss for a majority party since
1948. Among the defeated Democrats were House Speaker Tom Foley, the first speaker to
be defeated since 1862 and only the second in history; Jack Brooks, the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee and a member of Congress for forty-two years; and Dan Rostenkowski,
the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and a member of Congress for thirty-six
years.
The vote share totals were equally as astonishing. 70 million voters went to the polls
in 1994, 9 million more (15 percent more) than had voted in the last midterm in 1990. This
constituted the second largest jump in history. Before 1994, the Republicans had never
exceeded 28 million votes, but in that election received 36.6 million for a 31 percent increase
over their previous high. Democrats received 1 million fewer votes than they did in 1990.
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Although some have attributed this shift to an electorate turning its back on the in-party, ―if
that were the case, disgruntled voters could have stayed home—as they did in the Watergate
election of 1974, when the GOP vote dropped by more than 3 million from its 1970 level
while the Democratic vote rose by less than 1 million.‖ To political scientists John Pitney
and William Connelly, this meant that ―in 1994, people voted for Republicans, not just
against Democrats.‖316
The sweeping results also showed this landslide to be truly national. In 1992, House
Democrats had received more votes than the GOP in every region of the country. In 1994,
House Democrats lost every region except the Northeast. In fact, the only state in which the
Democrats netted a House pickup was Rhode Island.
Most important, of course, the Republican landslide in 1994 brought the Republicans
out of the minority for the first time in forty years, a result that almost everyone in the
political community thought was impossible. Republicans had solved what Newt Gingrich
had called ―the hardest problem in American politics,‖ although he acknowledged that 80
percent of the solution laid beyond Republican control. This is not to say, however, that the
Republicans were ―Forrest Gumps, passive beneficiaries of destiny. Instead, they carried out
shrewd strategic and tactical decisions, which paid off in November.‖317 Gingrich‘s grand
strategy to nationalize the election had finally paid off.
On the day after the election, as Gingrich, Armey, Walker, DeLay, and others
emerged from Newt‘s office in the Capitol to begin planning the transition, the press
swarmed them, eagerly asking what Republicans planned to do now they had won the
majority. As Gingrich later recalled, ―‗Implement the Contract,‘ I said…‗Look, the election
is over,‘ they said. ‗Can you tell us what you are really going to do now that you‘ve won
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your victory?‘ Each time I would pull out my copy of the Contract. ‗Read this,‘ I told
them.‖318 Over the next few months, Gingrich and the new Republican majority would use
the Contract as a governing tool to focus the new Republican majority.
***************
The 1994 election was certainly a landslide victory, but several important questions
remain. The first is one of process: what was the real effect of the Contract with America?
Its critics, and there are many on both the Democratic and Republican sides, point to poll
numbers taken immediately before and after the election that cast doubt on its significance.
The New York Times/CBS News poll of October 29-November 1, 1994 found that 71 percent
of respondents had never heard of the Contract and another 15 percent said it would make no
difference in how they voted.319
Many Democrats shared the opinion of DCCC Chairman Vic Fazio, who called the
Contract ―process stuff that sounded good.‖ ―I think the Democrats lost the majority more
than the Republicans won it,‖ Fazio recalled. ―I think Newt Gingrich would like you to
believe that the Contract was decisive, but the Contract was really an afterthought. It was
late in the election cycle, not a lot of exposure was given to it by the free media, and there
was not a lot of money to buy paid advertisements…It did not have nearly the impact that
other factors did.‖

320

Even some Republicans, like newly-elected freshman David

Funderburk of North Carolina, did not believe the Contract played much of a role: ―Nobody
in my district had heard of it, and it was not a major factor.‖321 ―The Contract was something
that got candidates excited, but it wasn‘t the reason the Republicans got elected,‖ said Scott
Bensing.322
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Nevertheless, although the Contract itself was perhaps not the decisive factor of the
election, it played a pivotal role in providing a positive platform for Republicans candidates
to complement the attacks on Clinton and the Democrats. ―People did not vote for Gil
Gutknecht because of the Contract,‖ newly-elected Republican freshman Gil Gutknecht of
Minnesota recalled, ―but the Contract moved Republicans off the image of Nyet, Nyet,
Nyet…The Contract gave the Republicans a positive attitude and a positive agenda.‖ 323 ―I
think it was one of many reasons,‖ said Kerry Knott. ―You also had the unpopularity of
Clinton, you had the rise of the Perot vote that was really looking for reform. Like Newt‘s
original vision. The combination of going negative on Clinton and a positive agenda both
worked together to win us a majority.‖324 Frank Luntz, the Republican pollster, had a similar
take on the Contract‘s impact:
―The Contract with America kept Republicans positive at a time when they
would otherwise have gone negative because they were attacking incumbents.
What happened was that it gave them a reason to run a different style
campaign, and for six weeks instead of telling Americans what they were
against, they told Americans what they were for. They all built up a level of
credibility so when they turned around and started to attack the Democrats, as
challengers always do, they had credibility. They had a basis to attack and to
say I‘m not just against A, I do support B.‖325
To Bob Walker, it was this positive agenda that provided the decisive votes, namely
the 9 million new people who showed up to the polls on Election Day: ―I think the 9 million
people who showed up at the polls who had never been there before were at least largely
influenced by a message that had a positive theme to it. The Democrats got out almost
exactly the same number of people that they‘d gotten in the previous off-year election, but
what really made the difference was this whole group and their enthusiasm.‖326

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Noah Weiss, College ‘09

WEISS | 120

Proponents of the Contract downplay the seemingly negative poll numbers and rather
emphasize the aggregate impact of the message embodied by the Contract. According to this
argument, although voters may have not known the Contract as such, they understood the
message and they associated the message with the Republican Party. The fact that nearly all
Republican House candidates were saying the same thing all over the country reinforced this
image of a party that stood for certain issues. ―The fact was that the Republican candidates
in 1994 were all speaking the Gingrich mantra of tax cuts, a balanced budget, and a stronger
military,‖ said historian Steven Gillon.327
The Contract also provided a lightning rod for party activists to rally around. As
Walker remembered, ―I believe that we generated enthusiasm for the Republican ticket
because we had this well focused message. So whether people knew about it as the Contract
or whatever, the activists knew about it and the activists were able to drive people out.‖ 328
Key to the motivation behind the activists was the vocal support for the Contract provided by
talk radio hosts around the country. Talk radio was instrumental in reaching the party
faithful quickly and effectively.
Furthermore, Republicans in 1994 were able to recruit exceptional candidates to
challenge Democratic incumbents around the country. More about this subject will come in
the next chapter, but suffice it to say here that better candidates with a consistent message
were a recipe for success for the GOP. But even for the second-tier candidates, the Contract
provided a strategy that would keep them on-message and on the rise. As Kerry Knott later
recalled:
―One of the things was excellent candidate recruitment, which Bill Paxon and
Newt had done. Their idea was that we needed to get a candidate in every
single district. We really set out to create a wave, because if you are able to
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do it then you get to beat some people that you don‘t expect to beat. But if
you don‘t have a candidate running, then you can‘t win. So we had a
candidate running everywhere. A lot of those candidates, and even a lot of the
ones that would be considered first-tier candidates, generally adopted the
Contract as their message. So we didn‘t do a lot of national advertising, but I
would say it was fairly universal as far as candidates who decided to talk
about the Contract on the campaign trail and to drive it through their
campaign literature. And it gave a lot of those second-tier candidates
something to talk about. They couldn‘t afford high-priced consultants or slick
TV time, but it gave them a coherent vision to talk about and get people
excited about. What I‘ve told people when they say that the Contract wasn‘t
particularly impactful, I say, think of how the election would have gone
without the Contract. I think we would have come close, but we would have
not gotten there. Because a lot of these members who were swept in wouldn‘t
have had a prayer. They would have been out there getting attacked and
fighting back on who knows what issues. But we gave them a tool to win.‖329
Almost undoubtedly, the decisive factor in the election was the fact that the
Republicans were able to successfully nationalize it. Essentially, the House Republicans
were able to convince the electorate to apply the standards most often used in presidential
contests (where Republicans had won five of the last seven) to congressional elections. ―All
politics was not local in 1994,‖ said political scientist Gary Jacobson.

―Republicans

succeeded in framing the local choice in national terms, making taxes, social discipline, big
government, and the Clinton presidency the dominant issues.‖ 330 The Contract was the
vehicle through which nationalization was achieved. ―In Congress you had traditionally been
able to win by saying: ‗Here‘s what I‘ve done for the district,‘‖ said Rep. Jon Fox (R-PA).
―With the Contract one party was able to say:

‗Here‘s what we want to do for the

country.‘‖331
Crucial to their success was the disapproval with President Clinton. Clinton and his
policies provided the symbols that Republicans rallied against. In Republicans‘ eyes, his
health care reform bill represented the march of big government. His 1993 budget and tax
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increase represented the Democrats‘ willingness to raise taxes. The crime bill and assault
weapons ban represented the threat they posed to gun owners. His attempt to change the
policy on gays in the military represented the threat posed to cultural traditionalism. The
Contract fit into this scheme by turning the election into a choice between the Republican
agenda and the failures of the Clinton Administration. According to Clinton aide Doug
Sosnik, ―The Contract gave a symbolic and substantive vehicle for the Republicans to make
this a change-versus-status-quo election.‖
Much later, Clinton accepted partial blame for the Republican victory:

―I had

contributed to the demise by allowing my first weeks to be defined by gays in the military;
by falling to concentrate on the campaign until it was too late; and by trying to do too much
too fast in a news climate in which my victories were minimized, my losses were magnified,
and the overall impression was created that I was just another pro-tax, big-government liberal,
not the New Democrat who had won the presidency.‖332
For all the advantages that Clinton gave the Republicans, the flip side could as easily
be applied to Democrats in Congress. Often the president‘s unpopularity was a weight
around Democrats‘ necks. But even more fundamental was the need for Democrats to
support the president in the two years prior to the 1994 election. According to Rep. Vic
Fazio (D-CA), after the 1992 election, ―Democrats suddenly had a majority that needed to be
operationally supportive of their president. The Democratic majority had observed in the
Carter Administration that when they were at odds with each other, they all suffered. I think
[Speaker] Tom Foley wanted to be as supportive of the president as he could, and therefore
Foley went along with White House requests.‖333 In many cases, this meant acceding to
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Administration desires over what would have been best in the long run for keeping a
Democratic House. Fazio recalled:
―The Democrats made several mistakes. The first was to fail to pass the
health care proposal. The fact that they couldn‘t even get it out of committee
to vote on passing it at all really frustrated the Democratic base and
suppressed their turnout. The Democrats in Congress made a mistake by
adopting the Clinton plan in full. Rather than going to the Administration and
saying we can‘t pass this, but we can pass that, they didn‘t. Second, rather
than separating gun issues from the crime bill, we allowed the crime bill to
become a target for the NRA and the Democrats who supported it were
targeted for defeat. Thirdly, to the credit I think to the Democrats, they passed
a credible plan to reduce the deficit, which over time worked. But at the point
of the election in 1994, there was really no evidence of that. All it was was a
tough vote on the House floor that, as I can remember, only raised taxes on all
Americans in the form of a gas tax of 3.4 cents. At the time, Republicans
seized on that and said that this was a tax increase on all Americans.‖334

With something as large and complicated as a congressional election, it is impossible
to identify a single overriding reason to explain its results. As much as some partisans would
like to completely rely on or discount the Contract with America, it is clear that the Contract,
as a tool of the successful strategy of nationalization of the election, played an important, but
limited role in bringing the Republican Party out of the desert after forty years. Without the
decisions of Clinton and the congressional Democrats mentioned by Fazio and others, the
climate would have never existed for Republicans to win such sweeping gains in one election.
On the other hand, without the Republicans‘ visionary strategy to recognize the opportunity
and the guts to try something completely new, a majority would have never been
accomplished. This combination was noted by President Clinton: ―Gingrich had proved to
be a better politician than I was. He understood that he could nationalize a midterm election
with the contract, with incessant attacks on the Democrats, and with the argument that all the
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conflicts and bitter partisanship in Washington the Republicans had generated must be the
Democrats‘ fault since we controlled both Congress and the White House.‖335
Indeed, the 1994 election was exceptional merely on the basis of its results. In their
long tenure in the minority, Republicans had gained seats in individual elections. Yet as their
numbers waxed and waned, they never approached the 218 seats necessary for a majority. In
fact, between 1956 and 1994, the Republicans‘ high water point was only 192, reached three
times in the elections of 1968, 1972, and 1980 on the coattails of three Republican
presidential wins. Whereas the longest tenure of any previous minority was a scant sixteen
years, four decades passed without seeing a Republican majority. Yet in 1994, not only did
the Republicans gain the forty seats necessary to achieve a majority (their fifty-four seat gain
was the largest since the Democrats won seventy-five in 1948), but they did it in such
convincing fashion as to guarantee a place in history.

No Republican incumbent was

defeated while tirty-four House incumbent Democrats lost their seats, including the speaker
of the House and two powerful committee chairmen. State legislatures changed party control
to the Republicans, the GOP controlled more than half of the governorships, and the GOP
increased its vote share by a whopping 31 percent. Their strategy of nationalizing the
election is now a hallmark of political campaigns, augmenting Tip O‘Neill‘s maxim that ―all
politics is local‖ with the Gingrich corollary, ―except when they‘re national.‖
The effects of the election results, however, would not be fully experienced until the
Republicans took formal control of the House in January 1995. For the House Republicans,
winning the majority was just the first step in their Revolution.
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CHAPTER 4:
ATTEMPTING A REVOLUTION

As far as opening days go, the first day of the 104th Congress began quite ordinarily
with an ecumenical prayer service at St. Peter‘s Catholic Church on Capitol Hill. Democrats
and Republicans packed the church, joining together in the biennial tradition of opening a
new Congress with the tones of bipartisanship. Yet as members of Congress entered and
exited the sanctuary, murmuring brief greetings to one another, it was clear that January 4,
1995 was no typical day, but rather one that crackled with all the anticipation of an
inauguration. However, it was not a president that was to take the oath of office at 12:00
noon, but the first Republican-controlled House of Representatives in four decades.
Since the landslide Republican victory in November, Capitol Hill had seen a nonstop
flurry of activity. Moving vans had taken the place of taxicabs as the dominant motor
vehicle as defeated members cleared their offices and new members took their places. As is
the norm when majorities switch, the Republicans were moving into the more choice office
space and the Democrats retreating to minority quarters, which added to the chaos that
already reigned in the three House office buildings along Independence Avenue on the south
side of the Capitol.
November and December had been months of wildly conflicting emotions in the halls
of Cannon, Longworth, and Rayburn. Democrats, stunned by their electoral trouncing and
uncertain about their futures, quietly but emotionally packed up their offices and left town.
―Watching the Democrats move out of their offices,‖ Republican pollster Frank Luntz said,
―was quite an experience. I‘d never seen staffers, I‘d never seen adults, cry before. I saw
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just floor after floor of tears.‖336 Their successors—the Republican freshmen—were jubilant.
Freshman orientation had commenced December 1 at the Heritage Foundation, the venerable
king of Republican think-tanks in Washington. Although the New York Times described
these members as ―73 Mr. Smiths,‖ a not entirely flattering portrayal, their energy and drive
was palpable as members, their families, and visitors flooded into the Capitol on opening day.
By 10:30 a.m., the House galleries were packed with onlookers, and an overflow
room was set up for VIPs in Statuary Hall, which, incidentally, was where the House of
Representatives met until 1857. In the House chamber, the excitement and anticipation in the
air was palpable. For weeks, admittance to the galleries had been the hottest ticket in town.
The floor looked more like a gala than a legislative chamber. Members and their families
milled about, greeting their Republican colleagues with congratulations and their Democratic
ones with consolations. Many members had brought their children to the Capitol with them;
of special interest to the kids were the Mighty Morphin‘ Power Rangers who were going to
be performing in the Longworth cafeteria after lunch.
All the major news media had moved to Washington to cover the events of the day.
As news crews set up on the Capitol grounds, the new Republican majority had not forgotten
those who had helped them get elected—the talk radio hosts who had, until then, been barred
from broadcasting in the Capitol. The hosts lauded the day as a return to normalcy. ―God
bless America,‖ Cincinnati host Bill Cunningham exclaimed, ―the normal people are back in
charge.‖337 The traditional news media was unsurprisingly more reserved in their coverage,
but no less aware of the day‘s significance. ―When the bronze-framed clocks that loom over
the House chamber strike noon Wednesday, a clerk will gavel lawmakers to order, and the
chaplain will say a prayer. Across the Capitol, the Senate will observe a similar ritual of
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simple dignity, marking the two-century continuum of American democracy,‖ reported the
New York Times. ―Then comes the revolution.‖338
The other end of Pennsylvania Avenue was by and large subdued that morning. The
president was on vacation in Arkansas, choosing to spend the first few days of 1995 duck
hunting near his mother-in-law‘s home. He was due to return to Washington that afternoon.
Nevertheless, the president‘s absence was barely noted by the Washington establishment and
indeed by most of the country. Instead, all eyes were on the new Republican Congress and
its enigmatic new speaker, Rep. Newt Gingrich of Georgia.

Ever since the sweeping

Republican victory in the November midterm elections, no one, not even the president, had
commanded more attention and scrutiny.
Back inside the House chamber, the scene on the floor was notable as much for the
many new faces as for the absence of some familiar ones. Eighty-four new members—
seventy-three Republicans and eleven Democrats—were to be sworn in for the first time.
The freshmen were easily recognizable on the floor, their faces marked with exuberance and
euphoria. Gone, however, were some people that had seemed to transcend the beginnings
and endings of many previous congresses, institutions themselves within the institution of the
House. Jack Brooks, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, gone after forty-two years;
Dan Rostenkowski, the chairman of Ways and Means, gone after thirty-six; and the biggest
defeat of them all, House Speaker Tom Foley, gone after thirty years, the first speaker
defeated for reelection since the Civil War.
Adding to the strangeness of the morning, several senators, usually disdainful of the
lower house, were seen in the House chamber, eager to watch history being made. The
Senate, unlike the House designed by the Founding Fathers to be a continuous institution
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with no discrete beginnings and endings, recessed around 11:30 a.m. so that senators could
have the opportunity to watch the proceedings in the House of Representatives, and several,
including Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS) and Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), took
advantage.
At 12:00 noon, the formal opening got underway as the outgoing clerk of the House
gaveled the chamber to order. Following the traditional prayer by the House chaplain and the
roll call of the states, the balloting for speaker began at 12:42 p.m. One by one, the clerk
called the roll as the representatives cast their ballots in the traditional party-line vote, with
Gingrich garnering 228 votes to Richard Gephardt‘s (D-MO) 202. Although the outcome of
the balloting had been preordained, the election itself had not been without its light moments.
After the first two ballots had been cast by Reps. Neil Abercrombie and Gary Ackerman,
both Democrats, Ackerman shouted, ―Move to close the roll‖ with the vote total standing at
two for Gephardt and none for Gingrich. The chamber erupted in laughter.339
When the balloting was closed, the Republicans in the chamber let loose, and a chant
of ―Newt! Newt! Newt!‖ gained momentum as the new speaker entered the chamber
escorted, as per tradition, by Gephardt and the other members of the Georgia delegation. As
Gingrich mounted the speaker‘s rostrum, a member called out, ―It‘s a whole Newt world!‖
and an enormous wave of applause spilled across the chamber.
When the chamber quieted down, Gephardt, the new minority leader, began to
introduce Gingrich, deadpanning, ―This is not a moment I have been waiting for,‖ before
handing the gavel of the House to Gingrich.340 Most eloquently, Gephardt summed up the
significance and poignancy of the day: ―With resignation but with resolve,‖ he said, ―I
hereby end forty years of Democratic rule of this House.‖341
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The next day, Washington Post reporter Dan Balz wrote, ―For four decades,
Democrats had patrolled the corridors of Congress with a sense of permanence that seemed
impregnable. Yesterday, the Berlin Wall of American politics came tumbling down.‖342
The day was filled with ironies and symbols of the new order. Upon his election,
Gingrich was introduced by the House doorkeeper, whose position was soon to be abolished.
Gingrich was sworn in by the dean of the House—its longest serving member—John Dingell
(D-MI), whose father—who had held the same House seat that his son now did—Gingrich
lauded in his opening speech as an emblem of New Deal liberalism, exactly what Gingrich
and the other Republicans were about to set out to dismantle.

Even Gingrich‘s

acknowledgement of former Republican House Leaders John J. Rhodes of Arizona and
Robert H. Michel of Illinois somehow seemed paradoxical. After all, it was their brand of
traditional conciliatory Republicanism that Gingrich had set out to destroy during his decadelong ascent to power.
For all the symbolism of the day, it was hard to ignore the singular achievement of
Newt Gingrich, someone who had gone from being a backbench gadfly to the most powerful
speaker since Uncle Joe Cannon, who had served from 1903-1911. Since the founding of the
Conservative Opportunity Society in 1983, Gingrich and his allies reshaped the party from
the inside out. ―There are two ways to rise,‖ Gingrich once said. ―One is to figure out the
current system and figure out how you fit into it. The other is to figure out the system that
ought to be, and as you change the current system into the system that ought to be, at some
point it becomes more practical for you to be a leader than for somebody who grew out of the
old order.‖343 Gingrich had indeed followed his own advice.
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Yet for all the ceremonial significance of the first few hours of the 104 th Congress, it
was above all clear to the new Republican majority that they had a job to do, namely to
implement their pact with the American electorate: the Contract with America. For the next
100 days, the GOP would attempt to revolutionize the House and the nation.
***************
Understandably, the reaction to the results of the November election were mixed,
with Democrats shocked, stunned, and distraught and Republicans shocked, stunned, and
euphoric. The media struggled to find a large enough metaphor to describe the Republican
landslide.

―The United States was swept yesterday by the equivalent of a bloodless

revolution,‖ said ABC‘s Ted Koppel.344 ―The Republican Revolution of Election ‗94 shook
Capitol Hill like an earthquake today. Its reverberations went into statehouses and moved the
whole political landscape sharply to the right,‖ reported Dan Rather of CBS. 345 His
colleague Bob Schieffer remarked, ―For Democrats it was a nightmare come true as dawn
broke on a different Capitol, a Republican Capitol.‖346 And ABC‘s Chris Bury said, ―By
sunrise the shift in power was so seismic the earth under the Capitol might as well have
moved.‖347 Perhaps the most restrained reporting was by NBC‘s Tom Brokaw, who merely
stated, ―It was one of the most radical political shifts of the twentieth century.‖348
Whatever the appropriate metaphor, Republicans were understandably jubilant upon
hearing the news. The sweeping nature of the election prompted several leading Republicans
to claim a mandate in the hours after the election. ―If this is not a mandate to move in a
particular direction, I would like somebody to explain to me what a mandate would look
like,‖ proclaimed Newt Gingrich.349
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Nevertheless, some Republicans, including Gingrich‘s counterpart in the Senate,
incoming Majority Leader Robert Dole, sounded a conciliatory tone when speaking of
President Clinton, indicating that they were willing to cooperate on some issues. Indeed,
several of the items in the Contract with America were policy areas in which the president
had already indicated that he was interested in addressing. ―If we‘re going to make it work
and make it last, we have to work together...If we fail to produce, we‘ll be kicked out for a
long time again,‖ Dole said.350 Gingrich, however, in a move that perhaps portended later
political struggles, told a crowd in Washington, ―We will cooperate with anyone and we will
compromise with no one.‖351
President Clinton emerged from the 1994 election lost and confused, wounded by
what Congressman Dave McCurdy (D-OK), who had just been defeated for a Senate seat,
called ―a visceral anti-Clinton sentiment…which is almost unfathomable to people who
haven‘t experienced it.‖352 Appearing at a news conference the day after the election, the
president seemed exhausted, confused, and unsure of himself. In response to a question
about what message he was taking from the voters, the usually smooth Clinton replied, ―Well,
I think they were saying two things to me—or maybe three. They were saying—maybe
300.‖353 Other Democrats had no trouble finding a lesson for the president. ―I think for
President Clinton there is a pretty blunt message,‖ said Al From, president of the Democratic
Leadership Council, an centrist Democratic organization to which Clinton used to belong.
―It‘s ‗get with the program or you‘ll have to pay the consequences.‘―354
Behind the scenes, as historian Steven Gillon writes, ―Clinton was distraught at the
election results. Aides found him surprisingly passive in the days following the election, as
if he were in a state of shock. Bitterly disappointed in himself and his staff, he withdrew into
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himself refusing to communicate or give clear direction.‖355 In December, the president left
town, heading back home to Arkansas to ―water his roots.‖
Echoing the Republicans, Clinton spoke of cooperation in the days after the election,
inviting the new majority in Congress to join him in solving America‘s most pressing
problems. ―I am ready to share responsibility with the Republican Party when they assume
leadership in the Congress. I ask them only to join me in the center of the public debate,‖ he
said at Georgetown University, his alma mater.356
Other Democrats were more matter-of-fact in talking about their electoral defeat.
―I‘m going to go to Washington and clean out my desk,‖ said defeated Rep. Dan
Rostenkowski (D-IL). 357 ―Well, we made history last night,‖ said Democratic National
Committee Chairman David Wilhelm. ―Call it what you want: an earthquake, a tidal wave, a
blowout. We got our butts kicked.‖358
As the Democrats filtered back into Washington in late November for the lame-duck
session and their leadership elections, they chose to keep their current leaders, Dick Gephardt
as leader and David Bonior (D-MI) as whip, as they transitioned into minority status. It was
clear, however, that they were unfamiliar with their new role, and that it would take them
several months to truly formulate an effective strategy. When asked by the press how the
new Republican majority planned to treat the Democrats, Rep. Bill Archer (R-TX), the
incoming chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, replied, ―We will be at least as
accommodating to them as they have been to us.‖359
***************
Much like he did upon winning his first election to the House of Representatives in
1978, Newt Gingrich and the rest of the Republican leadership barely paused to rest after
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their sweeping victory in the November 1994 midterm elections before returning to
Washington to begin planning for their formal assumption of power the following January.
Luckily for them, while the transition from Democratic to Republican control was truly to be
a momentous event, it was one for which they had been planning for months.
In October 1993, when almost no one believed that the GOP would take over the
majority in the next Congress, Dick Armey sagely wrote a memo to Newt Gingrich urging
him and the rest of the leadership not to ignore the transition period in their campaign
planning. Recalling recent history, Armey wrote, ―When the Republicans won the Senate in
1980 they were woefully unprepared. We must not make that same mistake when we take
over the House…Good planning now will keep us from making serious mistakes during the
heat (and excitement) of the moment.‖ 360 He assigned his chief of staff, Kerry Knott, to
begin working on a plan and asked Newt to contribute a staff member as well.
Two months later, in December, Armey followed up on his initial transition planning
with another, more detailed, memo to Gingrich. Outlining what he called the ―Project
Majority Contingency Plan,‖ Armey wrote, ―This plan does not focus on what issues to push
or setting a legislative timetable. Rather this plan will cover specifically how we handle the
transition, including key appointments,…necessary Conference rules changes, how to handle
committee ratios, budgets, etc. The plan also focuses on the critical time between the
election in early November and our taking control in January…We will need a legal strategy,
an auditing strategy, a media strategy, and a continual campaign strategy.‖361
Central to Armey‘s strategy to create viable transition plan was the need to generate
widespread support within the Republican Conference for a single, comprehensive plan. To
do this, Armey adopted a strategy of member self-investment. He wrote in the December
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memo, ―I‘ve been working on an outline for a plan and had intended to develop it quietly and
privately over the next several months. After thinking more about it, however, I would like
to enlist ranking members and other key GOP members in the process. By doing it this way
we will probably get a better plan, plus more of our members will have an investment in the
process.‖362 As a result of this, as well as the fact that Knott was about to take over the
planning for the Contract with America, Armey turned the transition planning over to Rep.
Jim Nussle (R-IA), who had been a strong, activist member since his election to Congress in
1990.
Nussle quickly put together a committee of younger members to assist him in this
task, including Reps. John Boehner (R-OH), Deborah Price (R-OH), Pete Hoekstra (R-MI),
and Scott Klug (R-WI). Their work became increasingly important as the Contract with
America took shape and it became clear that there would be little to no time at the beginning
of the new Congress to organize the House. In typical years, the House would convene for
the election of a speaker and approval of the rules during the first week of January and then
recess several weeks before beginning legislative business. But considering the Republicans‘
intent to fulfill the Contract with America and bring its items up for a vote within the first
100 days, Republican leaders planned to hit the ground running. ―The first day of the next
Congress is scheduled for January 4, when the new members will be sworn in,‖ reported The
Washington Times. ―But rather than recess for about three weeks until the State of the Union
address, the practice at the start of other sessions, House Republican leaders intend to keep
the body in session.‖363
Eventually, Nussle and his team produced a flow chart that covered each aspect of the
transition down to the very last detail. After Election Day, Nussle was then appointed the
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official transition chairman by Newt Gingrich and began the implementation of his transition
plan. ―After months of planning,‖ Gingrich would later remember, ―we were ready to take
over the House on Wednesday morning, November 9. We had already scheduled a senior
staff conference call, a senior planning group conference call, and a leadership conference
call for the first day after the election. Now we were simply executing the first phase of the
plan.‖364
Initially, many political observers thought of the Contract with America as a mere
campaign gimmick. Used to the typical way that politicians treated promises, reporters were
eager to know what exactly the Republicans planned to do with their majority. As Rep.
Robert Walker (R-PA), one of Gingrich‘s closest confidants, recalled:
―I still remember coming into town a day or so after the election and meeting
in the Capitol building beginning to lay out our plans. We talked to the
incoming committee chairmen and all that. When we walked out into the
hallway, it was absolutely packed with press. I had never seen so many TV
cameras and microphones in my life as there were in the hallway that day.
Basically the first question for Newt was, ‗Well, what are you going to do
now that you are in the majority?‘ Newt said, ‗We‘re going to do the
Contract.‘ The attitude of the press was, ‗Oh well that was all campaign
garbage and so on. What are you really going to do?‘ Newt said, ‗No, you
don‘t understand, the Contract to us is real. We really believe it. We really
believe that we have a contract with the American people to do it, and we‘re
going to do exactly what we said we‘re going to do, and we‘re going to do it
in the 100 days that we said we‘re going to do it in.‖365
Reporters also underestimated the fervor behind the Republicans‘ commitment to
passing the Contract. But Republicans took it extremely seriously. ―This contract is our
Bible. It is our guiding set of principles for the first 100 days,‖ said Paxon on the day after
the election.366
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There was another reason, perhaps, behind the reporters‘ incredulity:

the

extraordinary difficulty that it would take to bring ten bills to the floor for a vote in 100 days.
Introducing major legislation, referring it to a subcommittee with hearings and markup, then
to a full committee with hearings and markup, then to the Rules Committee, and the finally to
the floor is a process that requires both great skill and great time. ―When we settled on the
100 days it was because 100 days sounded good,‖ recalled Bob Walker, ―but the fact is that
you had to organize the committees, you had to get up and running, you had to get committee
rules done, all before you could even move the first piece of legislation.‖ Gingrich appointed
Armey to come up with a schedule, and he did so very effectively. Rep. Dennis Hastert (RIL), at the time the chief deputy whip, recalled:
―Armey had lined up these measures and put them into a queue, as if they
were on an assembly line. He had constructed a very elaborate matrix so we
knew where everything was in every committee and subcommittee along the
way for the first one hundred days, and it was designed so that the moment
something veered off track, we would know about it immediately.‖367
Yet before the Republicans were ready to get to work on the Contract, there were
many organizational tasks to accomplish. These tasks were made much harder by the fact
that the Republicans, having been out of the majority for four decades, were unaccustomed to
wielding the reins of power. ―You have to remember, that that point we had no House
Republicans either at the member level or the staff level who had ever served in the
majority…so we had no idea what you needed to do to take over,‖ said Gingrich aide Jack
Howard.368
Logistical issues had to be taken care of first, even things that seemed to be the most
basic operations possible. ―We had been in the wilderness so long that nobody remembered
anything about being in the leadership,‖ Hastert later recalled. ―We didn‘t know where the
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special back rooms were; we didn‘t even know where the keys to those rooms were.‖369 To
remedy this problem, Gingrich‘s staff literally went around and knocked on every door to
find out what was going on in each room.370
The finances of the House were also under majority control. In the days after the
election, the Democrats handed over a large ledger in which the financial records of the
House were kept. The Republicans were dismayed at what they found. ―When we took over,
they literally handed us a journal where they had kept the financial records of the House of
Representatives. Hundreds of millions of dollars in expenditures. There were erasures, a
little bit of white out here and there, it was a mess,‖ recalled Rep. Bill Paxon (R-NY).371
―Everything that could tell us how the House should be run was in chaos. In fact, the books
were in such bad shape that an auditing firm could not even perform an audit,‖ said
Hastert.372 The ledgers were later matched to other records and an independent auditing firm
was hired to do a complete review of the House books, a procedure that has continued to
occur in every year since.
An early fear among the Republicans was that the Democrats would destroy
documents if they lost their majority. ―The Democrats will be in panic and will be shredding
more documents than Oliver North ever thought about,‖ wrote Armey to Gingrich in a
December 20, 1993 memo.373 In the days immediately following the election, Gingrich sent
a letter to outgoing Speaker Tom Foley asking him to cooperate in ―making sure that official
documents will not be removed or destroyed.‖374 Gingrich and the other leaders also asked
Foley to assist them in freezing committee spending for the last few months of Democratic
control. Ever the distinguished gentlemen, the vanquished speaker and his staff acquiesced.
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In mid-November, the GOP leadership turned their attention to the procedures of the
House, and specifically to the committee system.

During their years in the minority,

Republicans had routinely complained of Democratic abuse of the committee systems.
Overly skewed ratios, fervently liberal subcommittee chairmen, joint referrals of bill, and
other tactics were partially responsible for the Republicans‘ frustrations in the minority.
Thus, when the GOP leaders began to examine the committee system, they had their eye on
reducing its size and scope. ―Our aim,‖ said Gingrich, ―was to rethink the entire size and
structure of Congress.‖375
Rep. David Dreier (R-CA) was given the job of leading a task force to streamline the
House committee system.

―My goal was to enhance the deliberative nature of the

institution,‖ he said. ―We had 266 committees and subcommittees, and the congressional
bureaucracy was way too great.‖376 One of the congressional reforms in the Contract with
America was to reduce the number of committees and the number of staffers, and Dreier took
to this task with relish. Eventually, the GOP decided to eliminate three full committees:
District of Columbia, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and Post Office and Civil Service.
Several others that initially were on the chopping block like Veterans Affairs and Small
Business were saved because of the Republicans‘ strong ties to their lobbies. The most
significant change came on the subcommittee level.

Thirty-one of the 115 House

Subcommittees were abolished and committee staff was reduced by one-third. ―What some
Democrats dismissed as a campaign gimmick, the Republican Contract with America so far
turns out to be deadly serious. The Republicans plan to bring in an independent auditor to
examine House books and to fire thousands of employees on Capitol Hill,‖ reported Bob
Schieffer of CBS News.377
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Moreover, Dreier‘s task force recommended the reallocation of jurisdictions to
prevent against one committee from becoming too powerful and aimed to rename committees
in order to refocus their efforts. Eventually, ten of the twenty-eight full committees were
renamed, the reasoning being more substantial than just a mere indication of a new regime.
As Dreier said:
―Renaming was about shifting the agenda away from big government. For
example:
Government Operations became Government Reform and
Oversight, Education and Labor became Economic and Educational
Opportunity, and Public Works and Transportation became Transportation
and Infrastructure. The old names implied a desire to perpetuate and expand
on the size and scope of government. The new names were needed to put our
imprimatur on Congress and indicate the direction in which we‘re taking the
institution.‖378
As perhaps the most powerful incoming speaker since Joseph Cannon at the turn of
the twentieth century, Newt Gingrich leveraged his power during the November
reorganization to ensure that his handpicked people chaired the full committees in the House.
Usually, the seniority system was ironclad, as it had been with the Democrats, with few
exceptions, for decades. However, because the planks of the Contract with America would
be going through the committee system in the first 100 days, the process of choosing
committee chairs required Gingrich‘s special attention. Passing the Contract was of the
utmost importance, and Gingrich needed guarantees that this would happen. By making sure
that committee chairs were responsive to the party leadership, ―the leadership sought to
ensure that the key elements of the legislative program would not be compromised before
they reached the floor.‖379 The process was described by Bob Walker:
―What we had to do was convince some committee chairmen that they were
going to do this and they were going to do it in the time frame that we said.
Some of them came in and said, ‗Well I have my own agenda,‘ and Newt
would point out to them, ‗No, you don‘t have your own agenda until we are
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finished with the Conference‘s agenda.‘ We had a couple of people come in
and say to us, ‗Well I‘ve been talking to my staff and they don‘t think we can
get this done in the period of time that was set.‘ And Newt would say, ‗You
don‘t think you can get it done?‘ ‗Well my staff says we can‘t.‘ ‗Well,‘ he
said, ―I think I can probably find somebody for your job who has a staff that
knows they can get it done.‘ ‗Oh no, Mr. Speaker, we‘ll do it then.‘ So there
were some of those fairly hard-nosed discussions. There were a couple of
people who thought they were going to become committee chairmen that
didn‘t get the job because this relatively small group of people that had started
meeting in the basement of the taco place sat in a room and made some
decisions on who was going to get promoted and who wasn‘t.‖380

Although by and large Gingrich followed the seniority system after having these
hard-nosed discussions, there were a few cases in which he reached further down the
seniority ladder to find his preferred chairman. Reps. Robert Livingston (R-LA), Thomas
Bliley (R-VA), and Henry Hyde (R-IL) were made the chairmen of Appropriations,
Commerce, and Judiciary, respectively, even though none of these members were the most
senior on their panel. In Livingston‘s case, Gingrich jumped four other members who were
more senior to him to make him the chairman. Each of these chairmen were seen to be more
active and assertive (although not necessarily more conservative), as well as more likely to
pursue a party-favored agenda. However, he did not merely install someone who would not
have the support of the committee members. ―Newt would not have picked me had it not
been all right with the other Appropriations members,‖ said Livingston.381 Furthermore, the
Appropriations cardinals—the subcommittee chairs—were required to pledge their loyalty to
the Conference to secure their positions. 382 The biggest loser in this committee reshuffling
was Rep. Carlos Moorhead (R-CA), who was passed over for the chairmanships of both
Judiciary and Commerce. As Gingrich press secretary Tony Blankley recalled:
―We went through the campaign to accomplish certain things if we won.
Newt and the leaders wanted to put the right people in charge. The most
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painful decision was not giving a full chairmanship to Carlos Moorhead. He
is a very loyal, hard-working member. Basically, Newt thought that Carlos
was too nice and amiable a person to fight at the level we would have to fight.
The Judiciary Committee has the likes of [Democratic Reps.] Chuck Schumer
and Barney Frank. The chair would have to fend off those people on a daily
basis. He wasn‘t sure that Carlos was up to that.‖383
According to political scientist Nicol Rae, ―No Democratic speaker in the modern era
would have presumed to attempt this.‖384 Nevertheless, Gingrich‘s political position was
extremely strong. Not only had he led his party to its first majority in forty years, but also
had the unconditional support of the younger members, many of whom had gotten their start
in politics by listening to his GOPAC tapes. Additionally, during the 1994 campaign, Newt
had visited over 130 congressional districts and raised millions of dollars for Republican
candidates, who in turn felt that they owed him their seats. These young members comprised
a significant portion of the Republican Conference; the seventy-three freshmen and fortyeight sophomores easily combined for a majority of the 231 member House GOP.385
***************
On December 1, the seventy-three GOP freshmen members arrived for orientation.
They flooded into Washington for their first round of meetings and then the next day were
bused to a three-day session in Baltimore jointly organized by the Heritage Foundation and
Jack Kemp‘s political advocacy group, Empower America. The Heritage program was fairly
new, only having been started after the 1992 election. Before, freshman orientation was
organized at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, but
Republicans complained that it was too liberal in focus. The Heritage program was started at
as another option for Republican freshmen, and in 1994, suddenly became the dominant
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program because of the size of the GOP freshman class. 386 Ironically, when it became clear
that no Republican freshmen would attend, Harvard canceled their orientation.
In Baltimore, Heritage had put together an impressive schedule.

The freshmen

received a handbook on implementing the Contract with America and sessions were held on
policy issues such as welfare reform, farm subsidies, congressional reform, and the federal
budget. Heritage also attracted an formidable list of speakers including Kemp, Paul Gigot of
the Wall Street Journal, former Tennessee Governor and Education Secretary Lamar
Alexander, Ralph Reed of the Christian Coalition, former UN ambassador Jeanne
Kirkpatrick, former Education Secretary and Drug Czar William Bennett, Forbes Magazine
publisher Steve Forbes, Republican strategist William Kristol, and talk radio host Rush
Limbaugh.

Although all the speakers received warm welcomes from the freshmen,

Limbaugh clearly was a celebrity. For many of them, Limbaugh had been someone who had
provided encouragement to them long before they decided to run for Congress. Indeed, he
was probably more responsible than anyone for getting them elected. GOP pollster Frank
Luntz conducted a poll in which he found that people who listened to talk radio more than
ten hours a week voted three-to-one for the Republicans.

The freshmen even made

Limbaugh an honorary member of their class.387
More important, however, the Heritage orientation program made the freshmen a unit,
a cohesive class through which they would be able to drive the agenda once they took their
oaths as members of Congress.

―They bused us to Baltimore to attend the Heritage

Foundation‘s orientation. It was a fantastic event, all of the Republican freshmen were there,
and it really made us come together as a class,‖ recalled freshman Jon Christensen of
Nebraska.388
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Indeed, from the outset, it was clear that the freshmen were different. They were
young—over half of them were under 45 years old—and many of them were political
neophytes, never having run for public office before. Even more significant, however, was
that they were true believers in the revolution; they campaigned on a platform that was
fiercely anti-government, anti-Washington, and anti-politics-as-usual. They were the firebreathing activists that Newt Gingrich, Bob Walker, and Vin Weber were when they founded
the Conservative Opportunity Society in 1983. ―Newt‘s looking at us in his own likeness,‖
freshman Republican Mark Foley of Florida said.389
Indeed, the Republican freshmen preferred to think of themselves as outsiders,
elected to clean up the mess in Washington. Many, in fact, had been convinced to run by
observing what was going on in the nation‘s capital. Normally, the National Republican
Congressional Committee is charged with recruiting candidates to run for office, but, as the
NRCC‘s chairman, Rep. Bill Paxon, recalled:
―People were just coming in. In 1994, because of the national political
climate, there were a lot of people who really wanted to run. A lot of them
had never been involved in politics. They didn‘t come to me and say, as
candidates did before and since, ‗Alright, I‘m thinking about running for
Congress. How much money are you going to give me and what committee
assignments am I going to have?‘ Instead, I‘d have these candidates come to
Washington and stop in and they‘d say, ‗I‘m running, I don‘t care if I have
any money from you, and I don‘t care what committees I get because I‘m only
going to serve for six years.‘ They just didn‘t care. It was this prairie fire that
ran across the country.‖390

Many of those who decided to run were already involved in politics in some way or
another, whether they had run for state office or had served on a politician‘s staff. However,
many others were businessmen, lawyers, community leaders, and other outsiders that saw an
opportunity to run for Congress.

Several of the freshmen cited Bill Clinton and the
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Democratic Congress as their motivation to run. ―Clinton brought many conservatives out of
the woodwork, including people who had never thought they would run for office, like me,‖
said freshman Mark Souder (R-IN).391 ―In 1992, I just didn‘t like the way that our current
congressman was representing what I believed to be a more conservative district than his
opinions and his votes were reflecting. I didn‘t have any past political experience, but just
felt that he was not reflective of the second district of Nebraska. I decided that was going to
take him on and win. I don‘t know what made me think I could do that, but I just jumped
into it,‖ recalled Christensen.392 ―The reason that I needed to be in D.C. was that my values
as a father, youth minister, husband, and businessman are under attack in the United States
today as never before,‖ said Rep. J.C. Watts (R-OK).393 ―I thought Bill Clinton was the
worst president the country had ever had, and without a Republican Congress to balance his
views we wouldn‘t recognize the country anymore,‖ said Rep. Van Hilleary (R-TN).394
Perhaps because of their fierce anti-government stances, when the freshmen arrived in
Washington, they were unschooled in and antithetical to Congress‘ institutional norms. They
wanted to accomplish a revolution and they wanted to do it now. To them, the staid ways of
Washington were the embodiment of what was wrong with the system. ―Our class symbol
should be the bumblebee,‖ boasted freshman Gil Gutknecht (R-MN).

―Aeronautical

engineers say the bumblebee can‘t fly…but the bumblebee flies because he never studies
aeronautical engineering.‖395 ―It was an infusion of brand new ideas,‖ said Scott Bensing,
who was the legislative director to freshman Republican John Ensign (R-NV). ―None of
them came in with this congressional box, thinking ‗OK, we‘re freshmen, we have to act this
way.‘ They had no idea. So they fought to bring a brand new perspective to the House.‖396
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The attitude and makeup of the class of 1994 was eerily similar to another activist
freshman class that had taken Washington by storm, the Democratic freshmen of 1974.
Elected in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the Democratic freshmen of 1974 arrived in
the capital pushing for change and congressional reform, and refusing to take no for an
answer. Both classes—1974 and 1994—were large, seventy-five and seventy-three members
respectively, and although they would be on opposite sides of the political spectrum, ―in their
temperament and approach they were soulmates.‖397
Upon arriving in Washington, the brash freshmen of 1974 set out to make their mark.
―We had a real sense of urgency. We thought we were special. We thought we were
different. We came here to take the Bastille,‖ said Rep. George Miller (D-CA), a member of
the class.398 As future House Speaker Tom Foley recalled, the freshmen came to the House
―with unbelievable assertiveness.‖399 At the start of the 94th Congress in January 1975, the
freshmen invited every committee chairman to address them. One such chairman was F.
Edward Hébert of Louisiana. A real power in the House who often referred to himself as the
Grand Titan,400 Hébert had once tried to block the appointment of Reps. Pat Schroeder and
Ron Dellums—a woman and an African American—to his committee. Unsuccessful in this
effort, Hébert announced that ―while he might not be able to control the makeup of the
committee, he could damn well control the number of chairs in the hearing room…He said
that women and blacks were worth only half of one ‗regular‘ member, so he added only one
seat to the committee room and made Ron and me share it,‖ recalled Schroeder. 401 Hébert
showed no more courtesy to the 1974 freshmen, giving them a ―speech about how freshmen
should be content to sit quietly and learn the ropes for a few years.‖402 The freshmen were so
enraged that they voted en masse to remove him, providing enough votes in the Democratic
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Caucus to remove him. Two other chairmen, W.R. Poage of Agriculture and Wright Patman
of Banking and Currency, were deposed in similar fashion.
The freshmen of 1974 were also not content to follow the old maxim for freshmen to
be seen and not heard. As former House Speaker Tip O‘Neill recalled, ―In years past, most
of us had been reluctant to appear on the national Sunday-morning talk shows like Meet the
Press and Face the Nation. These forums were the exclusive prerogative of the senior
members, and anyone who violated this unwritten rule was seen as an upstart who needed his
wings clipped.

But the new members of the mid-1970s had no such reservations.‖ 403

Eventually, the class of 1974 would succeed in limiting the power of the committee chairmen
and drive much of the congressional reform agenda of the late-1970s, as the Congress sought
to restore some of its power after the encroachments of the Nixon Administration.
Much like the 1974 freshmen, the militant freshmen of 1994 were at the vanguard of
the revolution, and their impact was felt almost immediately.

Upon their return to

Washington after the Heritage Foundation‘s orientation program, the House Republican
Conference held their leadership elections to organize for the next Congress. Although there
was never any doubt that Newt Gingrich would be elected as speaker and Dick Armey
chosen to be majority leader, several other races were hotly contested, including the races for
whip and Conference chairman. The whip‘s race was symbolic of the others, pitting two
exceptional and experienced members, Bob Walker and Tom DeLay, against each other.
Both DeLay and Walker had been members of the inner leadership circle for years, and had
put aside their differences to work together in late 1993 and 1994. However, DeLay had a
distinct advantage, having visited many of the freshmen‘s districts during the campaign and
helped fundraise. ―During that harried election season,‖ DeLay later recalled, ―I had traveled
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to twenty-five states in support of candidates, and had developed fund-raising networks that
covered every state in the nation. To help the Republicans achieve victory, I had even run a
candidate school that got down to such details as talking points and yard signs. I personally
worked with and supported some eighty candidates, and by the time seventy of them entered
the freshman class, I had commitments from fifty-three to support me for Republican
whip.‖404 As Walker said:
―The whip race was an interesting thing because the two people who were
contending for the job had been meeting somewhat clandestinely for months.
So even in the midst of a race for whip, we were sitting down and talking in
very intimate details about what it was we were doing going forward. It was
an interesting dynamic. In the end, I had one view of how whip should
operate and Tom had another view, and he backed up his view by going out
and getting 10,000 dollars to everyone running for Congress. I refused to put
together a leadership PAC and raise any money to do it. I made some
contributions out of my own campaign fund to other candidates, but I just
didn‘t do that. The fact was that most of the freshmen arrived and they didn‘t
know either of us, but they knew there was one guy who had given them
10,000 bucks. So I had a hard time getting the freshmen. But they did end up
confused when it became clear to them that Newt wanted me to be elected and
that Newt was voting for me, but not confused enough that they ended up
voting for me. So I got the majority of the votes of those who had served with
both of us, and he got all but 9 or 10 votes from the freshmen.‖405
In each of the contested races, the freshmen‘s votes proved decisive, as the
Conference elected DeLay as whip, John Boehner (R-OH) as Conference chair, and Chris
Cox (R-CA) as policy chair. ―We elected a leadership that agreed with the freshman class,‖
said Souder, speaking of the newly elected leadership in terms of their conservatism and
energy. 406

Rounding out the leadership positions were Susan Molinari (R-NY) as

Conference vice chair and Barbara Vucanovich (R-NV) as Conference secretary, the first two
women to serve in the leadership of either party.
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Because the freshmen were, of all the groups of members in the House, most in tune
with the sweeping goals of the leadership, the freshmen were given positions on the most
select committees in Congress. Three freshmen were appointed to Ways and Means, seven
to Appropriations, and one to Rules. Moreover, two freshmen, David McIntosh of Indiana
and Tom Davis of Virginia—were appointed subcommittee chairmen. 407 Although these
actions ruffled the feathers of some of the more senior members, the fact that without the
freshmen the Republicans would not be in the majority was enough to quell their unrest.
―Every senior member recognizes that, without the freshmen, they would not be in positions
of leadership in this Congress. It happened that these guys made us a majority,‖ said
Walker.408
Once the House was organized through the selection of its leaders and the committee
chairs, Gingrich and the other leaders organized mock sessions to teach Republicans how to
behave in the majority. Bob Walker, who had long been the Republicans‘ best floor tactician,
held training sessions on floor procedure. Gerald Solomon, the incoming chairman of the
Rules Committee, taught the intricacies of the rules. Tom DeLay, the whip, talked about
voting procedure. Other Republicans played the roles of key Democratic opponents in order
to give the members experience in floor debate.
Although not a single member of the Republican Conference had ever served as a
member of the majority (the only member of Congress who had seen a GOP majority was 88
year old Democrat Sidney Yates of Illinois), one member of the GOP, Rep. Bill Emerson of
Missouri had been a 16 year old page during the 83rd Congress in 1954. In deference to his
long years of service, the GOP leadership often had Emerson sit in the speaker‘s chair during
these mock sessions.

In a story related by reporter Major Garrett, as Emerson was
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descending from the rostrum during one of these sessions, the footing was so unfamiliar that
he fell, seriously injuring his ankle. No one thought of it as an omen of bad luck, but merely
a reminder that the footing is trickier at the higher altitudes of power.409
The most important aspect of the transition period, however, was the Republicans‘
reaffirmation of their desire to remake Washington. In many ways, they truly believed they
were revolutionaries, and intended to radically change the way that the political
establishment acted as well as the direction in which the country was moving. ―We intend to
be revolutionaries in the sense that we are actually going to do after the election what we said
we were going to do before the election,‖ proclaimed Gingrich on Election Day, referring to
the Contract with America. 410 Rep. John Kasich (R-OH), the incoming chairman of the
Budget Committee, said, ―We‘re interested in very big, systemic changes. We would have a
dramatically smaller federal government. We would attempt to give people their money back.
We would begin to dismantle the New Deal.‖411
***************
Just as the Republicans were finding their sea-legs as the majority in the House
during the transition, the Democrats were gaining more confidence in their new role as the
minority party. Although the White House was providing precious little guidance at first, the
House Democrats turned to another powerful force in Washington for direction, Newt
Gingrich.
During his rise to power in the 1980s, Gingrich had proven his steeliness of will
during his long campaign to topple Speaker of the House James Wright (D-TX) on ethics
charges relating to Wright‘s book deal. Gingrich‘s goal was to discredit the speaker and
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make him a symbol of Democratic corruption in Washington. In the very same way, the
House Democratic minority in 1995 used similar tactics to go after Gingrich.
For many years, Gingrich had taught a college course at Kennesaw State College
entitled ―Renewing American Civilization.‖ Although Gingrich was not paid for his teaching,
the cost of recording and distributing the course via videotape and satellite to students around
the country—about $300,000—was covered by the same donors who donated to Gingrich‘s
political action committee, GOPAC. House Democrats seized on this issue, claiming that
Gingrich‘s course was not solely educational, but rather intended to benefit GOP candidates.
Additionally, on December 21, Gingrich finalized his own book deal that would pay
him an advance of $4.5 million. Although House rules do not prohibit income from book
royalties, they do require them to be ―received from established publishers under usual and
customary contractual terms.‖ 412 Understandably, Democrats pounced, calling for a full
investigation of the deal. ―We need to lift this cloud over his head,‖ said Democratic whip
David Bonior of Gingrich, ―if in fact it can be lifted.‖413 Even the president couldn‘t help but
to take a shot at Gingrich. In an offhand comment to the press, Clinton remarked, ―I made
$35,000 a year for twelve years [as Arkansas governor] and I was glad of it.‖ 414 The
Democrats got help from the same public interest organizations that helped Gingrich in his
efforts against Wright. ―It certainly seems like Representative Gingrich is out to capitalize
on the office of the speaker before he even enters the job,‖ said Common Cause President
Fred Wertheimer. ―This is an extraordinary act for a new speaker...who has spent his entire
career attacking the ethics rules of congressional Democrats.‖415
Responding to the pressure from the press and the congressional Democrats, Gingrich
agreed to forgo the advance on December 30. ―We‘re about to have the first Republican
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Congress in forty years,‖ he said. ―And I did not want to walk in next Wednesday and give
the embittered defenders of the old order something that they could run around and yell
about.‖ 416 However much the Democrats resented Gingrich‘s own use of these tactics
against Speaker Wright in the late 1980s, their use of them proved they were effective.
As the start of the 104th Congress neared, nonetheless, the Democrats were still
reaching for an effective long-term strategy to oppose the new Republican majority. In this,
they faced several significant challenges. First of all, just as the Republicans had trouble
adjusting to the majority, the Democrats had no experience in the minority. Especially since
they had been in charge for forty consecutive years, as political scientist Dean McSweeney
writes, ―It was to be expected that adjustment to minority status would create stresses greater
than for any previous minority.‖417 Second, President Clinton had almost completely ceded
legislative initiative to the House Republicans.

With Gingrich driving the debate, the

Democrats could not look to the White House for their cues as the Republicans had been able
to do during the presidencies of Reagan and Bush. Third, the Democrats were confronting
the most unified and driven majority in nearly a century.

Up against a phalanx of

Republicans marching to the step of the Contract with America, the Democrats could do little
to stop, or even alter the course of, the GOP onslaught. Finally, Democrats in the House had
to confront the same procedures that were designed to protect majority interests that they had
themselves devised during their long tenure in control. Ironically, ―procedural domination
now had to be withstood by the minority which had accentuated majority rule.‖418
***************
After a successful transition, the Republicans formally took the reins of power in the
House of Representatives on January 4, 1995. However, in the midst of their celebratory day,
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the Republicans were not content to rest on their laurels. Instead, the House immediately
jumped into action at the end of swearing-in ceremony. The first day was an omen of things
to come, a marathon fourteen and a half hour session that did not end until 2:30 a.m. the
following morning.
On the first day, the Republicans displayed incredible unity in instituting the initial
congressional reforms listed in the Contract with America. Three full committees were
abolished as well as thirty-one subcommittees and one-third of congressional staff.
Committee chairs were term-limited to six years in their position, and the speaker of the
House could only serve eight years as speaker. These measures were designed to prohibit
―kingdom building‖ by committee chairs. ―That will cut down on the number of powerful
little fiefdoms,‖ Walker said.419
Legislative Service Organizations—basically research and advisory organizations that
were funded by the House—were eliminated, cutting ninety-six staff positions and saving $4
million.420 Democrats were enraged at the elimination of LSOs, pointing especially to the
Congressional Black Caucus and the Democratic Study Group. Although most LSOs had
bipartisan membership, these two were chosen by Democrats to illustrate what they claimed
was partisan politics designed to ―get at the Democratic organizations that had clout.‖ 421 The
CBC continued to exist, but no longer had staff or offices paid for by the House of
Representatives. The DSG attempted to attract private funding for its services to continue.
In addition, the Republicans eliminated proxy voting—the system through which
committee chairmen and ranking minority members controlled the votes of absent members
of their party. Proxy voting was long identified by the Republican minority as a Democratic
abuse of power since a committee chairman could win a vote even if he was the only member
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of the majority present. The Republicans also abolished the practice of referring bills to
multiple committees, a tactic that the Democrats had frequently used to bottle-up legislation.
Another reform of the first day was the passage of the Congressional Accountability
Act, which made Congress subject to eleven federal laws applying to the private sector,
including the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the American with Disabilities Act, the
Family Medical Leave Act, and the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Act. The
Congressional Accountability Act also set up an Office of Compliance that was charged with
implementing the laws and providing a method for dispute resolution.422 The Act passed
unanimously. This was perhaps the most telling development of the day. Despite the
Democrats‘ willingness to unanimously vote for the bill once it was brought to a vote under a
Republican majority, the exact same legislation had not been able to become law when they
controlled the Congress.
―I am very proud of the changes we made on the first day,‖ said freshman Rep. Rick
White (R-WA). ―I will definitely talk about them in my 1996 campaign because they have
changed the way Congress does business.‖ 423 After fourteen long hours of debate in the
House, the GOP leadership introduced the ten Contract with America bills at the end of the
first day and they were referred to the appropriate committees. The clock to 100 days was
ticking.
***************
The institutional reforms passed on the first day of the 104th Congress were some of
the most revolutionary successes of the new Republican majority. For decades, the House
had been trying to reform itself, most recently with the 1973 Bolling Report, which called for
a ―complete restructuring that touched on twenty of our twenty-one committees.‖
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Unfortunately, the Report was ―too extensive to win widespread support, and required too
many sacrifices from the members.‖ 424

As such, most of its recommendations were

abandoned.
Yet change had come slowly, though more often than not, the changes wrought in the
late 1970s and early 1980s had done little but enhance the power of the majority party
broadly speaking, and the speaker in particular. For many, the centralization of leadership in
the speaker was the most effective way to combat what the majority Democrats saw as the
creeping influence of conservative government under Ronald Reagan.
In one sense, many of the reforms enacted on the 104th Congress‘ opening day were
simply a reaction against the way the House had been run for decades. The abolition of
proxy voting reduced the power of the majority party in committees. The elimination of
three full committees and thirty-one subcommittees reduced the power base of the majority
and made it much harder for the majority party to bottle-up unwanted legislation. The terms
of the committee chairmen and the speaker, the most powerful members of the majority party,
were limited to six and eight years, respectively, to prevent the long-term consolidation of
power. The audit performed on the House books by an independent agency opened the
House up to a new era of transparency and accountability. Even the reduction of committee
staff—billed as a cost-cutting, efficiency promoting reform—was also partially aimed at
reducing the power of the majority party, since oftentimes the majority controlled up to three
times as many staffers as the minority. For instance, the House Resources Committee had
seventy-two staffers in the 103rd Congress, fifty-four for the Democrats and eighteen for the
Republicans.425 This was epidemic throughout the House.
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Several of these reforms, of course, can be placed in a broader movement over the
last quarter of the twentieth century to reduce the power of the committee system and
increase the power of the leadership. Since the Watergate baby class of 1974, Congress has
been moving toward restricting the power of the committee chairs. The reforms in January
1995 continued this process. Term-limits prevented kingdom-building, reducing the number
of committees and subcommittees slashed the number of fiefdoms in the House.

The

elimination of committee staff reduced the bureaucratization and overspecialization of the
committee system.
The Congressional Accountability Act, a reform that most Americans had never even
thought of—why wouldn‘t Congress be subject to the laws it passes?—indicated a new
attitude in the Congress. It also helped Republicans reinforce their accountability message
found in the Contract with America.
***************
In the weeks and months after the opening of the 104th Congress, the House of
Representatives showed no signs of slowing their breakneck pace. On the first day of the
session, the Congressional Accountability Act was passed, along with a resolution banning
unfunded mandates to states and localities. The Senate, perhaps taken by the uncommon
legislative zeal displayed by the House, took up both measures and passed them within a
week. President Clinton signed them into law, a very successful beginning to the first
Republican Congress in four decades.
Over the next few weeks, the thirty-one bills related to the ten planks of the Contract
with America moved through Congress with dizzying speed. Emboldened by their claimed
mandate for change and signed pledges in the Contract, the Republicans marched in lockstep
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toward their goal of passing the promised legislation.

Each bill was considered in

subcommittee and in full committee, given hearings, markups, and votes, and then brought to
the floor for debate and final passage. Such a workload forced members to work harder than
they had in years, and oftentimes built an atmosphere of stress and exhaustion. ―With an
energy and determination I had seldom seen in my eight years on Capitol Hill, members
pushed themselves and stayed up until two, three, four in the morning to complete the
Contract with America in that first 100 days,‖ recalled Hastert.426 Republican pollster Frank
Luntz, who continued working for the House Republicans after they had won the majority,
said, ―The first 100 days started off with a complete disbelief and it degenerated into chaos
and confusion and that degenerated into the most incredible stress and exhaustion. To get ten
pieces of legislation in 100 days doesn‘t happen ever. People would be in session until 2:00
a.m. and they‘d come back in at nine in the morning.‖427
The freshmen were particularly stressed. As Scott Bensing remembered, ―The first
100 days was total chaos. All these new members were trying to set up offices and bring in
staff. At the same time, there was a huge learning curve for the freshmen. They immediately
had to get up to speed with the intricacies of dozens of issues. None of this dampened their
enthusiasm, however. They still believed they had a mission to accomplish.‖428
Especially tough was the workload of the Judiciary and Ways and Means Committees,
through which much of the Contract legislation moved. According to one Ways and Means
member, freshman Representative Phil English (R-PA), during the first 100 days ―it was
constantly burning the candle at both ends. It was a dizzying series of hearings in my
committee, reporting out a product, getting it to the House floor, and driving forward the
debate.‖429 Such a large amount of legislation required the expertise of impeccably qualified
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chairmen, which Newt Gingrich had in the persons of Henry Hyde (R-IL) and Bill Archer
(R-TX) on Judiciary and Ways and Means, respectively. Both had long been players in the
House Republican Party, with Hyde holding a leadership position as chairman of the
Republican Policy Committee and Archer being the ranking member on Ways and Means for
the previous six years.
Not only did the Republicans have to shepherd the bills through committee, but they
also had to ensure that each measure had sufficient votes to pass when it came to the floor.
As Hastert, who served as the chief deputy whip, said, ―If you‘re in the majority, you can‘t
bring a piece of legislation to the floor unless you know you have the votes to pass it. You
need to know ahead of time, and those commitments need to be ironclad.‖430 Considering
the incredible amount of legislation being passed in such a short amount of time, the job of
Hastert and the Whip Tom DeLay was incredibly stressful. At any given time, over fifty-five
deputy whips worked votes, contacting members in their offices and at their homes, calling
their wives and children, and knowing where every member stood on every piece of
legislation. The whip system DeLay and Hastert devised served the Republican majority
well as they considered the Contract items with their slim, thirteen-vote majority.
In the midst of the stressful atmosphere, the Contract proceeded on schedule. By
mid-February, several Contract items had been passed by the House, including a bill to
abolish unfunded mandates, a balanced budget constitutional amendment, and the line-item
veto. These proposals had been specifically selected to come up first, since each of them
were relatively uncontroversial and would win broad support among both House Democrats
and Republicans. ―We had deliberately put the easiest votes early so we could practice with
minimum risk,‖ Gingrich recalled, referring to the GOP‘s inexperience as the majority party.
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―This enabled us to win early victories and build momentum. But it also left the hardest
votes for when we would be most exhausted.‖431
The real meat of the Contract began to come to the House floor by the end of
February, in the forms of the crime bill, the national defense plank, and the welfare reform
bill. Republicans continued to march in lock-step, although they showed a shrewd sense of
what they could accomplish in the short, 100 day time frame. The crime bill was a good
example of their strategy.
Realizing that any crime bill that repealed the assault weapons ban passed in the
Clinton 1994 crime bill would be vetoed, the GOP leadership decided not to include its
repeal for fear that a fight over it would overshadow the rest of the Contract. ―We didn‘t
want this package of provisions to be drowned out by a furor over assault weapons. We
wanted to focus the public‘s attention on the other issues in the legislation,‖ said Paul
McNulty, the chief counsel of the House Subcommittee on Crime.432 Instead, Republicans
decided to concentrate on other crime issues such as limiting death row appeals, constructing
prisons, expanding the ―good faith‖ exception to warrantless searches, deportation of
criminal aliens, and other crime matters. The crime bill was then broken into six different
bills in order to limit amendments and draw Democratic support. All but one of the bills
passed with huge margins, and the one that was narrowly approved still drew 18 Democratic
votes.
During the debate over the national security bill, the Democrats showed why they
were still relevant. The bill contained billions in funding for space-based Ballistic Missile
Defense, which critics called ―Star Wars.‖ Although the National Security Committee had
defeated an amendment offered by Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) that would have redirected
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funding from space-based missiles to ground-based missiles while in committee, Spratt
reoffered his amendment during floor debate.

The amendment drew support from

Republican moderates and deficit-hawks concerned about costly defense programs and
passed by a razor-thin margin of 218-212. The entire bill passed 241-181.
The GOP leadership was shocked by the success of the Spratt Amendment; they had
assumed that since it had been defeated in committee it would be defeated on the floor.
However, in an odd way, the defeat was a good thing for the Republican leadership. It
reminded them that they couldn‘t take their majority for granted; indeed, each vote would
have to be carefully whipped in order to ensure sufficient support. In Gingrich‘s eyes, it was
good that the surprise had come early in the voting on Contract legislation; they would be
more vigilant from then on.433
The Democrats should have drawn a lesson from their victory with the Spratt
Amendment. In this case, the liberal Democratic leadership, usually on frosty terms with
their more conservative members, allowed the conservatives to lead the opposition and
propose reasonable alternatives to the Republicans‘ bill. By doing this, the Democrats were
able to stay united while drawing support from moderate Republicans. Yet, the Democratic
leadership seemed clueless as to the reasons behind their success, and would revert back to
their usual practice of selecting more liberal members to lead the opposition. This would
drive more conservative Democrats into voting with the Republicans.434
***************
President Clinton had largely kept a low profile during the first few months of
Republican control, a trend that had begun in the days after the November election. At first,
it was unclear how the president fit into the new political order. Although the 103rd Congress
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returned to Washington at the end of November for a lame-duck session to pass Clinton‘s
GATT trade agreement, it was clear that the president did not know how to conduct himself
or his White House in the weeks following the election. Clinton took refuge in foreign travel
and a trip home to Arkansas near the end of the year while he and his advisors formulated a
strategy to regroup.
The public was not giving the White House the signals it was hoping for. An NBC
News-Wall Street Journal poll conducted during the week following the election showed that
the public, by a margin of 55 percent to 30 percent, wanted the Republican Congress, not the
Clinton White House, to set the agenda in Washington. From his highs of 50 percent the
week before the election, Clinton‘s approval ratings sunk back into the mid-forties, hovering
between 42 to 45 percent for much of December and January. Even more worrisome for the
White House, a poll conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press in
early December found Clinton trailing a generic Republican opponent for the 1996 election
and fully two-thirds of Democrats wanted to see other candidates challenge Clinton for the
Democratic nomination.435 An embodiment of this warning sign appeared on December 15,
when incoming House Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt announced his own tax-cut
proposal to counter the Republicans‘ plan on the same day that Clinton was to give an
address to the nation announcing a White House proposal, prompting political observers to
speculate about a possible Gephardt primary challenge.
Clinton met with the bipartisan leadership of the House and Senate for the first time
on January 5. Nevertheless, Clinton still had trouble figuring out where he fit into the
political landscape. No clear message emanated from the White House in the first weeks of
1995, allowing the Republican Congress to dominate both the agenda and the news coverage.
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―I guess he‘s going to wait until the State of the Union to tell us how he fits into the
government,‖ said Charles O. Jones, a fellow at the Brookings Institution.436
Yet even the State of the Union could not rescue the president from relative obscurity.
Clinton gave the longest address in American history, an 81 minute, oftentimes rambling
speech that was below par, in the opinion of most observers. ―The State of the Union
Message that the president delivered tonight was notably short on demands for action and
long on appeals for comity, a demonstration of just how much he has been weakened in the
last 12 months,‖ opined the New York Times.437
Amid the onslaught of legislation being moved in the House, Clinton found himself
struggling to compete for attention, a rarity for modern presidents.

In fact, the media

lavished much of its attention (and ink) on Newt Gingrich. The news seemed to be, in the
words of the Washington Post, ―all Newt, all the time.‖438 ―It was as if a new king or new
president had been elected,‖ recalled Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Reich.439 ―Newt is
king of the world. I don‘t think there was any doubt that he was trying to signal that he, not
Bill Clinton, was the most powerful person in Washington,‖ said White House economic
advisor Gene Sperling.440 Gingrich cultivated this air of great importance. ―Officially the
ceremony marked the opening of the 104th Congress,‖ wrote Time of the January 4 opening
of the new Congress, ―but more important, it marked the beginning of an extraordinary
period in American history in which the president of the United States will in effect share
power with the speaker of the House.‖441
The grandiose words of Time rang true in the first few months of 1995. As Clinton
struggled to stay relevant, the House Republicans seemed to be enjoying victory after victory
in their legislative program.

As Clinton pollster Dick Morris recalled, ―Each week in
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February and March the House Republicans, shaped into a phalanx by Newt Gingrich‘s
discipline, passed bill after bill to implement their Contract with America. Democrats and
the White House seemed to oppose every step in some of the rawest partisan fighting that
Washington had seen in decades. Tempers flared, insults flew, but the march of legislation
went on without any break in ranks…The president was largely irrelevant as the House drove
the government.‖442
Clinton seemed powerless to stop the Republican advance, and was unsure how to
respond to the Republicans‘ success. ―There was a feeling of plummeting, and not knowing
when your feet would touch bottom, if ever,‖ said presidential speechwriter Michael
Waldman. 443

―We were floundering,‖ recalled White House communications director

George Stephanopoulos.

―As Newt Gingrich was orchestrating House passage of the

Contract with America, we were responding with a symphony of mixed signals.‖ 444
―February and March were truly the Gingrich administration,‖ wrote Morris. ―Even Dole
was an afterthought in the Republican revolution who couldn‘t keep pace with his House
colleague. Clinton was invisible. The nation watched the Republican Congress grind on
with its agenda. It was a withering sight.‖445
***************
Although the Republicans were incredibly successful during February and March in
plowing through the Contract‘s agenda, tensions certainly existed among House Republicans,
especially between the freshmen and the rest of the Conference. For the most part, the GOP
freshmen were some of the most ideologically conservative and inflexible members of the
104th Congress. Indeed, as historian Julian Zelizer writes, ―The seventy-three freshmen were
an extremely cohesive group of individuals who were convinced they had a mandate and
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cared little about their political future.‖446 Freed from the typical preoccupations of being
reelected, the freshmen were determined to drive the revolution as far and as fast as they
possibly could. The fact that many had term-limited themselves (and planned to vote for a
constitutional amendment for term limits when the final part of the Contract came up in late
March) proved to be strong motivation for accomplishing their goals quickly.
Unschooled in the ways of Congress, there was no limit to the freshmen‘s ambitious
plans. ―Our class is here to ask why," said freshman Rep. Steve Largent (R-OK). "Why do
we have to do that? Why do we have to pay that much? Why can't we cut that, why can't we
reduce that?‖ 447 As such, they had little patience for the idea that compromise was a
legislative fact of life. As journalist Linda Killian writes, ―The freshmen believe their
ideological purity not only on spending and government reform but on many social issues
sets them apart from their elders. They are extremely skeptical of deal-makers like Senate
Majority Leader Bob Dole, whom they consider all too willing to compromise.‖448 Therefore,
the freshmen disdained moderate members of their own party nearly as much as they did
Democrats, since the moderates tended to cut deals and compromise, thus, in the eyes of the
more conservative freshmen, weakening the thrust of the revolution.
Initially, the freshmen and the leadership shared a very strong relationship; after all,
Gingrich and the other leaders had put freshmen on exclusive committees, gave two of them
seats at the leadership table, and encouraged them to develop their ideas. No doubt this was
a way to win their loyalty and support, since the freshmen knew that the leadership was
treating them extraordinarily well. By the end of the transition, a very strong bond had
formed between the freshmen and the leadership. In fact, Gingrich, Armey, DeLay, and
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other members of the leadership had traveled to hundreds of congressional districts during
the 1994 campaign to help members get elected.
Yet the leadership‘s dependence on the freshmen to form a significant part of their
power base was also a double-edged sword. Just as the leadership derived much of their
power from the freshmen, the freshmen exerted significant power over the leadership,
especially when they acted as a cohesive group, as the freshmen of the 104th Congress were
prone to do. The leadership could hardly afford an open break with the freshmen, since such
a break would not only jeopardize the fulfillment of the Contract, but also would jeopardize
the leaders‘ own power.
Therefore, the Republican leadership was confronted with a difficult challenge in the
first 100 days of the 104th Congress. They needed to keep their Conference together while
moving the most ambitious body of legislation attempted in such a short time span since the
Great Depression. As a result, they had to walk a very narrow tight rope between the
interests of the more conservative members and the moderates. With the defection of either
block, the GOP majority was powerless to pass legislation. Many freshmen didn‘t appreciate
the distinction drawn by Newt Gingrich years later: ―It was true that conservatives had a
majority among the House and Senate Republican members, but this was not anything like a
majority of the House or Senate. There were about 170 solid conservatives in the House and
46 or so in the Senate, and the fact was the margin of our majority status was made up of
partisans who shared our Republicanism but not necessarily our conservatism or our
activism.‖449 At the time, the freshmen‘s attitude was more in line with freshman Lindsey
Graham‘s (R-SC): ―Practicality and revolutions don‘t go hand-in-hand. We have been the
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conscience of the election. When our leadership get back in the politics as usual mode, we
need to say, whoa, wait a minute; that‘s not why we got elected.‖450
The tension between the freshmen unwilling to bend and the leadership needing to
bend was evident just below the surface, and came to a head during the debate over the
balanced budget amendment.

The Contract version of the constitutional amendment

mandating a balanced budget included a provision requiring a three-fifths majority to
increase revenue, in effect making it harder to address a budget shortfall simply by raising
taxes. When this proposal was brought to the floor, it was clear that it would not win enough
Democratic votes to reach the two-thirds majority required to pass a constitutional
amendment as a result of the three-fifths requirement to raise taxes. A competing proposal,
brought to the floor by Rep. Charlie Stenholm (D-TX) during the preceding Congress, did
not have the three-fifths provision and had nearly passed the year before.

The GOP

leadership was then put in a bind; on one hand, forty freshmen were threatening to vote
against the amendment without the three-fifths proposal and on the other, a group of
moderates were threatening to vote against the amendment if it included it. It soon became
clear that without a compromise, there would be no amendment.451
The leadership decided that the amendment was too important not to be passed,
although the Contract only promised a vote on its planks. They believed that failure to pass
the first item of the Contract would destroy their momentum and weaken the new Republican
majority irreparably. After postponing the vote for several weeks, the leadership succeeded
in bringing the freshmen back into the fold by promising them a separate vote on the threefifths provision to occur on April 15, 1996. When the amendment came up for final passage,
the Stenholm version passed by a vote of 300-132, with all Republicans save two freshmen
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supporting it.

One of those, Mark Souder of Indiana had some choice words for the

leadership, and they showed a keen understanding of the freshmen‘s power: ―They [the
leadership] think we are spoiled children and they would like to spank us. But they know
they need us back here to protect their chairmanship and majority. If we freshmen stand
together, we can have continued influence.‖452
Of course, not all freshmen were conservative members. As moderate freshman
Steve LaTourette of Ohio said, ―I always chafe when I read about the ‗seventy-three
Republican freshmen,‘ which implies that we are in lockstep all the time or that there is 100
percent agreement.

As Republicans in general come in different flavors, so do the

freshmen.‖453 However conservative or moderate they were, the freshmen were certainly
making a quick impact in Congress.
***************
As Gingrich had predicted, the hardest votes came near the end of the 100 days when
the House considered the last two items of the Contract, term-limits and the tax cut. The
term-limits movement had been gaining steam for several years throughout the United States
and it was seen by most of the public as a way to force reform in Congress. Over the thirty
years before 1995, term limits had never dipped below 47 percent popularity and in the early
1990s was supported by over 80 percent of Americans.454 Proponents of term limits did not
just rely on public popularity to bolster their position. Rather, they argued that the current
system, with its incumbency advantage, encouraged the creation career politicians that were
increasingly distant from their constituents. They hoped to replace the career politicians with
citizen legislators who were more in tune with grassroots democracy.
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Nevertheless, term limits seemed almost doomed from the start.

Many senior

lawmakers in both parties were vehemently opposed to them , claiming that they not only
prevented needed expertise to be built up in Congress but also that term limits infringed on
the fundamental right of voters to choose who should represent them. Responding to the
claim that term limits should pass because the public wanted them, Rep. Bill Emerson (RMO) said, ―I don‘t believe the public understands the problems with term limits…We have a
very good process in place to limit terms. It‘s called elections and it just worked in 1994.‖455
Also presenting a challenge to term-limit advocates was that the GOP leadership did not
make the passage of term limits a central part of their legislative goals. Gingrich was
lukewarm on the idea and several leaders opposed them outright, including DeLay and
Conference Chairman John Boehner. Rep. Henry Hyde, the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, the committee that had considered the term limits amendment, was vehemently
opposed to term limits, and even spoke out against them on the House floor.
Also presenting problems for the advocates of term limits was the fact that several
competing bills were on the floor. The leadership-supported twelve year limit competed with
bills calling for six or eight year limits, some with the ability to ―sit out‖ a term and then run
again and others that allowed states to set more restrictive limits. The number of bills
presented made it hard to rally support around a single proposal.
Eventually, the twelve year limit came the closest to passage, garnering 227 votes,
sixty-three votes short of the necessary two-thirds majority. Although the GOP had kept its
Contract promise to bring term limits up for a vote, it was the only Contract plank that did
not pass the House.
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The last item of the Contract to come up for debate was the tax cut bill, which Newt
Gingrich called the ―crown jewel‖ of the Contract. The bill called for a 50 percent reduction
of the capital gains tax and a $500 per child tax credit for those earning up to $200,000. The
capital gains tax cut had long been advocated by Republicans. Backed with support from
economists, they argued that reducing the tax would stimulate the economy by promoting
maximally beneficial investment activity. Fearing the high taxation that would result from
selling an asset, investors may keep it longer than would be most economical to avoid paying
the tax. Politically, however, cutting the capital gains taxes are very controversial, because it
looks like Congress is giving a tax break to wealthy investors.
The child tax credit also was designed to be a broad-based cut, since Republicans
reasoned that a family could more easily pay their taxes if they didn‘t have multiple kids to
support. Giving a subsidy per child would help offset the costs related to raising children.
Nevertheless, the high earnings cap of $200,000 overshadowed these arguments.
The tax cuts were very controversial for several reasons. First, Democratic opponents
of the bill charged that Republicans were playing class warfare. ―I have heard Speaker
Gingrich refer to this tax proposal as the crown jewel of the Republican Contract. I could not
agree more. Like the crown jewels, this bill is for royalty, it was for the truly wealthy among
us,‖ said Rep. John Lewis (D-GA). ―If you are middle class, if you are poor, you can look
but you better not touch.‖456
Second, the bill was also attacked on the same grounds that the Contract was attacked
during the 1994 campaign: that it would explode the deficit and force cuts in programs like
Medicare and Social Security. Democrats were responsible for most of these charges, but the
bill also was opposed by some Senate Republicans, including Sens. Bob Packwood (R-OR),
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the chairman of the Finance Committee, and Pete Domenici (R-NM), the chairman of the
Budget Committee. These two senators stressed that cutting taxes would not assist in
reducing the deficit, their main priority.
House Republicans countered these arguments by stressing that the proposal would
stimulate economic growth by creating jobs, encouraging entrepreneurship, and providing tax
savings for the majority of families in the country. Although dissention appeared internally
among Republican ranks, especially between those favoring a more modest earnings cap of
$95,000 and those who wanted to leave the cap as it was, the leadership put a far higher
priority on passing the tax cut legislation than they had on passing term limits, and were able
to get dissenters to support the bill with pleas of party unity. On April 5, the 92nd day of the
104th Congress, the tax cut bill was passed 246-188.
***************
On April 7, 1995, the House Republicans gathered once again on the steps of the
Capitol, this time to celebrate the completion of their Contract. In ninety-two days, the
Republicans had brought each of their ten planks to a vote in the House of Representatives,
passing all but the term limits amendment, something they were quick to cite as winning a
simple majority if not the required two-thirds.
Much like the event in September 1994, this event was designed to publicize the
success of the House Republicans in passing the Contract, distilled into a motto favored by
Gingrich: Promises made, promises kept. The event included speeches by party leaders,
satellite feeds for congressmen to conduct local interviews before and after the event, and a
video retrospective documenting the formation and implementation of the Contract shown on
an 11 ft. by 14 ft. Sony JumboTron. The rally capped off a week of media blitzing by the
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Republicans. House Republicans wrote op-ed pieces, did countless television and radio
interviews, and planned so-called tarmac rallies to greet congressmen‘s planes as they came
home to their districts. A USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll taken the first week of April had
shown that only half of Americans could describe the Contract, but of those who could,
people supported it by nearly a three-to-one margin, 32 percent to 12 percent.457 The goal
was to extend this level of success to the rest of the country.
The Contract‘s celebration reached a climax on the night of April 7, when Speaker
Gingrich asked the networks for television time for a thirty minute speech broadcasting the
successes of the Contract. Gingrich‘s move was unprecedented; normally addressing the
nation was solely a presidential prerogative. Even more surprising was that Gingrich‘s
request was granted by CNN and CBS, and was carried live. The speech signaled how much
Washington had changed since the beginning of the year, and how much Gingrich had
transformed the role of the speaker of the House. President Clinton was not impressed. ―To
hear him tell it,‖ he said later, ―you would think the Republicans revolutionized America
overnight, and in the process changed our form of government to a parliamentary system
under which he, as prime minister, set the course of domestic policy, while I, as president,
was restricted to handling foreign affairs.‖458
In a sense, however, Gingrich was right; President Clinton had certainly taken a
backseat role as the House drove the government in the first 100 days of 1995, leading
congressional expert Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute to comment, ―In
our adult lifetimes, I don‘t think we‘ve seen a situation like this where Congress has become
the driving branch of government.‖
***************
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As President Clinton‘s remarks imply, the legacy of the first 100 days of the 104th
Congress was hotly debated in the weeks, months, and years after the April ceremony. To
hear the House Republicans tell it, the Contract was a great success, radically shifting the
direction of the country toward a more prosperous future. They made their promises and
then delivered on them quickly, efficiently, and decisively.

When voters demanded

accountability, they fulfilled their promises, all the while bringing about needed reform in
Congress.
To their critics, however, the claimed success of the first 100 days was disingenuous
at best and damaging at worst. Asked what he thought was the legacy of those first 100 days
on the night Gingrich was to give his speech, Vice President Al Gore responded, ―I wouldn‘t
be proud about cutting school lunches.‖459
Democrats also charged that the Contract‘s terms were a farce. House passage of a
bill was a far cry to final enactment of a law, and the Republicans‘ breakneck pace had not
been matched by the Senate. ―If you want to give people credit for passing legislation
through one House, Tom Foley should be the Marquis of Spokane, or maybe the Duke,‖
quipped Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), one of Gingrich‘s fiercest critics.460
One thing everyone could agree on, however, was that the House had worked
extremely hard in the first 100 days. In fact, during its first three months, the 104 th Congress
had been in session for 487 hours, nearly 300 more than the 103rd Congress had been during
the same period. It was almost four times the average of 123 hours in the previous ten
congresses. The 104th had 279 roll call votes in the first three months, compared to 127 for
the 103rd and 64 for the average of the past twenty years. 111 measures were passed
compared to 87 for the 103rd and 86 for the previous ten congresses.461 ―This is a much
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harder working Congress than I‘ve ever seen,‖ said Rep. Carlos Moorhead (R-CA), a
thirteen-term veteran.462
Remarkably, the Republicans were able to pass nine of the ten Contract items with an
extremely slim majority. The thirteen-vote advantage that the Republicans had in the 104th
Congress was nothing when compared to the forty-one vote advantage that the Democrats
had in the 103rd Congress. With such a large majority, the Democrats could lose three dozen
members and still win without a single Republican vote. Considering the sweeping nature of
the legislation in the first 100 days, keeping together such a slim majority was an extremely
hard task. As Gingrich later recalled, ―We were trying to push through a major reformation
of government with a majority of twelve votes.

At any moment, a loss of thirteen

Republicans could have ended the effort.‖ In the end, it was truly a testament to the hard
work of the leadership that the Republicans were able to stay so unified and pass everything
but the term limits amendment.
The achievements of the first 100 days were also accomplished under generally open
rules. One of the major gripes the Republicans had while in the minority was that the
Democrats rammed legislation through by utilizing closed or modified closed rules almost
exclusively. Therefore, the Republicans pledged to debate the Contract under comparatively
open rules. During the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, the Republican majority had
brought 72 percent of the bills to the floor under open or modified open rules (an open rule
allows any germane amendments and a modified open rule allows any germane amendment
subject to a time limit on the amendment process or to a requirement that the amendment be
printed ahead of time in the Congressional Record). Only 28 percent were debated under a
modified closed rule (which specifies the specific amendments that may be offered) and none
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were brought under a completely closed rule (in which no amendments may be offered). In
contrast, during the 103rd Congress, only 44 percent had come to the floor under an open or
modified open rule while 47 percent were under a modified closed rule and 9 percent under a
closed rule. 463 Nevertheless, some Republicans advocated abandoning their pledge if the
passage of the Contract required it. ―We are going to make the deadline,‖ said freshman
Republican Mark Souder (R-IN) in early February. ―The freshmen are pushing to close the
rules in order to pass it [the Contract]. If worse comes to worse, we‘ll close the rules at the
last minute and ram everything through.‖464 Luckily, Armey‘s scheduling of the Contract
proceeded without a hitch, and the GOP was never forced to make that decision.
Most important, the first 100 days was notable for the way it changed the terms of
debate. As the New York Times wrote, ―When the Senate returns from its own recess on
April 24, it will confront a stack of legislation already passed by the House that was
considered well outside the boundaries of political possibility just six months ago.‖ 465
Although the celebration of the Contract was unwarranted in relation to the amount of
legislation formally enacted during the first three months of 1995, the Contract did serve its
purpose to focus the Republican majority and give them a starting point for changing the
nation‘s direction. The first 100 days had gone off without a hitch, but the second 100 would
be more challenging.
***************
In the days following the Gingrich speech, Clinton strove to regain his initiative.
Speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Dallas, Clinton attempted to set a
new tone, asserting that he still had an important role to play: ―In the first 100 days it fell to
the House of Representatives to propose,‖ he said. ―In the next 100 days and beyond, the
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president has to lead the quiet, reasoned forces of both parties in both houses to sift through
the rhetoric and decide what is really best for America.‖ ―The major purpose of the speech,‖
noted The New York Times, ―was to mount a counterattack to the Republicans and to indicate
that Mr. Gingrich‘s unchallenged moment in the spotlight had come to an end.‖466
As both sides geared up for the battle over the 1996 federal budget during the early
weeks of April, it was clear that the president had the weaker hand. His approval rating,
according to a New York Times/CBS News poll, was 42 percent in early April and 75 percent
of Americans believed that the Republican Congress would have a greater influence over the
direction of the country in the next two years, as opposed to 19 percent who thought Clinton
would.467 Another poll, taken by the Washington Post/ABC News, reported that 49 percent
of Americans trust the GOP to do a better job ―with the main problems the nation faces over
the next few years,‖ compared with 41 percent who said Clinton would do a better job.468
As the House recessed for three weeks after the completion of the Contract, it seemed
that the Republican House had all of the political momentum it would need to continue its
revolution.

On April 19, however, this momentum was stopped in its tracks when an

explosion ripped through the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The
attack, which killed 168 people including nineteen children, was at the time the worst
terrorist attack on U.S. soil.
The Oklahoma City bombing instantly and dramatically changed the political
landscape. President Clinton, able to take on the mantle of mourner-in-chief, led the nation
in its struggle to come to grips with the horrible tragedy. In his handling of the bombing,
Clinton was able to reestablish himself in the minds of the American people, and it certainly
did not hurt that 84 percent if the nation approved of his handling of the crisis, according to a
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Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll.469 ―He reached America in a way he never had before,‖
said Clinton pollster Dick Morris. ―He spoke for America, expressing our outrage with great
power. He spoke as an American president, not as a partisan.‖470
Cast out of the political shadow, Clinton moved swiftly to regain political relevance
with a radically strengthened hand. After bringing back his old political pollster Dick Morris,
Clinton would experience an amazing rebirth over the summer and fall of 1995, adopting a
policy that has since been labeled ―triangulation.‖ Clinton stressed places where he agreed
with the Republican Congress and moved to work with them in politically popular positions,
taking credit when the credit was positive. Yet Clinton continued to hold firm in opposing
the Republicans when they attempted to significantly cut popular programs, taking advantage
of the age-old American tension between the ―public‘s abstract disdain for Washington and
its appetite for programs that directly benefitted them.‖471
Clinton also benefitted from a House Republican Conference that dramatically
overreached, very much in the same way that the president himself had done with his health
care plan the year before. In their zeal for significant institutional reform, House leaders
forgot pragmatism and politics as they shaped the federal budget over the summer of 1995.
Ambitious plans to cut several cabinet-level departments, remake Medicare and Medicaid,
cut government spending in nearly all areas (except defense, of course), and effect wholesale
reform with one swing of the bat stalled as Clinton promised to veto any attempt to
implement these proposals.
The problems for the Republicans did not stem from a lack of unity or drive after the
first 100 days. On the contrary, they were as motivated as they had ever been to remake
Washington. ―The press says…that after the first 100 days our unity will dissolve. But it is
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the height of absurdity to suggest that we are going to break apart. We want to show the
people that this Congress can work, that we can govern. That desire will hold us together,‖
said Rep. Chris Shays (R-CT).472 Shays turned out to be right. At the end of July, even
skeptical Democrats were impressed by the way the Republicans were running the House. ―I
told Dick [Armey],‖ former Speaker Jim Wright said, ―that I sure did disagree with the
direction they were taking the country, but I have to take my hat off to them for the assertion
of leadership in making the House move and fulfill an agenda.‖473
Clinton‘s growing popularity after the Oklahoma City bombings did not stymie the
Republicans either. However, as it became clear that he was more of a player and was
willing to use the full powers of the presidency to combat the House Republicans,
disagreements sprang up between the two sides over the budget that seemed to be
irreconcilable. The Republicans were pushing for $270 billion in Medicare cuts, and the
president initially wanted to stand firm against any cuts. However, as his political position
grew weaker in the summer of 1995, Clinton agreed to $128 billion in cuts. Although the
two sides seemed to be working toward a deal, Gingrich became constrained by the members
of his own Conference, especially by the freshmen. As historian Steven Gillon writes, ―Any
public hint of compromise on the speaker‘s part would incur the wrath of his conservative
base.‖474 ―To tell some of the freshmen they have to come more toward the middle is like
telling them they have to shoot their daughters,‖ said moderate Sherwood Boehlert. 475
Indeed, as White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta noted, Gingrich ―was constrained by the
politics that he helped to create.‖476
The climax came in November and then in December, when the federal government
shutdown following the breakdown of budget negotiations between the Congress and the
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White House. The first shutdown, which began November 14, was accompanied by some
extremely bad public relations from the Republican side. After flying on Air Force One to
attend the funeral of Yitzhak Rabin in Israel, Gingrich complained that he had shut the
government down because Clinton failed to negotiate with him during the long plane ride.
―It‘s petty, but I think its human,‖ he said. ―You‘ve been on a plane for twenty-five hours
and nobody talked to you and they ask you to get off the plane by the back ramp…You just
wonder, where is their sense of manners? Where is their sense of courtesy?‖477
Happening on the second day of the shutdown, when public opinion was still
malleable, was a disaster for the Republicans. On the next day, the New York Daily News ran
a front page cartoon of Gingrich in a diaper with the caption, ―Cry Baby.‖ To make matters
worse, the White House released a photo that afternoon of Clinton and Gingrich chatting on
the plane. ―With one self-indulgent remark,‖ First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton recalled,
―he punctured his credibility and ensured that the American people knew to blame Congress,
not the Administration, for the government shutdown.‖ 478

The first shutdown ended

November 19. Although it had wounded the Republicans, Gingrich was still able to force
Clinton to agree to a seven-year timeline for a balanced budget, one of the Republicans‘ deal
breakers.
The first shutdown, however, was only to be followed by another one beginning
December 16 after further disagreements brought the process to a standstill. Although
Gingrich was worried that a shutdown near the holidays would force him to play the Grinch,
the conservatives within his Conference would not budge to compromise. ―This is the most
defining moment in 30 years in this town, and the question is, is it going to be business as
usual, or are we going to do the right thing for our children?‖ Boehner said.479 Although the
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polls showed that the public wanted to end the shutdown, the Republicans would not budge
from their position in the latter weeks of December. ―I believe we are in the middle of one of
the defining battles of our nation‘s history,‖ Armey wrote his colleagues. ―If we don‘t see
this through and win, we may never get another chance…I believe we are right. I believe the
country agrees with us. And I believe we can muster the stamina, the courage, and the
resolve to finish this fight and win on our terms.‖480
Yet as the weeks progressed, it was clear that public sentiment turned against the
Republicans, and on January 2, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole convened the Senate and
rammed through a bill reopening the government. Seeing no other options, the House
followed suit on January 5. Although conservatives within the House GOP Conference
advocated continuing the standoff, Gingrich told them the time had come to end the
shutdown. Faced with intense anger on the part of some conservatives, Gingrich lashed back,
―If you don‘t like the way we‘re doing it, run for leadership yourself.‖481 On January 6,
President Clinton signed the law and the government was reopened.
In subsequent years, the budget battle and the two government shutdowns have been
seen as the stalling of the Republicans‘ momentum. However, it was not the shutdowns
themselves that slowed the Republicans‘ revolution. Rather, Clinton learned from the budget
battle what it took to win. He understood that the House leadership was being squeezed on
both sides and that the ideological inflexibility of many House members could be used to his
advantage. Furthermore, he realized that he won because he was seen as reasonable while
Gingrich and the GOP were seen as extremists. The decision to meet the Republicans
halfway on the Medicare cuts and co-opt their issue rather than just hold the line became the
epitome for his future action.

Over the next year, he would successfully make the
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Republicans‘ issues his own and take credit for the Republicans‘ willingness to drive the
agenda. Ironically, the success of the Republicans would greatly help Clinton in his quest for
reelection. Although Clinton began the year trailing by a few points in a hypothetical matchup with the Republican presidential front-runner, Bob Dole, by the time Dole won the
nomination in late March, Clinton had built an insurmountable lead. He went on to win a
second term in November.
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CONCLUSION:
A MIXED LEGACY

Between 1980 and 1995, the Republican Party in the House of Representatives was
transformed. At the outset of this era, the House Republicans were a permanent minority,
both in the minds of nearly all political observers and, more importantly, in their own minds.
Never believing that the GOP would achieve a majority, most House Republicans adopted a
go-along-to-get-along attitude with their Democratic colleagues, choosing not to challenge
the Democrats‘ hold on power in exchange for a small sliver of their own influence.
Over the next decade, the Republican Party would mature into a confrontational
minority and take advantage of the Democrats‘ weakness in 1994 to run an innovative
campaign in which they took control of the House for the first time in four decades. Not
content to rest on these laurels, the Republicans would come to Congress in 1995 intending
to dramatically change the course of American government, and would move quickly and
efficiently to implement their Contract with America. Although by the end of 1995, their
revolutionary momentum had been slowed, the Republicans would continue to hold on to
majority control for the next twelve years.
The legacy of this era is nearly as complex as describing the era itself, a story with so
many facets and confounds that its underlying truths are hard to fully explain. To some, the
events described in this thesis constituted a real revolution, not in the same vein as an
American or French or Russian Revolution, in which the old order was completely scrapped
in favor of a new one, but in the sense that the direction of the government of the United
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States was shifted in a decidedly Republican direction. The debates of the 1990s and the
2000s were emphatically on Republican terms.
In the realms of campaigns and elections, policymaking, institutional reform, media
strategy, and others, the Republicans induced significant change over the era between 1980
and 1995, and their efforts have had lasting effects on the political system in the United
States.
Yet for all their successes, their rise was correlated with regrettable failures.
Increasing partisanship has been characteristic in the House since the early 1980s, as Tip
O‘Neill and the Conservative Opportunity Society sparred with intensely partisan tactics.
Furthermore, in the nonstop effort to gain majority control, minorities have more and more
turned to legislative obstruction in order to gain a political advantage, gridlocking the
political process on the pressing issues facing the country.

Partisanship
The maturation of the House Republicans between 1980 and 1995 had lasting
implications for the nature of partisanship in Washington. For many decades, Democrats and
Republicans had worked together hand in hand in Washington, most notably between
Republican presidents and Democratic Congresses.

The cooperation between President

Eisenhower and the Democratic Congress led by Speaker Sam Rayburn in the 1950s
produced some of the most important legislation of the twentieth century, including the
Interstate Highway Act. Decades later, President Reagan and Speaker O‘Neill had famously
cordial relations. ―Despite our disagreements in the House, we were always friends after six
o‗clock and on weekends,‖ O‘Neill later recalled.482 The friendship between Reagan and
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O‘Neill was mirrored within the House. ―Speaker Tip O‘Neill and President Reagan would
be competitive and partisan in their business dealings and cordial after hours,‖ said Rep. Don
Sundquist (R-TN), ―and the same was true for most of the rest of us. After the House
adjourned, everybody was decent to each other and could share a laugh.‖483 In fact, O‘Neill
and Republican Leader Bob Michel regularly played cards together.
Although partisanship certainly existed in the years before Newt Gingrich and the
Conservative Opportunity Society, the COS was the first to embrace it as the most effective
strategy to win a majority. In the early 1980s, the House Republicans had no identity as a
party, nothing that really brought them together and made them sacrifice personal influence
for party advancement. To Gingrich, only a stronger sense of unity would allow them to
build the momentum they needed to win control. Partisan tactics, he believed, would provide
the catalyst.
Events like Camscam, the disputed Indiana House seat, and Black Thursday
convinced Republicans that they would never gain the majority if they did not fight back
against what they saw as the despotism of the Democrats. They came to believe Gingrich‘s
credo, and elected Gingrich to their leadership.
The Democrats, for their part, deserve a fair share of the blame. Their penchant for
using closed rules in debate, their decision to respond to COS tactics with their own
inflammatory actions, and their willingness to take full advantage of the majority powers of
the House to suppress the minority all served to polarize the debate and drive Republicans
directly into Gingrich‘s hands. What resulted was a vicious circle of partisanship that has
spiraled into the situation that exists today.
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It would be remiss not to mention that Gingrich‘s motives weren‘t entirely altruistic.
He achieved a great deal of personal power because of the increased polarization of the
House. In his own words, he changed the system so much that he was the only man to lead it.
One of his fiercest Democratic critics, Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), a tough partisan himself,
once said, ―People who dislike the angry, virulent, you‘re-no-good tone of American politics
should understand Newt Gingrich has had more of a role in bringing that about that anybody
else because he was not only one of the earliest practitioners of it, he‘s the most successful
practitioner of it…Gingrich really decided that the way to get ahead was not to disagree with
the opposition, but to delegitimize it, to stigmatize it.‖ 484 ―Gingrich is the man who is
principally responsible for destroying civility in the House of Representatives,‖ reflected Rep.
David Obey (D-WI). ―He recruited and trained an entire generation of Republican leaders to
divide the public and attack Democrats.‖485
Gingrich‘s long reign of terrorizing the institution of the House paid off for him in the
end. Respected political observer Charles Cook said, ―In retrospect I firmly believe that the
institutional terrorism Gingrich waged against Speakers Tip O‘Neill, Jim Wright, and Tom
Foley was absolutely critical in his journey to become speaker…Whether you like or dislike
Gingrich, whether you agree or disagree with his contract, one thing‘s for certain: In a town
of overly cautious, timid politicians, he played for keeps, and he played to win. In the end, he
did.‖486
Increased use of partisan tactics and the polarization of the House was one of the
most effective ways for Republicans to win back the majority. When Clinton became
president, the Republicans‘ policy of torpedoing nearly all his major initiatives served their
political purposes by not allowing the Democrats to take credit for major legislation. In
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November, the voters understandably reacted against a president and a Congress they felt had
not kept their promises.
But from a broad-picture point of view, who lost by the Republican decision to
unconditionally oppose the Clinton agenda, for example? Would the American people have
been better served by a compromise bill that would have done something about health care in
America? The Republicans‘ decision to place electoral success over compromise perhaps
doomed a once in a lifetime change to reform the health care system.
This is where the problem with partisanship lies. It is a fantastic way to motivate
your party and build a majority, but it is a lousy way to govern. Policymaking takes a back
seat to positioning and reform cannot be realized. Increased amount of polarization in
Washington has led to more one-sided policymaking, more unwillingness to compromise,
and more gridlock that causes the critical problems faced by the nation to go unaddressed.

Campaigns and Elections
In the realm of campaigns and elections, the Republican campaign of 1994 brought
revolutionary change.

The key to the Republican success—the nationalization of the

election—was a strategy actively formulated and employed by the House Republican
leadership, and was one that ran counter to the conventional wisdom regarding congressional
elections.
As political scientist Gary Jacobson writes, ―Until 1994, Democrats were able to
maintain House majorities despite Republican dominance of presidential contests by
persuading electorates to use different criteria for making presidential choices than for
making congressional choices.‖ 487 House Democrats had been adept at forging local
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majority coalitions, but the diversity of the party did not allow these coalitions to be applied
to national elections. The opposite was true for the Republicans. In 1994, however, the
Republicans were able to wed the two, framing the campaign around a set of national choices
tailored to individual districts.
The Contract with America, signed by 367 House Republican candidates, was central
to keeping Republicans on message throughout the country. With a popular agenda of ten
issues, the Republicans were able to complement their attacks on the Clinton Administration
and successfully nationalize the election based on these proposals and Clinton‘s unpopularity.
The Contract was run on broad themes, not local issues, and when the Democrats began to
attack the Contract, they unwittingly guaranteed that the election would be conducted on the
Republicans‘ terms. The Contract was also revolutionary in the sense that the document
itself was unlike any prior political promise. Designed to harness the people‘s desire for
accountability, formulated by teams of members, and perfected by polls and focus groups,
the Contract was a new and ingenious type of campaign platform.
In years since, nationalization has become the norm in Congressional elections. As
Bill Clinton noted, ―The nationalization of midterm elections was Newt Gingrich‘s major
contribution to modern electioneering. From 1994 on, if one party did it and the other didn‘t,
the side without a national message would sustain unnecessary losses.‖ 488 In each of the
subsequent midterm elections—1998, 2002, and 2006—the nationalization strategy was
employed. 2006 was an especially notable year for the widespread Democratic use of
President George W. Bush as a proxy for Republican congressional candidates.

The

unpopularity of Bush proved to have the same effect as the unpopularity of Clinton in 1994,
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as the Democrats regained control of the House and Senate following the November 2006
elections.
The Contract with America, however, has not been copied as closely as the
nationalization strategy, neither as a campaign pledge nor as a governing document. Perhaps
the shadow cast by the success of the Contract has discouraged further attempts. Also,
accountability is no longer the trump issue that is was in the early 1990s.

Legislation
The House Republicans‘ ability to claim lasting influence through their legislative
accomplishments during the first 100 days is questionable. Although the ten Contract items
were all brought to a vote within the first 100 days and all passed except the term-limits
amendment, the bills ran into considerable slowing in the United States Senate.
Unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate was created by the founders to slow
the process of legislation and to mitigate the winds of passionate policymaking to which the
House was supposed to be responsive. This purpose was revealed in a famous anecdote, told
repeatedly in the Senate literature. Thomas Jefferson, who had not been in the United States
during the drafting of the Constitution, asked George Washington what led the future
president to accept the idea of a Senate. Washington responded, ―Why did you pour that
coffee into your saucer?‖ Jefferson answered, ―To cool it.‖ To which Washington replied,
―Even so, we put legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.‖489
The Senate slows legislation by design. Its rules provide for unlimited debate and
unlimited amendments. One senator may place an anonymous ―hold‖ on a bill to prevent it
from being discussed, a group of forty senators can filibuster a bill indefinitely to kill it, and
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the Senate majority leader enjoys nowhere near the House speaker‘s power in enforcing party
discipline, making party government much harder to implement and speed much harder to
induce. As a result, minority party rights are strongly protected in the Senate by virtue of
individual rights, and a committed group of minority members can slow legislation to a
snail‘s pace. Dole presaged these concerns on CBS‘s Face the Nation on January 1, 1995:
―What happens in the House may be a little different than in the Senate because we have
different rules and we can‘t push things as quickly as they can in the House.‖ 490 The
difficulty of enforcing party discipline was starkly put into perspective when Sen. Mark
Hatfield (R-OR) was the deciding vote that prevented the passage of the balanced budget
amendment.
The Senate‘s commitment to the Contract was also a factor in their slow
consideration of the Contract items. No senator, not even the Republicans, had committed to
the Contract; it was fundamentally a House document.

On one hand, some senators

embraced it. ―I think the American people see this as a Republican contract. And quite
frankly I see it as a Republican contract and I want to deliver on it even though technically no
member of the Senate ever signed this contract,‖ said Sen. Phil Gramm (R-TX).491 Yet other
members weren‘t as enthusiastic to push the Contract through. ―The Senate is not going to
be rolled over by what appears to be the unrestrained enthusiasm of that other house,‖ said
Sen. John Warner (R-VA).492 ―I don‘t think in any way that the people in America look on
the Senate as having made a contract with them,‖ declared Sen. John Chafee (R-RI)493.
By April 1995, as the House Republicans declared their Contract fulfilled, the Senate
had only passed three minor measures and the majority of the major bills like welfare reform
and the tax cut bill were facing stiff resistance. The White House and the Democrats were
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glad for such a slowing of legislation in the Senate; the fast pace of the House action during
the first 100 days gave Democrats no time to organize opposition to the bills. In fact, this
had been a strategy pursued by the Republicans to ensure quick and efficient passage. As
Gingrich advisor Tony Blankley said, ―The Democrats don‘t have a chance to organize a
national opposition to any issue because they‘re coming too fast…the constant rat-a-tat-tat of
our bills has put the Democrats in an extraordinarily difficult position where they can‘t
marshal public support for opposition to any of our bills.‖494 In the Senate, however, the
slow pace of legislation allowed opposition to form, and the fate of the bills languished there
for months.

Eventually, with several Republican senators running for president (Dole,

Gramm, Specter, Lugar), the competition for leadership on issues helped win support for
much of the Contract. Even the welfare reform bill passed with strong Democratic support
on an 87-12 vote.495
By the end of the 104th Congress, of the twenty-one bills, 95 percent passed the
House (all but term-limits), 62 percent passed both chambers, 38 percent became law, and 24
percent were vetoed by the president.

The most significant Republican victories were

welfare reform, the line-item veto, and the reduction of unfunded mandates. However, many
other major provisions including the crime bill and the tax cuts were not enacted.
Looking at the legislative record, it is clear that in terms of the numbers of bills
enacted into law, the 104th Congress was not especially active during its first year. By the
end of 1995, only eighty-eight bills became law, the fewest passed in one session since
1933.496 The Republicans‘ rhetoric about enacting vast change did not pan out immediately.
However, the Republicans‘ zeal and unity in continuing the legislative onslaught in
the House drove the government and shifted the terms of the political debate decidedly to the
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Noah Weiss, College ‘09

WEISS | 189

right. Rather than employ the same liberal principles that had dominated American political
discourse of the last half century, the Republicans came to Congress determined to redefine
the debate, and succeeded in doing so. Writing about the period several years later, political
journalist Elizabeth Drew said, ―There was to be a war of ideas. Fundamental questions
about the role of the federal government would be argued over. Assumptions of the past
thirty years—since Lyndon Johnson‘s administration, or even since Franklin Roosevelt‘s
New Deal—would be challenged. Budget and spending priorities would be reexamined.
The rationale for many programs would be questioned. The powers of the presidency would
be challenged on virtually all fronts. It was to be the greatest legislative onslaught on the
executive branch in modern history.‖497
Responding to the criticism that the 104th Congress was unproductive in its first
session, Rep. Tom DeLay asserted:
―The truth is that we were attempting historic change. We were not just
passing bills to pave a road or fund a new missile system. We were redefining
the way America is governed and making fundamental changes in systems
that had been erected over decades. It wasn‘t bound to be fast or easy, and we
knew we would probably disappoint the Washington pundits who always
seem to want immediate, statistically verifiable change to report in their
articles. Instead we moved the whole of American governance to the right,
and made changes that will shape our grandchildren‘s lives. We moved a
liberal president to the center…There is little doubt that our work in the 104th
Congress shaped American political history for decades to come.‖498
Thus, the quantitative record of bills passed is an improper metric. Instead, the
qualitative content of the bills changed. Welfare reform became a series of block grants, the
balanced budget amendment and the line-item veto put more emphasis on cutting spending to
balance the budget, and so on. Even Clinton pollster Dick Morris acknowledged the shift:
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―Now the issue was not whether but how to balance the budget, not whether to cut taxes but
which ones to cut and by how much.‖499
Oftentimes in politics the frame in which the debate occurs is more important that the
details of the debate itself, since it limits and constrains the arguments. By moving the
country rightward, the Republican House was able to ensure its principles were the starting
point for future policymaking.

Relationship between the President and the Congress and Clinton’s Reelection
The first 100 days of the 104th Congress were also notable for the changing
relationship between the president and the Congress. During that period, the House drove the
government, and President Clinton took a backseat in the eyes of the public and the press to
House Speaker Gingrich.

Although swings in the balance of power between the two

branches is a regular occurrence in American history, the first 100 days of the 104 th Congress
signified a time in which the president himself was rivaled for power and authority in
Washington, a situation that had not occurred in the twentieth century. In no place was this
clearer than in the television networks‘ decision to grant Gingrich time to address the nation
upon the completion of the Contract with America on April 7, 1995, the first non-president in
history to be granted such a request. The president was so irrelevant that Clinton felt the
need to assert that ―The president is relevant here‖ in a press conference on April 18.500
Although Clinton was later able to use the institutional advantages of the presidency
to regain the initiative and reassert control over the news cycle, the ability of Gingrich and
the House Republicans to steal the spotlight shows that bold and determined political will can
capture the public‘s attention.
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Paradoxically, Clinton greatly benefitted in the long run from the existence of a
Republican Congress. Unlike his first two years in office in which he abandoned nearly all
of his moderate proposals in favor of more ardent liberalism, the existence of a Republican
Congress pulled Clinton to the right. The Republicans‘ willingness to push welfare reform
and a balanced budget, for example, gave Clinton the ability to co-opt these popular
proposals and make them his own, a role that he played extremely well. His strategy was
embodied in the word ―triangulation.‖ As Dick Morris explained, ―Triangulate, create a third
position, not just in between the old positions of the two parties but above them as well.
Identify a new course that accommodates the needs the Republicans address but does it in a
way that is uniquely yours.‖501
Morris provided Clinton an example relating to the GOP tax cut proposal: ―The
Democrats say, ‗No tax cuts.‘ The Republicans say, ‗Tax cuts for everyone.‘ We say, ‗Tax
cuts if you are going to college or raising children or buying a first home or saving for
retirement.‘‖502 By following Morris‘ proposals and the lead of the GOP Congress, Clinton
was able to reposition himself once again as a New Democrat and win reelection in 1996.

Power of the Speaker of the House
The assumption of majority control by the Republicans in the 104th Congress also
signaled a new period in American history in which the speaker of the House took on a
stronger, more powerful role within the House of Representatives itself.

Prior to the

Gingrich speakership, Democratic House speakers were generally constrained by the strength
of the committee system in which each committee chairmen controlled a fiefdom of their
own power. Democratic speakers would never have dared to take on a committee chairman
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directly or bypass the seniority system, something Gingrich was able to do with impunity.
As former Speaker Tom Foley said, ―For a Democratic speaker to have done what speaker
Gingrich did would have drawn a lot of blood and created a lot of controversy. It would have
pitted the speaker not only against that individual committee chairman, but the chairmen in
general.‖503
Having been out of power for forty years, however, Gingrich was working in a
situation in which no Republican power bases existed. Additionally, Gingrich had the
prestige of a Moses-like figure, having led the Republicans to the promised land of the
majority after forty years of wandering in the desert. As a result, the power of the speaker
was enhanced, and Gingrich not only exerted extraordinary control over the committee
system but also bypassed in when necessary through the formation of the Speaker‘s Advisory
Panel and a series of task forces appointed by Gingrich to write key legislation under the
watchful eye of the party leadership.
In later years, the party leadership would continue to exert significant control over the
committee system, especially considering that the limiting of committee chairs‘ tenure has
prevented the formation of independent power bases. Although Gingrich‘s successor Dennis
Hastert (R-IL) was seen as a quieter figure, it was clear that the Republican leadership, and
not the committee chairs, controlled the House until the GOP lost control in 2006. Current
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) is most definitely in the Gingrich mold; she is a vocal,
headstrong, and powerful leader.
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Republicans in the 21st Century
―Every revolution begins with the power of an idea and ends when clinging to power
is the only idea left,‖ Time opined in October 2006, as the Republican Party was about to lose
its majority in the House of Representatives after twelve consecutive years of control. 504
―The Republican Party of 2006 is a tired, cranky shell of the aggressive, reformist movement
that was swept into office in 1994 on a wave of positive change,‖ said Frank Luntz. ―I
worked for them.

They were friends of mine.

These Republicans are not those

Republicans.‖505
By 2006, the revolutionary zeal of the Republican Party had long since petered out,
and the party had come to act just like the Democrats had over their long tenure in control.
After George W. Bush became president in 2001, the Republicans adopted high spending
habits and had little regard for the values that brought them to control in 1994. For their
revolutionary talk about cutting entire departments and revamping the federal budget, the
Republicans ―made only slight and temporary progress in slowing government growth,‖
according to Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute.506
The budget surpluses of the late 1990s, which the Republicans had fought hard to
achieve, were turned into deficits within several years. Though the recession in the last year
of Clinton‘s presidency had a significant impact in creating the deficit, the Bush
Administration along with Republicans in Congress did nothing to slow the growth of budget
deficits and indeed continued spending. Between fiscal years 2001 and 2005, in fact, federal
spending increased 28 percent and nondefense discretionary spending increased 34
percent.507
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The Revolution also petered out in the realm of health care. Whereas in 1995 the
Republicans wanted to overhaul the system, convert Medicaid into block grants, and reduce
the government‘s health spending, in 2003 the GOP Congress enacted a Medicare
prescription drug benefit that ―added nearly $17 trillion to Medicare‘s unfunded liability of
$45 trillion.‖508 Even more surprising was the Republicans‘ willingness to use the same
tactics they decried Democrats for using in the 1980s. In order to get the bill through the
House of Representatives, Speaker Hastert, in a move that recalled Jim Wright on Black
Thursday, held the vote open for over three hours until enough votes had been secured to win
passage.509
Just as the voters had acted against the Democrats in 1994, they voted the
Republicans out in 2006.
***************
Thus, the Republican Party between 1980 and 1995 brought revolutionary change to
some aspects of Washington and confirmed the status quo of partisan politics in others.
Despite the mixed legacy, it is clear that the direction of the country shifted to the right, and
the debates of the 1990s and 200s were fought on distinctly Republican terms. ―If you look
at where Congress was headed,‖ recalled Kerry Knott, ―we were able to head that off and
shift in a completely different direction.‖510
The return of Republicans to the majority after forty years out of power is by itself
clearly noteworthy, if not revolutionary. It ended a Democratic monopoly on the House that
had been virtually unbroken since 1930.

Through depressions, wars, and Republican

presidents, the ―Berlin Wall of American politics‖—Democratic control of the House of
Representatives—did not fall until 1994.
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In terms of lasting significance, the Republicans revamped the Congress, forcing it to
live under its own laws and limited the power and terms of its committee chairs, a reform that
the Democrats kept when they regained the majority. The powers of the speaker were
enhanced as the Congress shifted to a more centralized structure.

The method of

electioneering was forever changed, as nationalization of congressional elections is now the
norm.
Interestingly, though many of my interview subjects considered the era to be a
revolution, they wish that it wasn‘t labeled as such. ―There‘s no question in my mind that I
was a part of a revolution,‖ Bill Paxon told me, ―but I wish we didn‘t call it that. When you
start calling something a revolution, you scare people.‖511 The shutdowns of 1995 and 1996
made these fears a reality and turned much of the public off to further talk of revolutionary
change.
Whatever the era was called—whether a revolution or not—the Republicans had an
opportunity to make enormous change. They were unified, they faced a weak president, and
they had the backing of the public. But they went too far too fast; in their zeal they did not
understand that the American people prefer to move slowly and deliberately. Radical change
can occur, but step-by-step, something the GOP did not fully understand or appreciate.
―Everyone thought, ‗We‘re going to do what Reagan couldn‘t do.‘ That was the
philosophy,‖ recalled Frank Luntz, lamenting the Republicans‘ squandered chance to make
further change. ―In the end, what they applied was hubris. They could have done so much
more if they had been so much more careful.‖
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